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This thesis sets out to treat Adam Smith’s work as a whole, showing how his two books, The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, both are part of one underlying message rather than 
opposed to each other. A comprehensive introduction to Smith’s moral philosophy and his remarks 
on political economy will not only explain his central ideas and put them into context with each 
other,  it  will  also  illustrate  how  his  thought  evolved  and  was  inspired  by  predecessors  and 
contemporaries. Moreover, the alleged Das Adam Smith Problem, holding a contradiction within 
Smith’s work, will briefly be outlined and put into its historical context. It will be examined, how it 
came into existence and why it seems, both historically and contentual, untenable. On this basis, 
this thesis will claim that Smith’s thoughts build one academic project and are connected by a red 
thread, which is present in both of his books at all time.
———
Diese Masterarbeit behandelt Adam Smith’s Werk als Ganzes und zeigt, wie seine zwei Bücher, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments und The Wealth of Nations, anstatt sich zu widersprechen, beide Teil 
einer einzigen Botschaft sind. Eine umfassende Einführung in Smith’s Moralphilosophie und seine 
Ausführungen  zu  Politischer  Ökonomie  wird  nicht  nur  seine  zentralen  Ideen  erläutern  und 
miteinander  in  einen  Zusammenhang  bringen,  sondern  auch  veranschaulichen,  wie  sich  sein 
Denken entwickelte und von Vorgängern und Zeitgenossen inspiriert wurde. Darüber hinaus wird 
das  angebliche  Adam Smith  Problem,  welches  einen  Widerspruch  in  Smith’s  Werk  sieht,  kurz 
umrissen und in seinen historischen Kontext eingeordnet. Dabei wird gezeigt, wie diese Auffassung 
entstanden ist und warum sie historisch und inhaltlich unhaltbar scheint. Auf Basis dessen wird 
diese  Masterarbeit  vertreten,  dass  Smith’s  Gedanken  zu  einem  akademischen  Projekt 
zusammenführen und durch einen roten Faden verbunden sind, der in beiden Büchern Smith’s zu 
jeder Zeit präsent ist.
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Adam  Smith  became  known  as  the  inventor  of  modern  economics  and,  as  a  result,  the  real 
foundation of  his  thoughts  became temporarily neglected.  This  was further  encouraged by Das 
Adam Smith Problem in the late nineteenth century, suggesting a contradiction between Smith’s two 
works. However, rather than concentrating on The Wealth of Nations (WN), one should study his 
first book on moral philosophy, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), and set it into context with 
his later findings in order to understand the basis for his ideas and the foundation for his thinking. 
This is precisely what this thesis endeavours to undertake. Its purpose is to uncover the overall 
message, which Smith conveys through both of his books, and to show how it is present like a red 
thread throughout his works. It will be argued that, throughout Smith’s academic career, his ideas 
and  writings  can  be  condensed  to  the  thought  that  every  individual’s  self-interest  includes  the 
interests of other members of society and, in turn, the public good itself. Smith’s project in the TMS 
is to describe how we, as moral agents, interact with each other and, in extension, are able to form 
and maintain meaningful relationships. Thereby, he puts into words nothing less than the nature of 
practical morality. “Smith sets out to explain the principles humans actually, as a matter of fact, use 
in  making  moral  judgments”  (Sayre-McCord  2009,  p.  2).  The  basis  for  his  moral  philosophy, 
Smith’s unique understanding of sympathy, will be defined from the conventional usage in chapter 
II. Hereby, its twofold nature, combining in itself the motivation and ability to engage in social 
exchange, will be exemplified. After dealing with the nature of the Smithian notion of sympathy, 
this thesis will explain in chapter III how from sympathy, Smith develops the figurative character of 
the Impartial Spectator. Illustrating its nature and the way it is formed in us, it is spelled out how the 
Impartial Spectator serves as ideal judge in Smith’s moral philosophy. Thereafter, the fourth chapter 
will briefly summarise Smith’s second work, highlighting its major motives. This thesis will also 
show, how Smith’s thinking developed over decades,  being primarily influenced by his  teacher 
Francis Hutcheson and his friend David Hume. Finally, chapter V will deal with Das Adam Smith 
Problem, showing its historic development as well as its flaws and shortcomings. Additionally, it 
will be explained how, throughout Smith’s work, the mentioned red thread is present, connecting his 
writings to one overall academic project.
II. Smithian Sympathy
Smith’s moral philosophy depends to a large part on his unique understanding of sympathy and 
makes this notion the cornerstone of his entire findings. He develops this distinct notion in his first 
major work, the TMS, and the whole subsequent idea of morality and human interaction, which he 
develops in the course of this book, is built on his term of sympathy. Indeed, without sympathy, 
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especially his unique take on it, Smith seems to be unable to see any form of human contact as all of 
people’s  behaviour  is,  so  Smith,  based  on  and  incentivised  by  the  underlying  capability  and 
motivation to feel sympathetically with our fellow human beings. Consequently, he assigns to his 
understanding of sympathy an essential role in two respects. Not only does it serve as a condition 
for any human interaction by enabling people to approach others adequately to their intentions and 
interpret the behaviour of others when being approached themselves, it at the same time provides 
the motivation for doing so by making human behaviour and appropriate conduct impossible to 
understand without the agents engaging in sympathy. In addition to that, sympathy, in Smith’s moral 
philosophy, marks the foundation of self-reflection as well as it enables an understanding of two 
moral  agents.  This  makes  it  also  the  basis  for  another  Smithian  notion,  that  of  the  Impartial 
Spectator,  which will  be explained later.  Smith’s notion of sympathy being distinct results in it 
differing from the understandings of his contemporaries. Most prominently, Francis Hutcheson’s 
and David Hume’s view of the notion of “sympathy” vary, at times drastically, from that of Smith. 
As his teacher at Glasgow University in the case of Francis Hutcheson and his close, life-long 
friend  in  that  of  David  Hume,  they  both  undoubtedly  influenced  Smith  immensely  as  he  was 
developing his moral philosophy. However, or perhaps resulting from that, Smith’s conclusions, 
although  built  on  their  findings,  differ  significantly  from  both  of  them.  In  the  following,  the 
distinctness of Smith’s notion of sympathy to the common usage of the term will shortly be pointed 
out. Hereafter, sympathy will be explained in more detail, showing its meaning as an essential part 
of Smithian moral philosophy. By suggesting two major functions that sympathy serves in Smith’s 
moral philosophy, namely the motivation to interact with one another and the capability to do so, it 
will  also be shown how the concept of sympathy acquires its standing at the centre of Smith’s 
understanding of morality. Following that, Smith’s concept of sympathy will be put into contrast to 
the ones of Hutcheson and Hume. This is to illustrate the presuppositions Smith was influenced by 
when developing his own interpretation of the notion. Also, it is to clarify how, while contributing 
immensely to Smith’s usage of the term sympathy, the accounts of Hutcheson and Hume differ 
significantly from Smith’s.  At the end of this  chapter,  the concept of  sympathy as the basis  of 
Smithian moral philosophy should have been made clear in both its essence and on which basis it 
was developed.
Smith understands and uses the term sympathy as a part of his moral theory. However, by reading 
his TMS, it quickly becomes clear that “Smith does not use the term sympathy in the narrow sense 
of positive affinity, compassion or pity as we do today” (Freiin von Villiez 2011, p. 67). Although 
he occasionally falls back to the common usage of the word, failing to sufficiently appreciate his 
unique  take  on  it  leads  to  a  lesser,  if  not  entirely  warped,  understanding  of  Smith’s  moral 
philosophy. “‘Sympathy’ is therefore to be understood as a technical term” and “misunderstandings 
can, and do, arise when his particular account of it is ignored” (Broadie 2006, p. 164). Sympathy 
commonly  refers  to  compassion  or  pity  towards  a  person  in  discomfort  or  pain.  It  is  almost 
exclusively meant as a positive, supportive response to people in need of affirmation. Smith sees 
sympathy as a more complex and more universal faculty.  “In its narrow sense, sympathy is an 
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emotion (that of compassion); in its broader Smithian sense, it is also the means through which 
emotions are conveyed” (Griswold 2006, p. 25). This seems to underline the more general approach 
Smith takes. The wider character of sympathy becomes particularly apparent when Smith goes on to 
explain that two agents are capable of sympathising with each other regardless of what type of 
emotion has been displayed. The kind of feeling that a person shares with another does not seem to 
matter. “Any human emotion can be transposed into the sympathetic mode, so that there can be 
sympathetic joy or pain, sympathetic gratitude, etc., just as there can be sympathetic resentment, 
etc.” (Freiin von Villiez 2011, p. 67). This, in extension, leads to a much more universal character of 
sympathy and allows us to engage with and understand others in a much more refined way. It also 
enables more fitting responses to emotions displayed. “The realisation that something makes our 
fellows  miserable  makes  us  miserable  and  when  something  makes  them  happy,  we  are 
happy”  (Coase  1976,  p.  4).  Smith  explains  that  himself  fairly  early  in  his  TMS.  “Pity  and 
compassion  are  words  appropriated  to  signify  our  fellow-feeling  with  the  sorrow  of  others. 
Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much 
impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever” (Smith 1759, 
I, i, 1.5). For Smith, the sharing of feelings itself becomes the most crucial aspect of sympathy and 
the particular feeling becomes a replaceable component. “He is using the term, as its etymology 
allows,  to mean the sharing of any kind of feeling” (Raphael  2009,  p.  12).  Consequently,  “the 
spectator’s anger would count as sympathy qua fellow-feeling with the agent’s anger” (Broadie 
2006, p. 164) in any given situation. Sympathy, in the Smithian sense, can also be described as a 
social capability. It is one, so Smith, which is allowing for people to live together and to step into 
contact with each other by being “a capacity for being immediately affected and moved by the 
feelings of others” (Freiin von Villiez 2011, p. 66). Providing a way of understanding our opposite, 
it  enables  us  to  form an  informed  opinion  about  another’s  behaviour  and  respond  to  it  in  an 
appropriate fashion. “Sympathy for Smith was an ordinary social practice through which people in 
shared spaces produce morality together without the artifice of coercion, philosophy, religion, or 
formal education” (Forman-Barzilai 2005, p. 192). Put differently, by practicing sympathy, people 
get to understand the meaning of another’s action and can put themselves into a position which 
enables  them to  find a  proper  response in  any given situation without  the  help  of  any sort  of 
facilitator. As a result, “sympathy for Smith was not a principle of benevolence. It was rather a 
mechanism  for  moral  judgement  that  allowed  the  agent  to  judge  the  appropriateness  of  all 
behaviour” (Mehta 2006, p. 246). In a way, sympathy thereby serves as a universal interpreter for 
different languages of morality which is inherent to all human beings and thereby an activity to 
overcome individual biases. 
The key to utilising this interpretative capability is, so Smith, the faculty of imagination. It is not 
possible for us to come to a conclusion on the feelings of a person for the very nature of them is not 
objective and can only be experienced directly. We are not able to sympathise based on reason 
because we can never adequately grasp the emotion of another person through rationality. “Smith’s 
model of fellow-feeling posited that humans can empathize with the passions of others. This trait is 
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not a faculty of rationality but of imagination” (Wight 2007, p. 344). Smith emphasises the pivotal 
role imagination plays in his understanding of sympathy. “By imagination we place ourselves in his 
[another person’s] situation (…) we become in some measure the same person with him, and hence 
form some idea of his sensation” (Smith 1759, I, i, 1.2). Because we connect to another person 
through our own feelings, rationality cannot bring us to understand the emotion of our fellow. “We 
judge of our neighbour’s feelings by our own; we put ourselves in his place, not by our senses, for 
they cannot give one man another’s feelings, but by our imagination” (Bonar 1926, p. 336). As a 
result,  we become capable of  picturing the situation of  another person and of forming an own 
attitude towards it. Without that capability, we would be unable to understand other’s reactions in 
relation  to  particular  situations  as  “our  senses  will  never  carry  us  beyond  our  own 
situation” (Griswold 2006, p. 25). This process is not implying or aimed at a ‘re-feeling’ of the 
exact feelings and an experiencing of the same sensations as the other person. If he had composed 
sympathy  that  way,  Smith  would  have  ignored  the  possibility  of  different  opinions  or  even 
judgements  about  a  certain  behaviour  because  every  situation  would  have  one  specific  feeling 
attached to it. Contrary to that, it is giving us the opportunity to see the bigger picture of a situation 
rather than zooming in to re-experiencing every particular feeling. “Imagination is narrative, not 
just representational” as it “draws things into a coherent story whenever possible” (ibid., p. 23). 
That makes the essence of what Smithian sympathy is about. It  is providing the opportunity to 
become aware of and, in turn, appreciate other agent’s individual biases and convictions. This is 
also  where  it  draws  its  normativity  from.  Understanding  of  other  people’s  attitudes  towards 
situations enables to a more refined moral judgement. As a result, Smith’s sympathy has a much 
more individual character than its counterpart in conventional use. Rather than resembling another 
person’s behaviour and attitudes in great detail, “we enter imaginatively into the situation of another 
(or ourselves, as the case may be), and we see whether we are disposed to share those feelings or 
not” (del Mar 2012, p. 244). The imagination is focussed on making a person understand a situation 
another person is in as it “makes possible a complex ‘change of places’ and enables [us] to grasp the 
situation and sentiments of an actor” (Griswold 2006, p. 23). It is directed towards the particular 
circumstances rather than the other’s particular feelings themselves. Experiencing the exact same 
and thereby literally ‘bringing home’ another’s feelings and sensations would not serve the purpose 
of becoming sensitive for the proper reaction to them because we would be in the exact  same 
mental state, having the same attitudes, feelings, opinions, prejudices, et cetera. We would react in 
the same way as the other person already does. That is because by perceiving the exact same, we 
would as well adopt the other’s individual biases and be influenced by the other’s opinions towards 
the circumstances he or  she is  in  and eventually act  in  the exact  same way.  “The only way a 
spectator can generate fellow feeling for the agent, according to Smith, is imaginatively to project 
herself  into  the  agent’s  world  and  to  ask  herself  whether,  were  she  the  agent,  she  would  be 
motivated by his circumstances to feel and act as he does” (Forman-Barzilai 2005, p. 192). Thus 
Smith puts the emphasis on the situation another finds himself in and allows for our own feelings 
and attitudes to develop in it. “We try to reproduce for ourselves [the other’s] situation, that we may 
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fancy how we should feel in his place” (Bonar 1926, p. 336). By seeing it this way, Smith enables 
us  dive  into  “their  world,  their  motivations,  and  to  the  circumstances  to  which  they  are 
responding” (Griswold 2006, p. 26, emphasis added). Focussing on that becomes crucial as it not 
only provides Smith’s conception on human interaction with flexibility, it also “is essential to his 
moral theory. Doing so provides his moral philosophy with a normative component as Smith “also 
prescribes the conditions for appropriate moral practice” (Freiin von Villiez 2011, p. 65). We can 
therefore set our own feelings, which we would have in the imagined situation, against the ones 
expressed by another person. Based on the results of that comparison, we come to an evaluation of 
the other’s reaction to the situation he or she is in. “As we have no immediate experience of what 
other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving 
what we ourselves should feel in the like situation” (Smith 1759, I, i, 1.2). As a result of that, we 
either appreciate the other’s reaction to his or her condition as appropriate and sympathise with it or 
we reject  the feelings demonstrated as  an exaggeration or  understatement  of  what  we came to 
believe was appropriate when we imagined us being in the same situation. “Because of her natural 
sympathy a person can share other people’s feelings,  and she will  do so if  she considers these 
feelings as a proper response to the given circumstances” (Fricke 2014, p. 350). This is, in turn, the 
footing of our own reaction to the behaviour of other people displaying emotions with their actions. 
“The compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he himself 
would feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situations” (Smith 1759, I, i, 1.10). Apart from 
compassion,  other  reactions  to  the  imagination  of  the  feelings  of  another  person  range  from 
sympathetic resentment to sympathetic love and all the way to sympathetic disgust. Sympathy in the 
Smithian sense is therefore not only a process of understanding others through picturing ourselves 
in the particular situation they are in, it is also evaluative on the basis of the imagined feelings. Put 
differently, focussing on the imagination of ourselves in another one’s situation is the only way for 
us to experience genuine feelings and a genuine understanding of the other’s sensations. For Smith, 
all the feelings we feel as a response to seeing the display of other agent’s feelings are our own 
feelings and are only made possible by the very process of sympathy. “Sympathy, in turn, forms the 
basis for moral judgements since our inability to sympathise with someone equals disapproval of 
their  sentiments”  (Sivertsen  2017,  p.  103).  Subsequently,  sympathy  serves  as  a  basis  for  the 
formation of normative conclusions. However, to this end, it is again essential that we do not feel in 
the same way as the person whose behaviour we observe at least not initially. Our forming of moral 
beliefs and moral evaluations which, in turn, lead us to figure out our own attitudes towards what is 
a proper response in any given situation, seems to rely on the uniqueness and authenticity of our 
emotions. “We do not, says Smith, have any direct experience of what other men feel but we form 
an idea of what they feel by placing ourselves, through an act of imagination, in the situation of the 
other” (Nieli 1986, p. 617). In other words, the differing of our feelings from the ones of our fellow 
moral  agent  seems to  be  a  necessary condition for  an original  evaluation of  our  own and our 
fellow’s feelings towards a certain situation. This reciprocity of emotions therefore seems essential 
for  sympathy  in  Smith’s  sense  for  without  it,  an  actual  alignment  of  feelings  seems  close  to 
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impossible. “In the course of acting and reacting, the participants in this affective communication 
about the propriety of feelings […] adjust their feelings” until they “approach a common verdict on 
proper feelings”. We can rely on the resulting judgement proportional to how well the behaviour 
and the attitudes of the other matches with what we imagine behaving or feeling when put into the 
same  situation  ourselves.  “The  closer  the  correspondences  of  feelings,  the  more  correct  the 
verdict”  (Freiin  von  Villiez  2011,  p.  68).  As  sympathy  seems  to  serve  as  a  tool  to  gradually 
determine the proper  behaviour  in  any given situation,  lacking the opportunity to  compare our 
virtual reactions and feelings towards a particular situation with the ones which others experience 
would thus be devastating to the normative function it seems to have for Smith. However, the very 
process  of  comparing  as  an  “ongoing  process  of  adjustment,  a  continuous  search  for 
equilibrium” (Griswold 2006, p. 35) is aimed towards a more and more comprehensive correlation 
of our feelings with those of others. Once we reached that state with someone, we can be said to 
fully sympathise with him or her. “Sympathy is thus not just a way of sharing feelings with others; 
it also opens a gap between their feelings and ours” (Fleischacker 2017, Ch. 3). The aim is, so 
Smith, to close this discrepancy and to reach an identity between our own feeling towards some 
particular circumstances and that of the other person. “It is primarily this interaction which Smith 
has in mind when he talks about sympathy, although he uses the term indiscriminately to describe 
the very act of sympathizing as well as the intended outcome of sympathetic interaction” (Freiin 
von Villiez 2011, p. 68). Once our feelings correlate with the ones of our fellow, so Smith, we rate 
the feelings they have as approvable and appropriate to the situation. “Nothing pleases us more than 
to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast” (Smith 1759, I, i, 
2.1). Put differently, reaching a stage of mutual sympathy with our opposite moral agent is our 
ultimate  goal  when  imagining  another’s  situation  and  us  in  it.  We  want  to  be  on  the  same 
wavelength with our fellows. It is important to point out that this adjustment process is not aimed at 
alter our understanding of what is proper. We are not manipulating our own feelings in order to 
sympathise, neither do we accept as adequate improper passions in others because we desperately 
desire to sympathise with them. Rather than that, we gradually understand the impropriety of our 
own attitudes  and  tame  them.  “Sympathy  was  not  meant  to  encourage  or  legitimize  emotions 
involved in distress or happiness. Its purpose was to temper them” (Teichgraeber 1981, p. 117). 
Setting  the  focus  of  sympathy  on  situations  of  others  and  so  to  speak  detaching  it  from their 
individual feelings also opens the door for sympathising with beings we normally would not assign 
feelings to. The mere existence of cases, in which we sympathise with ‘feelingless’ beings, seems to 
validate the focussing of imagination on the situation rather than the particular feelings of the other. 
Smith himself calls these cases “illusion of imagination”. One example of this are cases of insanity. 
We, as observers, here consider “how [we ourselves] would feel if [we] were reduced to the same 
unhappy situation” (Smith 1759, I, i, 1.13; 1.11). That is the only way for us to sympathise with the 
other because the person without reason is, “on the contrary, happy, being blissfully unaware of the 
tragedy that has befallen him” (Broadie 2006, p. 167). As a second example, Smith holds that the 
dead seem to be an object of our sympathy as well. Although they arguably do not have any feelings 
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we could share anymore, Smith describes in great detail how we feel the misery of “being deprived 
of the sun; to be shut out from life and conversation; to be laid in a cold grave, a prey to corruption 
and the reptiles of the earth” (Smith 1759, I, i, 1.13). Here, we again feel sympathetic feelings as an 
observer of an agent that “are plainly not matched by the agent’s own feelings” (Broadie 2006, p. 
168).  This  is  only possible  through Smith’s  focus on the situation of  a  dead corps  rather  than 
depending on “re-feeling” the feelings of the object. The result of imagining the situation in this 
particular case is crucial to human life though. Imagining the circumstances the dead are in and 
bringing home their feelings, that is imagining what we would feel put in a like situation, equips us 
with the fear of death which seems to serve us significantly in surviving. As Smith puts it, “the 
dread of death, the great poison to the happiness, (…) which, while it afflicts and mortifies the 
individual, guards and protects the society” (Smith 1759, I, i, 1.13). For purposes of completeness, 
it has to be added that notwithstanding the central role imagination plays in Smith’s understanding 
of  sympathy,  he  also  sees  cases  in  which  sympathy  is  “entirely  spontaneous  and  are  not 
accompanied by the exercise of imagination” (Raphael 2009, p. 13). Smith indeed mentions that 
”grief and joy, for example, strongly expressed in the look and gestures of any one, at once affect 
the spectator with some degree of a like painful or agreeable emotion” (Smith 1759, I,  i,  1.6). 
Nevertheless, imagination is in the vast majority of cases “a prerequisite for sympathy” and “an 
explicit  exercise  of  the  imagination  is  certainly  part  of  Smith’s  account  of  moral 
judgement” (Raphael 2009, p. 13).
According to Smith, people want to approve of other’s feelings and attitudes and seek approval of 
their own. However, in order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to actively aligning our feelings of 
sympathy to the level of the other person in a gradual process. “Smith sees sympathy as building an 
aspiration to make one’s sentiments harmonize with the sentiments of others into those sentiments 
themselves”. This process serves as ongoing reflection on our own feelings towards other members 
of society, or their attitudes and behaviour in certain situations. Consequently, the result of it serves 
as a guideline to adjust our own feelings of sympathy to an appropriate level. While some feelings 
are appropriate in a given situation, others are not, so “the search for feelings we can share—for 
mutual  sympathy—is  a  basic  human  drive,  and  it  leads  among  other  things  to  the  rise  of 
morality” (Fleischacker  2017,  Chs.  3,  4).  Throughout  this  alignment  process,  humans therefore 
constantly build and modify their own moral beliefs which are underlying any of their interactions 
with other people. Thus, mutual agreement seems to be the ultimate goal of human interaction, for a 
person feels the greatest approval when he finds his own attitude in accordance with that of his 
opposite. “[Sympathy] is, after all, the compound desire of understanding others and having others 
understand us” (Sivertsen 2017, p. 103). Moreover, feeling the approval of others not only serves to 
the purpose of showing us the morally right behaviour in any given situation, it is also an end in 
itself as it seems to have a calming effect on us. In seeing our actions approved of by others, we 
“derive pleasure from the observation of the agreement of [our] feelings with those of the [other], 
the pleasure is the pleasure of relief”. The relieving character of this pleasure comes from it serving 
as “validating [our] own position and reinforcing [our] judgement” (Broadie 2006, p. 172). The 
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interdependence of human contact is therefore essential for self-reflection. Smith sees this aspect 
when he writes that “we are anxious about our own beauty and deformity, only upon account of its 
effect upon others. If we had no connexion with society, we should be altogether indifferent about 
either” (Smith 1759, III, 1.4). Accordingly, moral thought in general is relying on imagining how 
we would feel in other’s situations and eventually sympathising with them. Sympathising means 
morally aligning our feelings and attitudes with others in order to bring home their  feelings to 
ourselves and enabling them to bring our own feelings home to them respectively. “By a method of 
trial and error, we seek to anticipate the limits of the willingness of others to go along with our self-
interest” and thereby we gradually come to understand the difference “between self-interest and 
other-interestedness” (Freiin von Villiez 2011, p. 70). So it is a gradual process that lasts “until the 
judgement  and  consequent  feelings  are  in  line  with  each  other”  (Broadie  2006,  p.  176)  and 
eventually can lead us to us fully sympathise with another person. In addition to that, the ability to 
sympathise  is  constituting  “our  capacity  to  approve  (or  disapprove)  of  actions,  motives,  and 
characters  as  moral  or  not”  (Sayre-McCord  2014,  p.  2)  and  seems  to  be  necessary  to  form a 
normative moral judgement in the first place. Our opinion of someone seems tightly connected to 
whether or not we can sympathise with that person. “When we approve of the actions or emotions 
of another we do so because we perceive that we fully sympathize with his sentiments” (Morrow 
1927, p.  338).  It  follows for Smith that not only our ability to judge a person morally but our 
understanding of morality as a whole depends on and cannot exist without sympathy for “if that 
capacity for sympathy were entirely absent, so too would be moral thought and practice” (Sayre-
McCord 2014, p. 2). This significance comes not only from its explanatory value, sympathy also 
plays a vital role in determining the very process of coming to a moral conclusion and forming 
everyday decisions. Smith “thus uses the concept of sympathy not only as a mere description of 
moral practices, but also for the construction of a normative procedure that accounts for criteria of 
rational judgement and that can, thus, serve as a touchstone for everyday moral judgements. For 
Smith,  sympathy  plays  an  important  role  in  the  justification  of  moral  judgements”  (Freiin  von 
Villiez 2005, p. 68, transl. S. Z.). It enables us to become aware of our moral opinions, sympathy 
can therefore be seen as our capability of morality.
Again, it becomes clear that sympathy as an ability mainly relies on the component of imagination. 
The further our capacity for imagination is developed, the better we can estimate another’s situation 
and picture us in it to experience our own feelings towards it. Sympathy is “the capacity which we 
have of entering into the situation of another and experiencing an emotion similar to what we would 
feel  if  in  his  situation”  (Morrow  1927,  p.  337).  Consequently,  imagination  is  essential  to 
sympathising and enables us to use sympathy as a capability on the way to form normative moral 
judgements about others and ourselves. But being able to imagine another’s situation provides us 
not only with an indication of how we would have felt or behaved ourselves in those circumstances. 
It can also make us realise how we would react to our own conduct if we were confronted with it 
ourselves by another person as “our understanding and moral assessment not just of others, but of 
ourselves as well, depend on an exercise of the imagination” (Griswold 2006, p. 38). Sympathy so 
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to  speak  provides  us  with  an  opportunity  to  see  ourselves  as  the  other  person,  coming  to  a 
judgement about our own behaviour and attitudes towards certain circumstances like we are used to 
judge other people. That opportunity only arises in interaction with other people in a society of 
sorts. “Smith shows the necessity of others not only for the moral development of the individual but 
also of self-consciousness itself” (Urquhart 2016, p. 341). Without constant interaction with other 
moral agents, we therefore simply do not learn how to do so.  As Smith points out, a person cannot 
think of his own character “without any communication with his own species (…) but bring him 
into society and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before” (Smith 1759, 
III, 1.3). We need community to become moral agents. “One only learns to see oneself as a person 
and as a member of a moral universe of agents through sympathy with others’ view of one’s identity 
and situation in the world” (Haakonssen 2006, p. 13). It is worth noting that Smith, by embedding 
the individual  in  society like that,  acknowledges the need for  an equal  status  of  moral  agents. 
Without this equality, we cannot sympathise with each other for we cannot understand each other’s 
perspective adequately if we lack a basic likeness. “Only people who respect each other as equals 
can provide each other with the ‘mirrors’ which allow them to understand the impression they make 
on others” (Fricke 2014, p. 353). In addition to that, sympathy enables us to imagine our reactions 
to the behaviour in question before we engage in it and, depending on our attitudes towards it, alter 
and adjust our planned actions to ones we find more agreeable. As a result, as Smith points out, 
sympathy is  not  only directed towards others  but  can also serve as  an important  tool  for  self-
reflection. Seen in that sense, sympathising has a rewarding effect on us for it indicates that we are 
behaving in a favourable and proper way. “There is a distinct pleasure when our own sentiments 
accord  with  those  of  our  fellows.  Nothing  pleases  us  more  than  to  observe  in  other  men  a 
sympathetic echo of our own emotions; and nothing chagrins us more than an appearance of the 
contrary” (Morrow 1927, p. 338). Smith states that “we either approve or disapprove of our own 
conduct, according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another man (…), we 
either can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathize with the sentiments and motives which 
influenced it” (Smith 1759, III, 1.2). 
The motivational character of sympathy seems to show itself in, firstly, our potential to get along 
well with other people and, secondly, the prospect of self-reflection and self-realisation. The first is 
inherent to sympathising itself as engaging in the process of aligning our feelings with the ones of 
others is aimed at mutual sympathy. Sympathising is precisely what we are after when we engage 
with others. Consequently, we are highly incentivised to put effort into the process and, in turn, get 
along with them as well as possible. “Because of fellow-feeling, humans have a strong desire for the 
social  acceptance  that  comes from pleasing others”  (Wight  2007,  p.  344).  Smith  seems to  see 
individual humans as having a desire for a state of perfect sympathy with the people they interact 
with. The reason for this is that we can approve of other’s behaviour and attitudes only if they 
resemble our own. The opposite state, being on completely different pages in a particular situation, 
terrifies us as “a man is mortified when, after having endeavoured to divert the company, he looks 
round and sees that nobody laughs at his jests but himself” (Smith 1759, I, i, 2.1). Therefore, we 
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take effort to adjust our feelings and attitudes to those of other people as they go through a similar 
procedure with their own feelings. At the final stage of this alignment process, we aim to have 
reached a harmony between our feelings and those of our fellow humans. We desire this harmony 
precisely because we long to approve of and agree with other people and their feelings and reactions 
in particular situations. “When one’s own passions are in alignment with the passions of others, one 
experiences pleasure; when they are not, one experiences pain”. It seems to come down to the wish 
that we do not want to feel alone with our attitudes. Sympathising therefore not only confirms to us 
the propriety of what we are feeling, it  also gives us a feeling of being integrated into society. 
“Nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our 
own breast” (Wight 2007, p. 344). Thereby, it is worth noting that sympathy and approval are still 
two separate concepts. Although Smith states that “to approve of the passions of another (…) is the 
same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with them”, in the very next paragraph he goes 
on to say that “to approve (…) is acknowledged, by every body, to mean no more than to observe 
their agreement or disagreement with our own” (Smith 1759, I, i, 3.1; 3.2). Rather than expressing 
the same concept, Smith is therefore likely to see sympathy and approval as following on each other 
in a positive feedback loop of sorts. “The identity view is in any event far-fetched, while the casual 
connection view seems a reasonable account of the psychological explanation that Smith has in 
mind” (Raphael 2009, p. 18). In addition to that, sympathy in the Smithian sense seems to serve the 
even more general task of providing a basis for moral evaluation. “We cannot get to the stage of 
either approving or disapproving of a standpoint until we see that it is a standpoint”. It therefore 
seems to be “preparatory for any assessment of people” (Haakonssen 2006, p. 11) and as such an 
essential component of our ability to build and maintain meaningful and rewarding relationships. 
The  second  side  of  sympathy  as  motivation  is  directed  towards  ourselves  and  a  thorough 
understanding of our individual morality. The morally right or proper action in the Smithian sense 
seems only to be revealed to us when we judge unbiased from influences that would normally 
preoccupy our minds. Sympathy is the way to achieve this as “through sympathy, the individual 
transcends the limits of his own individuality” (Lamb 1974, p. 675). By enabling us to leave our 
own  perspective,  sympathy  shows  us  how we  present  ourselves  to  other  people  and  how our 
conduct impacts them. Moreover, it also makes us become aware of what effect our actions would 
have on us if we were the object of them ourselves. In other words, we stay the observer while at 
the same time becoming the observed person as  well.  This  additional  perspective on ourselves 
enables  us  to  evaluate  our  behaviour  more  profoundly.  “Smith’s  self-examination  framework, 
therefore, involves an agreement structure between the ‘judge’ and ‘the judged’ on the basis of 
sympathy” (Shin 2015, p. 2).   We see ourselves so to speak from two angels and evaluate our 
behaviour  from  two  vantage  points.  As  a  result,  we  are  able  to  come  to  a  normative  moral 
judgement about our own conduct. Through our ability to see ourselves from another angle, we can 
put ourselves in the luxurious position of really acting according to our own convictions in a way 
that does not seem to be possible without this extra perspective on us. By conceiving clearly our 
actual behaviour and attitudes in comparison to how we ideally would want to see us, sympathy 
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holds the juicy carrot of acting morally right in front of our noses. Thereby, it manages to motivate 
us to strive towards bettering ourselves and living up to our own moral standards which we have 
developed interacting with others. It  could be argued that sympathy cannot motivate and solely 
enables us to understand other’s perspectives. “Sympathy itself cannot be motivational: it is part of 
the  enabling  or  (literally)  actualising  of  our  motivations”  (Wilson  2006,  p.  256).  As  such,  the 
function of it is limited to morally evaluate the actions and attitudes of us and the people around us. 
“The Moral Sentiments highlights the role of sympathy in judgement, not in motivation” (Raphael 
2009, p. 118). However, this interpretation does not appreciate enough the twofold character of the 
unique notion of Smithian sympathy. In addition to serving as tool for understanding one another 
and morally judging conduct and feelings, sympathy, in Smith’s sense, also motivates to do so. 
“Smith established a connection between psychic hardware (e.g., the desire for approbation) and 
social  learning  (e.g.,  accepting  limits),  the  former  providing  the  motive  that  inculcates  the 
latter” (Evensky 2001, p. 504). The motivational character of sympathy therefore comes from the 
inbuilt desire to agree with others. It is the aim towards which sympathy as a capability is directed 
that  constitutes  sympathy as  a  motivation.  One example of  this  double-nature  is  the reciprocal 
character of friendship. Doing a friend a favour is motivated by, at least in part, the belief that this 
friend would not hesitate to do us a favour in return. “Although the cultural forms of reciprocity are 
endlessly variable, functionally, reciprocity is universal. We do beneficial things for our friends, and 
implicitly we expect beneficial acts in kind from them. In fact, this condition essentially defines the 
difference between friends and foes” (Smith 1998, p. 3).  Having friends is more desirable than 
having enemies so we engage in friendly actions. Applied to sympathy, this means that the aim of 
sympathy itself motivates us to enter into the process of sympathising. 
In  a  nutshell,  sympathy,  as  capability,  firstly  enables  us  to  judge  what  is  proper  in  any  given 
situation before motivating us with the prospect of engaging in fulfilling social interaction with 
others. Secondly, sympathy equips us with the ability to imagine our own conduct from another 
perspective and so to  speak gradually  sympathise  with ourselves  and thereby motivates  by the 
prospect of taking control of our own conduct and acting according to our own moral compass. To 
which extent we actually align our behaviour to our own moral convictions as a result of that is not 
important in this context. However, Smith seems to have aimed at fully following our sense of 
morality. He indicates this attitude in several passages in his TMS where he praises moral behaviour 
(see for example: Smith 1759, I, ii, 3.5; 4.1). 
Apart  from all  its  benefits  to  our  understanding  and the  moral  assessment  of  the  feelings  and 
behaviour of others and ourselves, imagination as a cornerstone of the process of sympathising, and 
therefore sympathy itself, seems to not entirely serve us to the best of our interests. Firstly, Smith 
points  towards  religion  as  it  can  “occasion  any  very  gross  perversion  of  our  natural 
sentiments”  (ibid.,  III,  6.12).  This  is  an  especially  peculiar  case  because  religion  is  “the  very 
mechanism that affords us a normative standpoint” and thereby deceives us into a sense of duty. 
Unfortunately, it at the same time “supplies an incentive for the corruption of norms” (Griswold 
2006, p. 43) and opens the door for the vitiation of our morality. Another way our imagination can 
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be corrupted is by neglect or over-consideration. “Smith argued that natural sympathy often falls 
short of what is morally justified by mass misery” (Ashraf 2005, p. 134). We do not sympathise as 
much with the victims of an earthquake on the other end of the world, although their suffering is 
quite real and arguably deserves of our sympathy. Even though we could briefly bring us to feel for 
them, we would still go on with our daily lives like nothing happened. “Let us suppose that the 
great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was swallowed up by an earthquake, and 
let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe (…) would be affected upon receiving intelligence 
of this dreadful calamity”. He postulates that such a man would not be overly touched and “he 
would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and 
tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened” (Smith 1759, III, 3.4). On the other hand, it is 
equally possible to feel excessively when such a manifestation of emotion is not suitable to the 
situation  the  subject  of  it  is  in  at  all.  “In  other  cases,  Smith  believed  that  people  experience 
sympathy that is completely out of proportion to the plight of the individual one feels sympathetic 
towards (Ashraf 2005, p. 135). Here, we could not sympathise adequately with our opposite yet and 
need to further align our feelings. Somewhat connected to the last point, sympathy can be deceived 
in  a  third way by the trait  of  vanity.  “So partial  are  the views of  mankind with regard to  the 
propriety of their own conduct” that we are sometimes blind for what is apparent to “any indifferent 
spectator” (Smith 1759, III, 4.5). We are therefore perfectly able to see us as we are theoretically 
because as we are closest to us, we have a much more accurate insight in the moral worth of our 
conduct and are therefore fitter to assess it than anyone else. But we actively refrain from doing so 
as the picture which we have of ourselves pleases us far too much for us to drop it in favour of a 
more realistic one. “Moral blindness is thus a major theme in Smith’s vivid depiction of moral 
experience” (Griswold 2006, p. 43). A fourth source of our imagination’s corruption is our affinity 
to the beauty of things. As Smith lays out, “the fitness of any system or machine to produce the end 
for which it was intended, bestows a certain propriety and beauty”. This is because we can enter 
into “the sentiments  of  the master,  and necessarily [view] the object  under the same agreeable 
aspect”. But Smith sees danger of corruption as beauty “is often the secret motive of the most 
serious and important pursuits of both private and public life”. This leads to us being “charmed with 
the beauty” and forget to “view it in this abstract and philosophical light” (Smith 1759, IV, 1.1; 1.2; 
1.7;  1.9).  Without  this  calming  influence,  we  single-mindedly  lose  sight  of  the  bigger  picture. 
“Human life is naturally restless, driven not so much by fear (…), but by longing for a species of 
beauty” (Griswold 2006, p. 44). Fortunately, Smith sees a way out for us. “Nature, however, has not 
left this weakness (…) without remedy; nor has she abandoned us entirely to the delusions of self-
love”. As he points out, we are able to cope with these herds of deception over time by developing 
best-practice  guidelines  to  live  by.  “Our  continual  observations  upon  the  conduct  of  others, 
insensibly  lead  us  to  form  to  ourselves  certain  general  rules  concerning  what  is  fit  and 
proper” (Smith 1759, III, 4.7; see next chapter).
The two characteristics of sympathy, being a capability to understand and a motivation to practice 
moral behaviour, are working together closely. “Sociability is not merely due to the cold calculation 
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of advantage (…) but to genuinely social inclinations” (Freiin von Villiez 2011, p. 67). How they 
are arranged alongside each other to form what is  then observable as sympathy becomes more 
evident by the example of a traffic accident. We can use our imagination to put ourselves into the 
position of the different individuals involved. We obviously sympathise with the accident’s victims, 
being injured and trapped in the car. We can imagine feeling the victim’s pain and agony. But we 
cannot resemble the same genuine feeling within ourselves. We are, as observers of the situation, 
therefore experiencing a less intense or an exaggerated version of the observed pain and desperation 
of the person stuck in the crashed car. This expression of sympathy comes from its ability form and 
enables us to feel our genuine feelings towards the situation of the accident’s victim. In turn, we 
compare them with the ones actually displayed by the unfortunate victim himself. Put differently, 
we are giving “a varied emotional response to equally varied emotional states” (del Mar 2012, p. 
242), no matter whether we are observing other’s displays of emotion or are the subject of them 
ourselves. Our imagination, following Smith, is directed towards the situation the object of our 
observation  is  in,  not  the  particular  feelings  of  that  person.  Sympathy  does  not  give  us  an 
“immediate experience of what other men feel” but leaves us with what “we ourselves should feel 
in the like situation” and as a result, “we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected” 
(Smith 1759, I,  i,  1.2).  The capability aspect of sympathy therefore does not help us re-feeling 
someone’s feelings in the exact way the other felt them. It is worth pointing out that the ability to 
imagine another’s situation is not restricted to people close to us as “by means of the faculty of 
imagination sympathetic participation even in the fate of spatially far removed persons (and of 
historical  personalities,  who  have  been  subjected  to  injustices)  becomes  possible”  (Freiin  von 
Villiez 2005, p. 67, transl. S. Z.). Smithian sympathy therefore enables us to sympathise with our 
ancestors as well as people in a far away country we never even heard of. However, Smith stresses 
that we care about those less and are naturally more concerned with the people most immediately 
around us. That first and foremost implies ourselves as “every man feels his own pleasures and his 
own pains more sensibly than those of other people” and is therefore “in every respect fitter and 
abler to take care of himself than of any other person” (Smith 1759, VI, ii, 1.1). In the case of the 
traffic accident, sympathy as motivation drives us to find out whether or not the emotion displayed 
by the person stuck in the car is proper in that situation. “on the basis of sympathy, each of us is 
made the ‘immediate judge’ of others” (Sivertsen 2017, p. 106). The process of imagining situations 
works both ways. The example of the traffic accident shows that quite clearly when we turn our 
attention towards the victims themselves sympathising with us as the observers. While “the people 
observing the scene are constantly considering what they themselves would feel, if they actually 
were the sufferers,” the victims as well “is constantly led to imagine in what manner he would be 
affected if he was only one of the spectators of his own situation” (Smith 1759, I, i, 4.8). In rare 
cases a person might even exceed the mere imagination of another’s situation when “we do not 
simply imagine ourselves in that person’s situation, we take up (in our imagination) that person’s 
character and commitments” (Sayre-McCord 2014, p. 9). In these circumstances, the perspective of 
the other person, in this case the victims of the traffic accident, is entered entirely. This process of 
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imagining an accident-victims’ situation triggers in the observer feelings which are not necessarily 
felt by the observed victim in the same way. “Imagination is essential to the production even of the 
‘idea’ of another’s feelings, and sympathetic feelings are no longer ones that the other person need 
actually  have”  (Fleischacker  2017,  Ch.  3).  The  feeling  one  senses  when  sympathising  with  a 
suffering person is  not  felt  by him in the same way but  is  the  result  and an expression of  us 
imagining the circumstances of the situation the other person finds himself in. “The existence of 
fellow-feeling does not imply that two people have feelings of the same kind, even though in many 
cases (…), the spectator shares the agent’s feeling” (Broadie 2006, p. 168). As a result, in addition 
to getting an idea of the accident-victim’s feelings, one at the same time experiences an own feeling 
as a reaction to it. This particular feeling  or emotion is felt in addition to the ones that are the result 
of  the imagined sensations.  Smithian sympathy as  a  whole,  being capability  and motivation to 
interact with other people at the same time therefore not only serves as the enabling condition of 
morality but also becomes its essence when put in practice. In other words, “sympathy is really a 
capacity or ability based on a fundamental interest in the fortunes of others” (Witzum 1998, p. 494).
Smith approached his examination of moral theory from a position which allowed him to refer to a 
plethora of work done before him. There have been two main sources of influence which feature in 
Smith’s  thought,  most  prominently  in  his  TMS,  but  also  throughout  Smith’s  work  in  general. 
Undoubtedly, Smith’s academic development was in huge parts owed to his teacher at Glasgow 
University, Francis Hutcheson as well as his life-long friend David Hume. Apart from that, Smith 
has been influenced by a range of thinkers of his time and of the antiquities.  One of the most 
prominent of his contemporary influencers was Voltaire (François Marie Arouet) who certainly had 
an impact on Smith’s attitude towards tolerance and morality in total as well as religion. At this 
place, one should also name, as antagonists of sorts, Bernard Mandeville and Thomas Hobbes for 
having a huge impact on how Smith saw the human nature and the individual as a moral agent. 
Mandeville’s  influence  on  Smith’s  moral  philosophy  is  of  special  character  as  it  is  somewhat 
indirectly imposed on him through his studies at Glasgow University. “Mandeville was an obsession 
with Hutcheson. He could hardly write a book without devoting much of it to attacking the Fable 
[of the Bees]” (Kaye 1924, cxli). It is therefore likely that he used Mandeville frequently in his 
lectures as well. When it comes to thinkers from ancient Rome and Greece, Smith, especially in his 
TMS,  very often relies on examples from Greek tragedies.  In addition to that,  he dedicated the 
whole part VII of his TMS to the origins of morality as such. Here, he shows how particular matters 
of  human  interaction  were  looked  upon  and  interpreted  by  Stoics  and  Epicureans  as  well  as 
household names of ancient philosophy, namely Plato and Aristoteles that Smith came across during 
his studies at Glasgow University. However, for the purpose of this thesis the focus will be set on 
the relationship between Smith and his fellow Scotsmen Hutcheson and Hume as the three of them 
actively defined what is referred to today as the Scottish Enlightenment. Following, each of their 
influences will be sketched shortly.
To assign to Hutcheson the credit of creating Smithian sympathy as a concept or even an outline 
would be an unfair exaggeration. Nevertheless, as his teacher and mentor, Hutcheson inevitably lay 
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the foundation of Smith’s understanding of and approach to morality as “seeds of the concept of the 
impartial spectator had already been sown by Smith’s teacher” (Broadie 2006, p. 159). Being a 
well-conceived Scottish Enlightenment philosopher himself, his own work paved the way for later 
findings in moral philosophy by introducing empiricism to morality. “Hutcheson proposed to place 
moral philosophy on an observational footing, to appeal to experience and facts rather than the 
traditional a priori perspective”. Hume and Smith hugely benefitted from this approach to moral 
philosophy, being laid out by Hutcheson. In addition to that, Smith’s idea of widening the notion of 
sympathy, at least its first seeds, can be traced back to Hutcheson.  Sympathy as a term only exists 
in its narrow form to the time of Hutcheson’s writings. As a result, he does not use it the way Smith 
uses it later in the TMS. However, it is not entirely absent. “Hutcheson concludes that human beings 
have different senses to perceive different aspects of reality” (Carrasco 2011, pp. 518, 521). He had 
developed a binary moral theory. It was built around a ‘moral sense’, inherent to every moral agent 
along with  other  senses  for  other  parts  of  their  perception of  the  world.  “The moral  sense,  as 
understood by Hutcheson, is a disinterested feeling of approval”. In this, he follows a line of moral 
philosophers before him such as his immediate predecessor Lord Shaftesbury who is the source 
from which Hutcheson’s idea of the ‘moral sense’ stems from. New to this account is the notion of 
disinterestedness in connection with approval of behaviour. He was the first to introduce the idea 
that “a judgement of approving another person’s action could be (…) uninfluenced by any thought 
of benefit to oneself”. The binary character of Hutcheson’s theory is based in its scope. The ‘moral 
sense’ is only “naturally evoked when we come across the disinterested feeling of benevolence, and 
a  similar  feeling  of  disapproval  for  motives  with  a  tendency  opposed  to  that  of 
benevolence”  (Raphael  2009,  p.  28).  So,  for  Hutcheson,  disinterested  judgement  is  limited  to 
approval of benevolence presented to us and disapproval of the opposite, most likely display of 
resentment.  The  connection  to  sympathy  becomes  clearer  in  his  remarks  on  the  nature  of  the 
approving response. “Virtue is then called Amiable or Lovely, from its raising Good-will or Love in 
Spectators  toward  the  Agent”.  Spectators,  understood  as  physical  and  otherwise  disinterested 
observers, do perceive ‘good-will’ from ‘amiable and lovely’ virtues. Put differently, they develop 
an affection towards the ‘agents’ and the virtues displayed by them. In Smith’s words, they bring 
home  the  feelings  they  observe  in  other  people  and  develop  a  fellow-feeling  towards  them. 
Hutcheson  also  specifies  that  this  affection  does  origin  “not  from  the  Agent’s  perceiving  the 
virtuous Temper to be advantageous to him or desiring to obtain it under that View” but from within 
the spectator himself. This connection, or effort to enter the perspective of the other, is similar to 
what Hume later calls sympathy and is then developed into the wider term that is all-present in 
Smith’s work. It is worth noting that Hutcheson was a defender of a generally benevolent human 
nature. “Every Mortal is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he sees another incolc’d in, unless 
the Person be imagin’d evil, in a moral Sense: Nay, it is almost impossible for us to be unmov’d, 
even in that Case” (Hutcheson 1729, II, 1.8). His insistence on sympathy, or ‘moral sense’, being a 
part of human nature was “a crucial ppart of his anti-Hobbesian doctrine that benevolence is natural 
to humans” (Broadie 2006, p. 160). Although it might seem like a far stretch to derive Smith’s 
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sympathy from Hutcheson’s remarks on morality, as his teacher, Hutcheson laid the foundation to 
Smith’s moral thinking and, eventually, academic career. 
The influence Hume had on Smith, not only compared to that of Hutcheson but also to any other, is 
decisively larger. Not only did he compose his own moral theory much more similar to what Smith 
comes up with about a decade later, Smith also responds to criticism of Hume in the second edition 
of the TMS. On top of that, both, Smith’s and Hume’s thinking, expanded to areas outside of moral 
theory in general and the sympathetic feelings in particular as they both held views on utility, justice 
and religion as well. This, in turn, has implications on how they viewed morality. Following, the 
Humean understanding of sympathy is contrasted to that of Smith before shortly indicating their 
different takes on utility, justice and religion to emphasise Hume’s influence on Smith’s work in its 
comprehensiveness. 
Looking at the two accounts of sympathy of Hume on the one and Smith on the other side, one 
quickly notices their similarity. They agree on wide parts of the concept of sympathy itself while 
also relying on it throughout the development of their respective philosophical work. Smith, as well 
as  Hume,  places  great  value  on  his  understanding  of  sympathy.  Not  only  does  he  place  the 
explanation of it at the very beginning of the TMS, he also uses it to construct the notion of the 
Impartial Spectator which will be sketched later. Regarding the human being as a moral agent, it is 
fair to say that “if that capacity for sympathy were entirely absent, they [Smith and Hume] hold, so 
too would be moral thought and practice” (Sayre-McCord 2014, p. 2). But although they are very 
similar  to  each  other,  the  usages  of  sympathy  in  Hume’s  or  Smith’s  work  respectively  differ 
significantly in crucial points. In Hume’s sense, sympathy is a process we engage in, or better, that 
happens to us naturally without us needing to put thought into it. It “simply transmits the emotions 
of one person to another more or less vividly” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 91). He sees sympathy therefore 
as a subconscious measure of exchange. For Hume, this does not only encompass feelings as “the 
whole weight of his exposition is to see sympathy as a principle of communication, not only of 
feelings, but also opinions”. In addition to that, he does not discriminate feelings here in the sense 
that only feelings or opinions, which qualify in a certain way, can be sympathised with. Humean 
sympathy therefore is in its scope comparable to that of Smith. However, its character is different. 
One time that  becomes very clear  is  when it  comes to how the act  of  sympathy is  effectively 
conducted. “Hume depicts this as a passive almost mechanical process” (Broadie 2006, p. 162). 
Indeed, Hume does not seem to see anything that is left to do by me as “a cheerful countenance 
infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind; as an angry or sorrowful one throws a 
sudden damp upon me” (Hume 1739, 2, 1, 11.2). Smith on the other hand sees sympathy as an 
alignment process that requires a “much more active projection into the situation of another person” 
(Rasmussen  2017,  p.  91).  In  Smith’s  understanding  of  sympathy,  it  is  virtually  impossible  to 
sympathise  with  anyone  unless  we  brought  home,  that  is  imagined  ourselves  in,  the  other’s 
circumstances. This is because we cannot come to feel anything for anyone if we are not familiar 
with what seems to have brought about the feeling the other is displaying. It  is only from this 
knowledge that we can then sympathise with the other. We need to come to a separate sentiment, 
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which is the result of us imagining ourselves in the other’s situation. “To sympathise in Smith’s 
sense  [we]  must  have  a  ‘fellow-feeling’,  literally,  a  feeling  that  is  a  fellow  of  [the  other’s] 
feeling” (Wilson 2006, p. 267). The crucial aspect of that feeling is that it is my own and therefore 
unique.  It  is  not,  as for Hume, a reproduction of another person’s emotion in me. “We do not 
automatically feel anger when we see an angry person, for instance; rather, we need to know what 
caused this person’s anger” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 91) for responding with a feeling of our own. In 
other words, “Smith regards sympathy as something that spectators need to ‘go out to get’“ (Hanley 
2016, p. 4). Smith sees certain circumstances in which such an automatic response takes place. 
“Upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a certain emotion in 
another person”. He also mentions where this might occur as “a smiling face is to every body that 
sees  it,  a  cheerful  object;  as  a  sorrowful  countenance,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  melancholy 
one”  (Smith  1759,  I,  i,  1.6).  These  are  of  course  the  same examples  “that  Hume himself  has 
used” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 91). Despite these exceptions Smith admits, Smith’s focussing on the 
situation of another rather than on the other’s particular feelings, differs from Hume’s understanding 
of sympathy as well. “On Hume’s account, sympathy arises precisely from the spectator’s view (…) 
and he does not discuss the agent’s situation”. Where Hume describes sympathising as a reaction 
which makes us feeling the same feeling as displayed by another person, Smith insists that it is first 
and foremost us imagining ourselves in the situation of the other and then feeling our own feelings 
as a sympathetic response. In other words, Hume puts forward a theory in which the transmitting of 
feelings and opinions, that is sympathy, functions as “a spontaneous, entirely involuntary operation” 
(Broadie  2006,  p.  168)  and  describes  it  as  an  emotional  “contagion”  (Hume 1739,  3,  3,  3,  5, 
Rasmussen 2017, p. 91.). Contrary to that, Smith sees sympathy as a process of actively aligning 
our feelings to those of others which is consciously and purposely set in motion by ourselves as 
moral agents. The result is us feeling our own feelings, which are distinct from those of the other 
person, towards the situation he is in. The active character of Smith’s understanding is also put on 
display from another perspective. Rather than exclusively focussing on the spectator, it involves the 
agent as well as “sympathy not only presumes the spectator’s active agency, but it also renders the 
agent capable of certain types of practical action”. The agent’s part in the process might be to do his 
part  in aligning his  feelings to perfectly sympathise with the spectator.  Smithian sympathy can 
therefore also be “conceived of as a principle of agent motivation” (Hanley 2016, p. 5). Another 
point of divergence was made by Hume when he suggested an alteration for the second edition of 
the TMS. He proposed to put more emphasis on the issue that there are forms of sympathy which 
are not bringing pleasure as he saw “an apparent implication that all sympathy is pleasant” (Raphael 
2009, p. 18). He writes to Smith in a letter while Smith prepares for the second edition: “‘I wish you 
had more particularly and fully prov’d, that all kinds of Sympathy are necessarily Agreeable”. The 
point Hume makes here is that sympathising with a person in agony does not excite an enjoyable 
feeling in us as  “we feel  pain rather  than pleasure when we sympathize with a person who is 
suffering”. Ultimately, Hume goes on to say, if sympathy was enjoyable every time it occurs, “an 
Hospital would be a more entertaining Place than a Ball” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 110). This criticism 
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by Hume comes from an inherent misunderstanding as Hume seemingly failed to see the whole 
nature of the Smithian understanding of the term sympathy. For Hume, seeing sympathy as working 
similar to a contagion, this must be true as the observer of a displayed emotion feels the exact same 
himself. Smith, on the other hand, responds to Hume’s comments in a footnote in the second edition 
of the TMS. Herein, Smith differentiates two excitations of sympathy. “first, the sympathetic passion 
of the spectator; and, secondly, the emotion which arises from his observing the perfect coincidence 
between this  sympathetic  passion in himself,  and the original  passion in the person principally 
concerned” (Smith 1759, I, iii, 1.9, footnote). Consequently, sympathy is split into two as it entails 
our  sympathetic  feeling  towards  the  other  person  we  are  currently  observing  and  also  “the 
observation of correspondence” of our feeling with that of the observed person, resulting in “a 
consequent emotion which is the feeling of approbation” (Raphael 2009, p. 19). Smith goes on to 
say  that  “the  last  emotion,  in  which  the  sentiment  of  approbation  properly  consists,  is  always 
agreeable and delightful”. It is the second feeling that Smith lays his focus on when making the 
point  that  we  always  enjoy  sympathy  as  “the  other  may  either  be  agreeable  or  disagreeable, 
according to the nature of the original passion, whose features it must always, in some measure, 
retain” (Smith 1759, I, iii, 1.9, footnote). It therefore does not matter whether or not the person we 
sympathise with is going through a pleasurable experience, the fact that we do sympathise, that is 
deeming the  displayed feeling as  an agreeable  response and proper  in  that  particular  situation, 
makes us enjoy every occurrence of sympathy. In other words, “Smith argues that we can take 
pleasure in a harmony of sentiments even if the shared sentiment itself is disagreeable” (Rasmussen 
2017, p. 111). That follows directly from Smith’s understanding of sympathy for “the man who 
sympathizes with my resentment or grief must approve of my feelings as appropriate” (Raphael 
2009, p. 19). This is a significant difference between Smith and Hume. It shows, how the notion of 
sympathy truly underwent an evolution in the Smithian understanding. In the TMS, it can explain 
the  soothing effect  someone understanding us  and holding our  hand in  sorrowful  times has  as 
“sympathy is often comforting to us when we experience a painful emotion”. The difference to 
Hume becomes apparent as “it  is difficult to see how Hume’s ‘contagion’ account of sympathy 
could account for this phenomenon” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 111). Smith adds another paragraph to the 
footnote in order to respond to the comments of his friend. He writes: “Two sounds, I suppose, may, 
each of them taken singly, be austere, and yet, if they are perfect concords, the perception of their 
harmony and coincidence may be agreeable” (Smith 1759, I, iii, 1.9, footnote). Hume seems to have 
been satisfied with that remark as he did not respond. “Smith’s view has helpfully been described as 
a ‘projection’ account of sympathy, as opposed to Hume’s ‘contagion’ account, since it involves an 
imaginative  projection  into  the  situation  of  another  person”  (Rasmussen  2017,  p.  92).  This 
distinction seems to capture the different natures of Smith’s and Hume’s understanding of the term 
sympathy adequately. However, despite the significant differences, sympathy plays an integral role 
in both their respective moral theories. For both, it is constitutive to the moral assessment of another 
one’s behaviour as it is “the starting point of all moral judgement”. In the end, the conclusion that 
“Smith’s account is more complex, and arguably more sophisticated” (ibid., p. 93) seems fair. Apart 
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from differences in the understanding of sympathy, the two friends disagreed on other topics as 
well. 
Closely  connected  to  their  individual  view  on  sympathy  is  their  attitude  towards  utility.  The 
difference here seems to arise from the importance each of them assigns to it. Hume seems to put 
much  more  weight  and  meaning  on  this  consequentialist  concept  when  it  comes  to  moral 
philosophy than Smith wants to allow. For Hume, we appreciate beauty of “a well-built  house 
because we sympathise with the sense of satisfaction and convenience that we assume its owner 
must gain from it” (ibid. 94). The gains of the owner constitute the importance of the house. We 
therefore put the use of an object above the emotions it may excite in us. Hume goes on to hold a 
similar view of morality. The consequences of a certain behaviour are what counts in the moral 
judgement of it.  We sympathise with the positive passions an action brings about in others and 
assess  the  action  itself  on  that  basis.  “Hume  explains  [moral]  approval  by  the  spectator’s 
reproduction of the pleasure of those affected by a virtuous trait” (Shaver 2006, p. 194). Smith 
argues against Hume’s universally utilitarian approach. He holds that this way of assessment with 
its focus on utility is not applicable when it comes to moral philosophy. Although Smith admits that 
our sense of propriety seems to be aligned to “the conveniency both of the individual and of the 
society” (Smith 1759, IV, 2.3), he does not see the cause of our approval in the utility of actions. 
Utility is an agreeable consequence of our behaviour but it is not influencing our moral judgement 
regarding it. “In other words, while we approve of useful actions and character traits, in Smith’s 
view, we do not approve of them (…) because of their utility” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 96). Here, he 
diverges from Hume for whom there cannot be any other source of approbation or disapprobation 
than utility. While Hume sees moral approval originating in us sympathising with the pleasures 
which come from an action, “Smith explains it by the spectator’s reproduction of the passions of the 
agent and of the gratitude of those affected” (Shaver 2006, p. 194). He claims it is “impossible (…) 
that we should have no other reason for praising a man than that for which we commend a chest of 
drawers” (Smith 1759, IV, 2.4). We therefore seem to care about actions far more than we do for a 
tool we use. Smith cannot see this ‘more’ in importance we put on the morality of actions. It is 
“difficult to see why they matter so much to us, why moral considerations move us as much as they 
do”  (Rasmussen  2017,  p.  97)  although  they  are  mere  means  and  not  behaviour  itself.  Hume 
responds  by  assuming  the  pleasures  we  take  from tools  and  morally  right  behaviour  are  of  a 
different quality. However, Smith goes on to argue that “the usefulness of any disposition of mind is 
seldom the first ground of our approbation”. We seem to have “a sense of propriety quite distinct 
from the perception of utility” (Smith 1759, IV, 2.5) when we judge someone’s behaviour morally. 
The different handling of utility continues to define their views when it comes to their respective 
understanding of justice. Again, Hume claims that “the virtue of justice is founded entirely on its 
utility” for “we approve of just conduct because of our sympathy with the public interest”. It is, for 
Hume, therefore the use we draw from justice which makes it desirable. This very Hobbesian view 
is heavily opposed by Smith. For him, the understanding of justice is founded upon our natural 
desire for atonement. “Our sense of justice springs not from reflection on its usefulness but rather 
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from the sentiment of resentment” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 100). As a result, decisive for our longing 
for justice seems to be resentment for actions we do not approve of and sympathy for actions we do 
approve. Smith sees an action or a behaviour as being unjust “if in the conduct of the benefactor 
there appears to have been no propriety, how beneficial soever its effects” (Smith 1759, II, i, 4.1) or, 
in other words, if it is a proper object of resentment. Proper behaviour on the other side is one we 
can sympathise with and therefore assess as just. Again for Smith, the consequences do not play 
into that evaluation and the focus lays on sympathising with the agent. This becomes clearer at the 
example of punishment. While Hume relied on its use for society as “the utilitarian explanation for 
[our] approval of punishment cites the good effects of punishing”, Smith, on the other hand, would 
argue with “the resentment [we] feel after imagining myself in the place of the victim” (Shaver 
2006, p. 194). Smith’s understanding of justice becomes relevant as it “provides a further window 
on the normative dimensions of his conception of sympathy” (Hanley 2016, p. 6). A final field on 
which Hume and Smith engaged in different views is that of religion. As it  does not influence 
Smith’s  moral  philosophy immensely,  it  is  only mentioned for  purposes  of  comprehensiveness. 
Reading Smith’s TMS, one gets the impression that he wants to avoid this topic wherever possible 
as,  “when Smith ventures onto religious terrain his writing is frequently evasive or equivocal”. 
Actually, his remarks in that context are far from essential for his moral theory as such as they occur 
most irregularly and mostly as side-notes to a primary point. Smith’s thoughts do not “rely in any 
way on religious premises or a divine will”. Unlike Hume, who famously entertained a very critical 
view on religion, Smith at least seems to see certain “practical benefits” in religion’s capacity to 
provide “comfort in the face of death”. In addition to that, Smith seems to  hold “that religion tends 
to underwrite rather than undermine morality” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 101). Indeed, he expresses the 
importance of religion to morality as such when he states that “those important rules of morality are 
the  commands  and  laws  of  the  Deity,  who  will  finally  reward  the  obedient,  and  punish  the 
transgressors of their duty” (Smith 1759, III, 5.3). 
The meaning Smith assigns to the term of sympathy fully clarifies how he sees the human being as 
a self-interested, not selfish, moral agent who is consistently forced into and trapped in an ongoing 
interaction with others. Sympathy acts as every single agent’s tool to understand and respond to 
others  in  a  way  that  is  subjectively  appropriate.  Throughout  this  interaction,  we  are  forced  to 
reevaluate and have to constantly adjust our views and attitudes towards circumstances and other 
moral agents until both sides, we and our counterpart, reach an agreement on the proper feelings 
and behaviour regarding a particular situation. Also, “we conform to the rules of conduct accepted 
in society largely because we wish to be admired by others” (Coase 1976, p. 10), we are therefore 
highly  incentivised  to  engage  in  the  process  of  aligning  our  feelings  with  our  opposite.  The 
equilibrium that we set out to reach is what Smith describes as fully sympathising with one another, 
achieving mutual sympathy. It is worth noting that Smith sees sympathy distinct from reason and 
rationality.  As  sympathising  depends  on  our  capacity  to  feel,  it  must  differ  in  its  nature  from 
reasoning  objectively.  Both  components  of  moral  judgement  each  fulfil  their  own  functions 
separately. “Sympathy is the emotion, reason the operative method of the social act, both expressed 
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through individual person” (Macfie 1959, p. 219). In turn, sympathy is not only giving us the ability 
to build up a connection with other moral agents, it also enables us to fully sympathise with every 
part of our own conduct and, in extension, living in accordance to our own moral standards. At the 
same time, sympathy serves as a motivation for finding and entering the impartial perspective of a 
disinterested spectator. The prospect of being in agreement with our fellows drives us to undergo 
the bespoke adjustment process which is supposedly guiding us to complete sympathy with our 
opposite. It is in this way that both characters of Smithian sympathy — ability and motivation — go 
hand in hand in forming the foundation of Smith’s Impartial Spectator. The Smithian concept of 
sympathy is for the proper understanding of Smith’s moral theory what the Humean concept of 
sympathy was for that of Hume’s. Sympathy occupies a central position as the foundation of their 
thinking as they build their respective theories upon it. In the case of Smith, he “systematically 
develops the concept to accommodate a theory of justification that is vastly more refined (and more 
tenable) than those both of Hutcheson and of Hume” (Freiin von Villiez 2011, p. 68). It not only 
serves Smith as a basic understanding of human interaction, it also is a necessary condition to his 
theory on morality as a whole. Without their respective interpretation of the term, both, Smith’s and 
Hume’s,  accounts  on  the  social  interaction  of  moral  agents  cannot  stand.  Regarding  Smith  in 
particular, this is emphasised by the urgency with which he deals with the explanation of sympathy 
at the very beginning of the TMS. Everything that follows is built on Smithian sympathy as its basis. 
Especially Smith’s notion of the Impartial Spectator, which will be the subject of the next chapter, 
relies heavily on the unique sense that sympathy is developed into by Smith. 
III. Smithian Impartial Spectator
The core of Smith’s moral philosophy — the propriety of our behaviour towards each other and, in 
turn, finding the right way to act in any given situation — is best exemplified by his notion of the 
Impartial Spectator. Especially in TMS’s third part, Smith uses the figure of the Impartial Spectator 
to show how human beings can become able to judge their own moral behaviour unbiased by and 
independently of subjective views and preoccupation. This process is divided into stages as moral 
agents escape individual biases by entering the perspectives of other people and avoid even those 
prejudices by entering the viewpoint of the Impartial Spectator. This figurative tool in that context 
can therefore be seen as a metaphorical instrument for any moral agent to understand what the 
proper  thing to do is  for  himself  in  any given situation.  Sympathising with others  and thereby 
understanding other people’s perspectives on our own behaviour helps us to morally evaluate their 
actions  and feelings.  The  Impartial  Spectator  shows us  how to  apply  our  moral  standards  and 
understanding of  propriety  to  ourselves  and our  own  behaviour.  “Moral  actions  are  only those 
which awaken the sympathy of a well-instructed and impartial spectator” (Oncken 1897, p. 444). 
Seen in this sense, Smith’s understanding of sympathy leads up to the elevated vantage point of the 
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Impartial Spectator, which provides the ultimate moral judgement not only regarding people we 
interact with, but ourselves as well. “Without sympathy, reason may be inhuman and powerless. But 
without the ‘impartial spectator’, without reasoning judgement, sympathy is dumb” (Macfie 1959, 
p. 214). Put differently, in evaluating other’s conduct, we and our views are the moral measure 
against which we judge. In evaluating our own behaviour, the Impartial Spectator steps into that 
role. As “the proper way to make normative judgments is to consider the details of a phenomenon 
from an impartial perspective” (Fleischacker 2017, Ch. 1), it simply does not seem to be possible 
for an individual to reach the level of impartiality necessary for an appropriate self-assessment. 
Since we cannot be the judge of ourselves without falling into intransitivity, we need another angle 
from which we can properly evaluate the propriety of our actions. Smith uses the device of the 
Impartial  Spectator to achieve exactly that,  utilising his  unique understanding of sympathy and 
combining it  with rationality. “While sympathy is the essential social sentiment (…), for Smith 
sympathy is always united with reason, with the operation of the impartial spectator” (Macfie 1959, 
p. 216). In this chapter, the nature of the Impartial Spectator will briefly be described. Thereby, it is 
shown  how  Smith  constructs  and  develops  it  as  a  self-standing  notion  based  on  his  unique 
understanding of sympathy laid out in the previous chapter. After that, the notion of propriety and 
its  meaning  for  Smith  as  the  criterion  of  praiseworthiness  is  pointed  out.  As  the  measure  the 
Impartial  Spectator  applies  in  judging  morally,  praiseworthiness  is  put  into  contrast  with  the 
meaning of actual praise in Smith’s moral philosophy. In this context, it is briefly demonstrated, 
how Smith manages to distinguish between self-interest and selfishness and thereby clarifies the 
distinct natures of praise and praiseworthiness even further. The chapter concludes with presenting 
the  influences,  most  prominently  Hutcheson’s  and  Hume’s,  which  lead  Smith  to  engineer  the 
Impartial Spectator as central part of his moral theory.
The  process,  which  Smith  uses  to  develop  the  Impartial  Spectator,  can  be  divided  into  three 
subsequent steps. Throughout it, the two characters of sympathy, namely ability and motivation, 
eventually conjoin in the nature of the Impartial Spectator as the end result. All three of the steps 
rely  on  our  capacity  as  moral  agents  to  sympathise  in  general,  including  sympathising  with 
ourselves. Consequently, we become the spectator of our own conduct. The first step, which Smith 
undertakes  towards  an  impartial  perspective,  is  to  show how we sympathise  with  other  moral 
agents. Imagination is a necessary condition of sympathy. Sympathising with another moral agent 
or not and, on that basis, understanding and assessing the propriety of another’s behaviour depends 
on  our  capability  to  imagine  the  particular  situation  the  other  person  finds  himself  in.  Put 
differently, the crucial character of imagination, when it comes to sympathising with other moral 
agents, rests hugely on our inability to align our feelings with others without having pictured or 
‘brought  home  to  us’  their  situation  and  having  understood  their  individual  point  of  view 
beforehand. The only possible way to reach the perspective of the impartial spectator seems to be to 
conceive of our own feelings towards others and gradually sympathise with these other agent’s 
feelings as “the motivation for developing and applying this faculty [of sympathetic participation] 
results from the fundamental [principal] sociability of human beings” (Freiin von Villiez 2005, p. 
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66,  transl.  S.  Z.).  As  a  result,  steady  contact  with  other  people  is  an  immanent  condition  of 
sympathising  with  them  and,  in  turn,  with  ourselves.  It  becomes  clear  that  the  motivational 
characteristic of sympathy is itself built upon the general companionability of a person which we 
are, in turn, enabled to by sympathy as a capacity in the first place. The concepts of sympathy and 
sociability seem to be symbiotic, one cannot survive without the other. As we deal with other people 
on a day-to-day basis, not understanding our fellow agents would be corrosive for the purpose of 
achieving best results and a smooth converse with them. Being able to sympathise with other moral 
agents proves to be the necessary first step towards truly entering a completely impartial standpoint. 
This, in turn, is exclusively determined by moral standards or a universal sense of propriety. It is 
only the first step because by sympathising with our fellow agents, we do not effectively approach 
impartiality as we stay in our own sphere and continue to see things from our own perspective. “For 
Smith,  sympathy  cannot  be  detached  from  spectatorship,  for  it  is  spectators  who 
sympathise” (Broadie 2006, p. 158). We, after having successfully imagined another’s situation and 
come to a verdict of the propriety of his responses to it, do not leave behind our prejudices and 
biases that influence our judgement because we remain the spectator of another’s conduct. What we 
do achieve is not entering another person’s perspective. Instead, we put ourselves in his situation 
and see for ourselves the circumstances he faces from his viewpoint. We still see the world with our 
own eyes and are influenced by our own opinions and attitudes. What has changed is our immediate 
experience, although this takes place only in our imagination. To sympathise with another moral 
agent is, so to speak, an intellectual effort of imagination rather than a sensational one as we still 
come to our own judgements, only regarding the situation another person is in. A situation is not 
firmly  attached  to  the  person  and  can,  in  most  cases,  be  experienced  by  everyone  while  an 
individual’s perspective is his very personal take on things and includes all his individual biases and 
specific influences his mind might operate under. What that means is that we do not leave our own 
way of thinking and feeling about things by sympathising with other agents. This is essential and it 
is also showing rather clearly that Hume’s conception of sympathy cannot result in the Impartial 
Spectator that Smith develops in the TMS. In Hume’s view on sympathy, as was mentioned above, 
we are experiencing the same feelings and emotions as the person we sympathise with is feeling. 
Smith’s notion of sympathy on the other hand relies on a different form of imagination which does 
not extend further than the particular circumstances of the person we are sympathising with.  It 
especially  does  not  include  the  specific  opinions  and  attitudes  this  person  holds  regarding  the 
situation he is in nor general individual prejudices. This gives us the opportunity to fill that void 
with our own views and enables us to understand as well as morally judge the perspectives of even 
the dead or  an unfeeling person.  Although it  does not  bring us closer  to  an unbiased view on 
ourselves, as the Impartial Spectator is supposed to do, sympathising with others seems to be the 
basis for all social interaction and, consequently, as well for the interaction with ourselves. This 
includes self-judgement which seems to be the purpose of the construct of the Impartial Spectator 
all along.
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Being  able  to  align  our  feelings  with  those  of  others  in  a  mutual  adjustment  process,  or 
sympathising with them, therefore seems to be a necessary condition for introspection. But it is 
introspection itself which marks the first time we actually come closer to impartiality and, in turn, 
Smith’s Impartial Spectator. The next step on the way to the viewpoint of an Impartial Spectator 
therefore has to be directed towards ourselves while at the same time avoiding our personal biases. 
However, introspection cannot be done from within us. In order for our judgement to stay consistent 
and avoid circularity, we cannot come to an unbiased verdict about us ourselves. If “I want to know 
what  a  disinterested  judge  would  say,  and  because  there  are  evident  obstacles  to  my  being  a 
disinterested judge of my own acts, it is necessary for me to turn to others” (Broadie 2006, p. 158). 
Consequently, the only way to reach such an evaluation is to exit our sphere and thinking in order to 
put all our own biases and prejudices behind us. Sympathising with ourselves cannot be done in any 
other way “than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other people 
other people are likely to view them” (Smith 1759, III, 1.2). The second step towards impartiality 
therefore seems to be leaving our own point of view completely and thereby to rid ourselves of any 
bias we have. In doing so, we naturally have to enter another’s perspective from which we can come 
to a moral assessment of our behaviour, attitudes and feelings. “[The Impartial Spectator] arises out 
of the actual process of moral judgment around us, and we heed it as part of our drive to find a 
harmony of feelings with our actual neighbors” (Fleischacker 2017, Ch. 4). Judgement is meant as 
coming from outside here. Our neighbours judge us and we, in order to come to a more neutral 
picture  of  ourselves,  enter  their  perspective,  loosing  all  our  personal  preoccupations.  Stepping 
outside  our  biased  perception  of  all-day  situations  and  entering  into  another’s  perspective  is 
therefore essential, so Smith, for appropriately evaluating the moral worth of our own actions and 
feelings towards others. “We must endeavour to view them [our feelings] with the eyes of other 
people or as other people are likely to view them” (Smith 1759, III, 2.3). Thereby, we entirely enter 
the thinking of the agents who initially only appeared to us as external judges of our own behaviour 
and become the judges of it ourselves through their eyes. “We can imagine not only ourselves in 
another’s place but how another at some distance from us might view our own actions” (Nieli 1986, 
p. 617). Only after having made that step outside of our minds, we can suddenly see our conduct 
without having any stake in it. “If we were unable to see the situation except from the standpoint of 
the person affected, (…) no independent evaluation would be possible” (Griswold 2006, p. 27). In 
other words, without having stepped out of the kind of thinking and seeing the world the way we 
are accustomed to, we seem to be unable to neutrally assess our conduct not only towards others but 
ourselves as well. As Smith puts it, we can never truly reflect on ourselves and, in turn, sympathise 
with our own conduct “unless we remove ourselves (…) from our natural station and endeavour to 
view them [our motives] as at a certain distance from us” (Smith 1759, III, 1.2). This reflects on the 
tremendous importance Smith puts on the sociability of us as moral agents and our contact with 
fellow moral agents. Without this steady exchange, there would be less or no opportunity to leave 
our own and enter another one’s perspective as “we only become aware of ourselves — gain self-
consciousness — through our relationship with others” (Haakonssen 2006, p. 12). Consequently, 
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seeing our own attitudes and behaviour objectively in an unbiased way would seem to require a 
significantly larger effort. A person’s “character, the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and 
conduct  (…)  are  objects  which  he  cannot  easily  see”.  Only  through  social  interaction  “he  is 
provided with the mirror he wanted before” (Smith 1759, III, 1.3). Our capacity to sympathise with 
others is essential for understanding other’s viewpoints. “It is through sympathy, Smith contends, 
that we are able to overcome the natural self-centeredness of our perspective and view ourselves as 
others would view us” (Nieli 1986, p. 617). By entering the perspective of our fellow moral agents, 
we not only have to be able to sympathise with them, as laid out in the previous step, the whole 
point of leaving our perspective is to sympathise with ourselves from the perspective of the other 
person as “distance creates the possibility of disinterest” (Broadie 2006, p. 180). Put differently, 
sympathising with others, in addition to enabling social contact, puts ourselves into a position to 
sympathise with ourselves. What makes that detour necessary is our inability to judge our own 
conduct. We therefore need other perspectives to enter into in order to become clearer about the 
propriety of our own. The first step equipped us with the ability to sympathise with moral agents in 
general. This does not include our own perspective, our own ‘self’ so to speak. We cannot enter into 
our perspectives ourselves as we already are in our position. The second step familiarised us with 
the adaptation of other’s points of view and attained the competence of judging ourselves from 
there. After the first two steps towards impartiality we know how to sympathise with our attitudes 
and conduct and we can do so unbiased by our own preoccupations from the distant position of 
other perspectives. Naturally, what arises now is the question of which particular perspective to 
enter. 
This is the subject of the third step towards the Impartial Spectator. Every other person who we can 
interact  with  is  operating  under  a  system of  influences  similar  to  ours  and  is  relying  on  this 
framework of individual biases and preoccupations much like we do ourselves. By entering their 
vantage point, we do leave our own prejudices behind but at the same time, we adopt another’s set 
of subjective beliefs. This seems to move us back to the point we started from. “We hardly ever, 
contends Smith, consider our own merit only by comparing ourselves to what we ideally ought to 
do; we almost always also compare ourselves to our friends and companions” (Sivertsen 2018, p. 
452). Consequently, Smith does not suggest that we should judge our conduct from the eyes of 
another person, as other perspectives are biased in their own, and, in extension, unfit to serve us as 
an impartial point of view. Instead, “we must become the impartial spectator of our own character 
and conduct” (Smith 1759, III, 2.3). Here, Smith does not use the notion of the Impartial Spectator 
to refer to a physical being whose perspective we should adopt the way we would with another 
person. Rather, Smith seems to point towards a virtual, theoretical entity that we imagine. “He [the 
Impartial Spectator] is a creation of my imagination” and “indeed myself, through the character of 
an imagined spectator, not in the character of an agent” (Raphael 2009, p. 35). It represents the 
moral values that we want to live by and, in turn, guides us in every decision we face towards the 
most  proper  behaviour  in  any given situation.  The Impartial  Spectator  therefore  does  not  exist 
physically. “The impartial spectator is the product of an act of imagination (…) it is not a real 
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spectator  who  has  the  merit  of  being  impartial,  but  an  ideal  spectator,  one  that  exists  as  an 
idea” (Broadie 2006, p. 181). Accordingly, to reach this particular level of impartiality it is not 
enough to enter into other people’s perspectives as we did in step one, neither is understanding our 
attitudes and actions through their eyes, as step two enabled us to. Because “the impartial spectator 
is  supposed  to  be  free  of  [any]  partial  feelings”  (Fleischacker  2017,  Ch.  4),   the  only  valid 
perspective we can use to come to a judgement about ourselves must come from a third source that 
has no agenda by itself, a truly and completely unbiased angle that neither belongs to our sphere nor 
that of one of our fellow moral agents. The Impartial Spectator’s perspective seems to be the only 
one  from  which  we  can  understand  how  our  behaviour  appears  from  a  completely  neutral 
perspective.  “We must  view them [our interests],  neither  from our own place not  yet  from his 
[another agent’s], neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes 
of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who judges with impartiality 
between us” (Smith 1759, III, 3.3). Neither ourselves nor any other person is involved in it because 
the Impartial Spectator itself is effectively representing the neutral point of view. “Each of us judges 
others as a spectator. Each of us finds spectators judging him. We then come to judge our own 
conduct by imagining whether an impartial spectator would approve or disapprove of it” (Raphael 
2009, p. 35). This exemplifies the two characters Smith assigns to the Impartial Spectator. While his 
disinterested nature seems to classify him as an objective instance external to us, the normative 
force of his moral judgement suggests an internal perspective that was resting inside us all along. 
“The impartial spectator’s role is to approve or disapprove the actions and thoughts of an individual. 
He is impartial, and views the individual as from outside, but he is also within, the man in the 
breast” (Urquhart 2016, p. 340). The challenge in attaining an impartial perspective on ourselves is 
to enter this internal perspective without depriving it of its objectivity. We have to completely rid 
ourselves of any immediate interests we naturally have. “In judging himself, he [the agent] has, or is 
presumed to have, the information but has to overcome self-love or self-interest” (Broadie 2006, p. 
180).  Here,  the  pivotal  role  sympathy  plays  in  the  moral  philosophy  of  Smith  as  well  as  the 
divergence from Hume become apparent once more. By the mere imagination and taking up of 
another’s perspective, effectively reproducing their feelings in ourselves, one cannot come to an 
own moral position regarding the situation at hand. It seems therefore that “attempts to replicate the 
actual feelings of others are not only futile, but also sterile” because they would “occupy a person in 
such a way that he would become blind to a more ethically significant task: namely, the creation of 
an independent perspective that is new to and independent of the original positions of both spectator 
and actor” (Hanley 2016, p. 10). This is why Hume’s understanding of sympathy does not allow for 
an Impartial  Spectator  in  the  Smithian sense.  There  is  no actual  person or  moral  agent  whose 
feelings we could bring us to feel ourselves the Impartial Spectator is a virtual figure. We enter his 
perspective only metaphorically. Hume simply would not be able start to sympathise with Smith’s 
spectator  because  sympathy,  in  Hume’s  understanding  of  it,  is  directed  towards  reproducing 
another’s feelings in ourselves. Consequently, the second step is as far as we can reach with the 
Humean conception of sympathy. The way Smith uses the term, on the other hand, focusses on the 
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situation instead on the particular feelings of the observed agent. Sympathy thereby becomes about 
imagining our own attitudes towards a particular matter or,  in other words,  we do not imagine 
other’s opinions or perspectives in us anymore, we imagine us, coming to our potential conclusions, 
in another one’s situation. “An agent can judge his own character and conduct only if he imagines 
himself in the position of a spectator (Raphael 2009, p. 42). That is what allows for us as moral 
agents to enter the perspective of even unconscious people, the dead or, as in the case at hand, a 
being  that  only  exists  in  our  imagination.  Rather  than  sympathising  with  ourselves  from  the 
perspective of another person, it is then about sympathising with ourselves from the point of view 
of an imagined spectator who observes the situation impartially without any individual interest from 
outside the scene. As Smith puts it, “we endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any 
other fair and impartial spectator would examine it” (Smith 1759, III, 1.2). Entering the perspective 
of the Impartial Spectator therefore seems to be the only way of self-approbation, self-validation or, 
to spell it out even further, evaluating whether or not our own actions and attitudes are appropriate 
to a certain situation according to objective moral standards. “The impartial spectator has normative 
force in part because it defines the moral point of view already latent in ordinary life” (Griswold 
2006, p. 39). 
It is worth mentioning that Smith did not intend the figure of the Impartial Spectator as a permanent 
solution to the problem of finding the morally right thing to do. Although it serves as exactly that 
initially, it is not what the Smith sees as the long-term ideal. “The impartial spectator is indeed real, 
for it is not unlike the agent who is imagining it into existence” (Broadie 2006, p. 181). A moral 
agent  becomes  the  Impartial  Spectator  himself  after  having  internalised  its  standards  of  moral 
decision-making.  “And  in  so  far  as  he  succeeds  in  imaginatively  switching  roles  with  such  a 
spectator,  he becomes his own spectator” (Fricke 2013, p. 186). It  would defy Smith’s positive 
image of human nature to leave the necessity of an overseeing instance that we ought to consult 
before we can make any moral decision. Smith does not see humans as inherently good or bad but 
he observes multiple variations of human temper and emotion depending on the specific situation 
that human is in. Instead of asking absolute questions like “is human nature benevolent of malign?, 
or is human nature self-interested of benevolent? Smith’s questions are rather, what in human nature 
makes virtue possible?, what in human nature makes morality possible?”. This suggests a more 
nuanced view on the matter as “the sources of human motivation are heterogenous and cannot be 
easily  reduced  to  a  few  principles”.  Human  passions,  which  guide  and  partly  determine  our 
motivations and behaviour, are to be seen in context. Understanding the nature of the passion that 
led to a certain behaviour alone does not suffice for coming to an evaluation of the agent’s character. 
The value of passions “cannot be determined simply from a description of the passions themselves 
but only from an account of their  appropriateness to specific occasions” (Mehta 2006, p.  248). 
Human nature therefore seems to be much too divers to be easily classified. Nevertheless, Smith 
sees  human  nature  as  consisting  of  and  relying  on  a  general  moral  system  that  cannot  be 
overwritten. “The sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation are founded on the strongest 
and most vigorous passions of human nature; and though they may be somewhat warpt, cannot be 
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entirely perverted” (Smith 1759, V, 2.1). He presumes this underlying sociability in parts because of 
our inclination for exchange. “Both The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, 
after all, build on a view of human nature that stresses the communicableness of the passions and 
the  passion  to  communicate”  (Phillips  2006,  p.  77).  This  is  a  necessity  for  our  capacity  to 
sympathise with each other.  So rather  than staying at  our  side as  a  moral  guide,  the Impartial 
Spectator, fully embraced and its perspective adopted by a moral agent, seems to be having the sole 
purpose of  working towards  becoming obsolete.  In  the  system of  Smith’s  moral  philosophy,  it 
seems to serve as a means for our minds to reach a certain point at which we, as individuals in 
society,  are  no  longer  in  need  of  its  moral  guidance.  We  internalise  the  Impartial  Spectator’s 
perspective to an extent at which “the division of the self into two persons, the imagined spectator 
and  the  agent,  almost  disappears”  (Raphael  2009,  p.  40).  As  Smith  puts  it,  the  agent  “almost 
becomes himself  that  impartial  spectator  and,  scarce even feels  but  as  that  great  arbiter  of  his 
conduct directs him to feel” (Smith 1759, III, 3.25). 
The particular point that the Impartial Spectator is supposedly making us to reach does not seem to 
be described adequately by having acquired an understanding of morality that provides us with the 
ability to judge every situation correctly and to decide which is the appropriate feeling to feel or 
action to pursue in any given set of circumstances. Such an explanation would imply having the 
choice of acting differently and immorally.  This does not seem to be what Smith has in mind. 
Neither  does  this  bespoke  point,  once  reached,  put  us  into  a  state  in  which  we  are  forced  or 
determined to do the objectively right thing or have the emotion that is considered proper according 
to a universal morality inherent to society.  Not only would that leave unanswered the essential 
questions of where such a morality would originate from and how it could be legitimised, it also 
would  contradict  Smith’s  favourable  image  of  human nature.  Instead  of  a  set  attitude  towards 
morality, he sees the moral agent’s character as living through an ongoing evolution. “Our reflective 
skills  can,  and  need  to  be,  constantly  sharpened  and  our  moral  self-awareness  tended  to  and 
enhanced  through  both  intellectual  and  moral  education  and  refinement”  rather  than  being 
involuntarily  committed  to  “natural  standard,  like  an  inborn  emotional  compass”  (Freiin  von 
Villiez 2018, p. 261). We therefore can and indeed must adapt our moral convictions according to 
experiences we make. Needing a coercive system to lead us towards right behaviour suggests a 
general and deep mistrust in the individual’s ability and intention to make morally right decisions. 
Smith, being the liberal thinker that he is, would have rejected this implication fiercely. As a result, 
there seems to be another explanation for this point at which the Impartial Spectator becomes a tool 
which we do not need to rely on anymore. Smith seems to suggest a simple but comprehensive 
learning process that extends to our psyche and consists of a moral agent imagining “himself as an 
impartial  spectator  of  his  [own]  feelings  or  acts”  (Broadie  2006,  p.  185).  In  other  words,  we 
gradually are becoming the Impartial Spectator by sympathising with him. During this process, we 
choose to lean on the Impartial Spectator in order to understand the nature of right and wrong as 
well as to be shown the proper and improper behaviour for any given situation. It is, for Smith, 
implied that we are entering this procedure freely because we, as moral agents, enjoy agreeing with 
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our  fellows  and  being  agreed  to  by  them since  this  mutual  sympathy  is  the  ultimate  goal  of 
engaging with other people and the only way of self-validation that we have. Sympathy with other 
moral agents requires an understanding of what is the proper response to actions towards us. That is 
what we seek guidance for from the Impartial Spectator. After we internalised his perspective, we 
act morally without having to reflect on the proper behaviour in every situation anymore because 
the Impartial Spectator, whose viewpoint we made our own, is responding properly in any set of 
circumstances.  “The impartial  spectator  is  the measure of  propriety” therefore,  “virtue is  not  a 
question of what is good for man, or of the obedience to laws or the satisfaction of desires. It is a 
matter of what the impartial spectator would approve of” (Mehta 2006, p. 260). Once we entirely 
internalised the perspective of the Impartial spectator and see the world through his eyes without 
having to think about doing so, we have achieved the level of introspection that does not require us 
to  put  thought  into  our  everyday  conduct  anymore.  Rather,  reaching  morally  right  decisions 
becomes natural as the propriety of different options is evident to us. An agent who reached this 
point does not need to rely on his imagined Impartial Spectator anymore. As Smith puts it, thinking 
like the Impartial Spectator “has become perfectly familiar to him. He has been in the constant 
practice (…) of modelling (…) not only his outward conduct and behaviour, but, as much as he can, 
even his inward sentiments and feelings according to those of this awful and respectable judge”. As 
a result, “he does not merely affect the sentiments of the impartial spectator. He really adopts them” 
(Smith 1759, III, 3.25). The overall aim of us as moral agents is therefore to become able to fully 
sympathise with ourselves from the perspective of the Impartial Spectator. The Impartial Spectator 
forms an identity with our sympathy “which implies that he can never be detached from sympathy 
since he is the one sympathizing (Broadie 2006, p. 158). It is therefore crucial to point out that his 
perspective  is  the  only  one  that  matters  in  developing  our  individual  morality  as  it  is  the 
indisputable touchstone of propriety. “Smith’s central argument in the Theory of Moral Sentiments 
is that the sentiments of an impartial spectator are what set the ultimate moral standard: actions and 
character traits that would earn such a spectator’s approval are morally right and those that would 
earn  his  or  her  disapproval  are  morally  wrong”  (Rasmussen  2017,  p.  90).  Once  this  stage  of 
complete identity is reached, “our judgments of propriety will be made according to the sentiments 
that have already been modeled, modulated or impartialized by this man within” (Carrasco 2011, p. 
541). On the way there, we develop rules and moral standards to live by but even the guidelines we 
use to act morally seem to come directly from the Impartial Spectator’s vantage point as “moral 
norms express the feelings of an impartial spectator” (Fleischacker 2017, Ch. 2). We develop this 
basic framework of rules to lead us as a guide which we use only until we entirely entered into the 
perspective and adopted the thinking of the Impartial Spectator as just mentioned. Once internalised 
the Impartial Spectator “is the personification of these rules in my breast”. Getting to this point is a 
learning process. “What he must teach me is how to look at myself as though I were anyone other 
than myself”. Moreover, this process by no means seems to be passive on the moral agent’s side. 
We must  actively work on our  capacity  to  see and evaluate  ourselves  without  personal  biases. 
Subsequently, by learning how to enter the Impartial Spectator’s perspective, we bring him into 
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place in the first place. “The impartial spectator teaches me, but I also have to learn, to some extent 
on my own, to create him; we constitute one another” (Urquhart 2016, pp. 345, 346).
The rules which constitute this framework seem to be formed by us through experience. “They arise 
(…) from our reaction to the conduct, especially the shocking conduct, of other people” (Raphael 
2009, p. 54).  We naturally watch the behaviour of our fellows as bystanders.  Subsequently, we 
analyse how we react to and feel towards other’s actions. The rules we give to ourselves are to a 
large extent a result of our shock regarding the behaviour we observed. This disgust serves as a 
motivation “never to be guilty of the like, nor ever, upon any account, to render ourselves in this 
manner the objects of universal disapprobation” (Smith 1759, III, 4.7). This very rudimentary and 
far from comprehensive evaluation of the other person’s conduct is the foundation for the rules we 
give to ourselves. “Our observation of the conduct of others insensibly leads us to form certain 
general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to be avoided” (Morrow 1927, p. 
339). The nature of these rules depends on whether we approved of the action or not. “We do not 
come by our individual moral judgements by applying the rules, but come by the rules by way of 
the individual moral judgements” (Broadie 2006, p. 186). In other words, the moral rules we form 
as guidelines to help us reaching moral decisions are founded solely on the experiences we acquired 
from following other people’s conduct and our analysis thereof and not the other way. “For making 
the general rules of morality explicit, an agent can rely on previous experience of behavior that was 
generally approved, as well as on inductive reasoning” (Fricke 2013, p. 195). The guidelines upon 
which we found our behaviour in order for it to receive approval by others are themselves based on 
how  people  we  interacted  with  throughout  our  lives  behaved  towards  us.  “Our  continual 
observations upon the conduct of others, insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain general 
rules concerning what is fit and proper” (Smith 1759, III, 4.7). Acting according to these guidelines 
provides a safe path towards a general behaviour we would approve of in others. The result also 
matches the way we want to be seen by others as the rules result from and point us towards what we 
appreciated as proper in other people’s conduct. Moral rules, therefore, are a product of what we 
approve or disapprove of in other people which is itself a result of our moral convictions and by 
how we see ourselves. Put differently, these moral guidelines “are formulated by induction on past 
impartial approvals” (Shaver 2006, p. 204). By following these rules, we avoid disapproved patterns 
and, as a result, they are not part of our behaviour anymore as long as we stick to the guidelines we 
created.  “They  [moral  rules]  are  ultimately  founded  upon  experience  of  what,  in  particular 
instances, our moral faculties (…) approve, or disapprove of” (Smith 1759, III, 4.8). But we do not 
only rely on how we judge the observed behaviour, we also take into account how other people 
react to it repeatedly. Our “own reaction is reinforced by seeing that everyone else is affected in the 
same way” and “by seeing that the particular kind of reaction is repeated whenever one encounters 
the particular kind of conduct” (Raphael 2009, p. 54). This eventually leads us to a state in which 
we do not need this  framework of rules anymore as we got used to acting according to them. 
Thereby, we fully internalised the Impartial Spectator. “Once we have on board the standard set by 
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the impartial spectator, we are in a position to consider our own patterns of approval to determine 
which ones meet that standard and which ones do not (Sayre-McCord 2014, p. 32).
Nevertheless, apart from the moral rules we set for ourselves according to how we reacted to other’s 
conduct earlier on, we seem to be driven towards acting morally by a different force. As Smith 
writes,  “those vicegerents  of  God within us,  never fail  to punish the violation of  them, by the 
torments of inward shame, and self-condemnation” (Smith 1759, III, 5.6). The mere disobeying of a 
rule we put upon ourselves seems to be a much too insignificant act for justifying or bringing about 
such a struggle with ourselves in the aftermath. Smith’s emphasis on us troubling ourselves after 
acting in a way we know was improper seems to suggest another instance that helps us find the 
morally right thing to do and leads us to a proper conduct in any given situation. A likely candidate 
for this function seem to be the opinions and attitudes of the other members of our society. “Social 
conduct and theory must take account of public opinion” (Macfie 1959, p.  219).  Society has a 
significant impact on the way we see ourselves, in many cases it even seems to generally determine 
our general attitudes and approaches towards particular issues. It seems reasonable to assume that 
the Impartial Spectator should be founded in public opinion as it “plays an essential role in fairness, 
by causing individuals to internalize other people’s sense of fairness” (Ashraf 2005, p. 136). In the 
second stage on the way to a truly impartial standpoint, we endeavour to see ourselves from the 
perspectives of the people we interact with in our community. Only this enables us to continue the 
process of entering into a fully impartial viewpoint. Not before we achieved this insight into other’s 
attitudes towards us can we reach a stage that allows us to adopt the Impartial Spectator’s vantage 
point  and morally  judge ourselves  from that  angle.  “According to  Smith,  moral  education is  a 
matter  of  engaging  in  sympathetic  processes  with  peers”  (Fricke  2014,  p.  354).  Consequently, 
Smith’s mirror, which can only be provided to us by our fellows in society, seems to be the obvious 
foundation of the Impartial Spectator as sketched above. “Our first criticisms are exercised upon the 
characters of other people; and we are all very forward to observe how each of these affects us”. By 
elevating the judgement of other people to the level of being the standard of our own moral attitude 
in such a way, our everyday points of contact with other members of our community seem to not 
only create the way we see the behaviour of others but especially determine in which light we see 
our own actions for “we soon learn, that other people are equally frank with regard to our own 
[conduct]” (Smith 1759, III, 2.5). But the accumulated individual convictions of our neighbours, in 
whichever form we may be confronted with them, seem to be missing the normative force that 
could make us adjust our behaviour away from its status quo towards the practices of other people. 
“The impartial spectator cannot simply be a repository of social opinion, nor is it possible to reduce 
the  judgement  of  the  impartial  spectator  to  the  judgement  of  society,  even  where  those  two 
judgements  coincide”  (Broadie  2006,  p.  180).  Our  approach  towards  the  Impartial  Spectator’s 
perspective seems to show this quite clearly as it is threefold and the angles of society’s members is 
not sufficient to help us reach the third stage of the process. We first enter the perspectives of other 
people in order to, secondly, view us and our conduct from their vantage point. Public opinion as 
the agreed upon moral standard in a society can therefore only serve as a guide thus far. But, if we 
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want to transcend this stage of impartiality, in which we are detached from our own prejudices 
though relying on society’s moral attitudes, the societal morality is not adequate anymore. “If the 
impartial spectator is no more than an idealized version of ‘our friends and neighbors’, it likely also 
conserves or even distils whatever biases and prejudices might be endemic to the moral culture in 
question” (Sivertsen 2018, p. 445). As soon as we accept that other’s perspectives are biased in the 
same way ours is,  we need to distance ourselves from the idea of  an identity of  the Impartial 
Spectator and the accumulated opinions of all members of our community. “Smith thus portrays 
society’s  spectators  as  superficial,  concerned  only  with  the  external  effects  of  an  action,  and 
contrasts them to the impartial spectator, who judges based on actual moral virtue” (Shin 2015, p. 
2). We must therefore leave this sphere of societal bias to achieve true impartiality. Because real 
spectators,  as  the  only other  positions  available  for  us  to  enter  into,  cannot  lift  our  view onto 
neutrality, a faculty of judging ourselves must exist within us which serves us in more ways than the 
mere  interpretation  of  other  people’s  judgements.  “In  response  to  the  challenge  arising  from 
disagreement  among  [real]  spectators,  an  agent  tries  to  look  at  himself  from  an  unconcerned 
spectator’s point of view and thereby learns to become his own spectator and judge” (Fricke 2013, 
p.  179).  Instead  of  accumulating  the,  sometimes  contradicting,  views  and  perspectives  of  our 
society’s  members,  we  disregard  them entirely  as  not  trustworthy.  With  regard  to  others,  “we 
become anxious to know how far we deserve their censure or applause” (Smith 1759, III, 2.5). This 
anxiety, which Smith mentions here, seems to be the essence of what we may call conscience and 
what seems to be a more likely candidate for that normative voice than public opinion. “It is no 
longer the opinions of factual spectators that are decisive. Their place is rather taken by an idealized 
spectator: the ‘impartial spectator’” (Freiin von Villiez 2006, p. 121). So instead of relying on the 
agents we are surrounded by and accepting their moral judgement, which involves their individual 
biases, the Impartial Spectator is to be seen as a separate entity whose judgement is not affected by 
particular attitudes and prejudices. “The voice of conscience reflects what I, with all my knowledge 
of the situation, would feel if I were a spectator instead of an agent” (Raphael 2009, p. 36). Not only 
does it seem to act as a cognisant tool for self-evaluation, it also works as a kind of ‘silent alarm’ 
which  warns  us  about  and  makes  us  aware  of  improper  behaviour  in  any  particular  situation. 
Through that, it equips us with an almost subconscious sense of morality which, in turn, helps us to 
act  virtuously  without  needing  to  rely  on  moral  rules  in  every  situation.  Our  drive  for 
praiseworthiness adds the focus to conscience. It therefore “enables [moral agents] to get actively 
and fruitfully involved in sympathetic processes, aiming not only at mutual sympathy in general but 
at mutual sympathy in accordance with real praiseworthiness in particular” (Fricke 2013, p. 194). 
The way conscience shows itself emphasises its cognisant character. “The consciousness (…) is the 
source of that inward tranquility and self-satisfaction with which it  is naturally attended, as the 
suspicion of the contrary gives occasion to the torments of vice” (Smith 1759, III, 1.7). Differently 
from moral rules that we apply directly to our conduct according to the voices of people around us, 
conscience seems to take a less noticeable approach and can nearly be described as a ‘feeling’ or a 
‘principle’ rather than a ‘sense’. “On the one hand, Smith wanted to retain the view that the voice of 
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conscience (…) is superior to popular opinion. On the other hand, he believed that conscience is 
initially  an  effect  of  social  approval  and  disapproval”  (Raphael  2009,  p.  37).  Following  this 
interpretation, Smith endeavours to reconcile conscience with public opinion to the extent that it 
depends on the approval of others but, in turn, develops a unique character on the basis of other’s 
responses. Conscience shows itself in peace of mind and therefore seems to succeed if we do not 
perceive it at all. Most importantly, conscience does not seem to be biased as it seems to be an 
independent  voice  inside  ourselves.  “The  point  here  is  that,  by  whatever  means  the  impartial 
spectator, considered as conscience, comes into being, it is not a member of society” (Broadie 2006, 
p. 182). As such, it must be seen distinct from influences we are inevitably under as moral agents in 
a society. This also explains, “how conscience [can] ever go against popular opinion, as it clearly 
sometimes does” (Raphael 2009, p. 36). Smith therefore seems to build up to this understanding of 
the notion of the disinterested observer as “he clearly sees the Impartial Spectator, in standing as the 
voice of conscience” (Sayre-McCord 2009, p. 10) and that, in turn, seems to give his perspective 
additional  normative force.  “Nevertheless,  the impartial  spectator  owes its  existence to the real 
spectators. Were it not for our discovery that while we observe and judge other people, they observe 
and judge us, we would not form the idea of an impartial spectator of us”. The opinion of others, 
aggregated or not, therefore seems to serve as a necessary condition for the Impartial Spectator 
understood as conscience. The very idea of an evaluating instance within ourselves relies on the 
concept  of  us  observing  others  and,  in  turn,  others  observing  us  as  the  Impartial  Spectator  of 
everyone else depends on us as observers as well. “Smith’s impartial spectator, considered as an 
inner man, is constructed by a process of internalisation of such outer people” (Broadie 2006, p. 
180). However, this bilateral dependency is restricted to being a part of the procedure that leads to 
the Impartial Spectator, which leaves room for the individuality of each person’s ‘man within the 
breast’. But it is worth noting that entering into the perspective of the Impartial Spectator really 
seems to  be  made possible  by  having sympathised  with  others  and imagined our  conduct  and 
attitudes from their perspectives beforehand. Frankly, it is only through the interaction with other 
people that we can come to morally assess our own behaviour and feelings. This dependency is 
essential to Smith’s moral philosophy. Smith’s notion of the Impartial Spectator is not merely a 
figurative tool  of  self-reflection but  rather  a  normative moral  ideal  as  “it  serves  as  a  figure of 
thought to illustrate the level of approbation of certain actions or attitudes” (Freiin von Villiez 2005, 
p. 72, transl. S. Z.). Stressing this point even further, the impartial spectator is an internal third 
perspective that, through its impartiality, enables us as moral agents to evaluate circumstances and 
what is the proper response to them in an unbiased way. Thereby, he makes us self-reflect, develop 
and, in turn, live by our own morality which we developed in the process. We could not achieve that 
ability  of  self-reflection  without  leaving  our  perspective  behind.  “Not  being  concerned  is  a 
necessary condition for impartiality” (Fricke 2013, p. 179). Understood in that sense, conscience 
seems to come close to describing the Smithian notion of the Impartial Spectator as a third party 
which is only partly reliant on our relation to any other person, but rather judges “from the place 
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and with the eyes of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either [of us], and who 
judges between us” (Smith 1759, III, 3.3).
Despite  its  genuineness,  the  Impartial  Spectator  is  by  no  means  an  irrefutable  entity  of  moral 
judgement but comes with its own limitations. One of them seems to be founded in the foundation 
of his judgements. “The impartial spectator as a creature of a person’s imagination has no more (nor 
less)  information  about  what  is  to  be  judged than  the  agent,  for  the  creature  cannot  be  better 
informed than its creator” (Broadie 2006, p. 182). The considerations of the Impartial Spectator are 
therefore based on the same knowledge that is to our disposal all  along. However, limiting the 
availability of information of the Impartial Spectator to the exact amount we have access to is vital. 
This restriction enables us to make the step of becoming the Impartial Spectator of our own conduct 
by ourselves. If we lacked the capacity for or access to information crucial for forming an impartial 
verdict on our own character, we would still be bound to rely on the judgement of others which 
would, in turn, disable us from an unbiased moral judgement regarding ourselves. Requiring the 
assistance  of  other  moral  agents  would  force  us  into  accepting  their  individual  biases,  a  truly 
impartial  assessment  of  our  own behaviour  would consequently  become an impossibility.  “Our 
autonomy as individual moral agents would then be limited to our specific society, and we end up 
with a kind of cultural relativism” (Sivertsen 2018, p. 445). Having this limitation, the Impartial 
Spectator can morally judge without relying on external information acquired from itself biased 
instances. However, that a vast majority of the information we as individuals have access to were at 
some point  acquired through exchange with another  agent  leads to a  slight  insecurity.  Because 
Smith connects the moral decision-making of the Impartial Spectator with our individual faculty of 
gathering information,  which is  all  about  consulting different  sources,  he  allows for  an almost 
certain involvement of external influences. The judgement of the Impartial Spectator therefore must 
always  be  seen  as  a  momentary  one  and  subject  to  constant  change  as  “we  can  never  say 
categorically  that  the  impartial  spectator’s  judgement  is  true”  (Broadie  2006,  p.  183).  Another 
limitation of the Impartial Spectator seems to arise regarding the justness of his judgements. Being 
reliant on and limited to the information the agent has access to seems to leave the possibility of 
unjust judgements as well.  This becomes clear at the example of apologising to another person 
without having caused any harm. “This task would never be imposed upon him, did not even the 
impartial spectator feel some indulgence for what may be regarded as the unjust resentment of that 
other” (Smith 1759, II, iii, 2.10). Smith opens two possible ways in which the Impartial Spectator’s 
judgement could be unjust. One of them is that this ‘unjust resentment’ could, at least in parts, be 
felt rightfully and the Impartial Spectator misjudged the implications of the committed act. The 
other refers to the Impartial Spectator encouraging the feeling of an unjust emotion although our 
intention to sympathise with others would necessitate us to adjust the display of our feeling, and 
indeed the feeling itself, to a proper level. “If the impartial spectator feels some indulgence for what 
may be regarded as the unjust resentment of the other, he must surely have some sympathy for that 
unjust resentment” and as a result “he is sympathizing unjustly” (Broadie 2006, p. 184). A last 
apparent constraint of the Impartial Spectator seems to be based in his courage. As “the abstract and 
Page !37
ideal spectator of our sentiments and conduct requires often to be awakened and put in mind of his 
duty, by the presence of the real spectator” (Smith 1759, III, 3.38), it seems that Smith himself 
questions the reliability of our ‘man within the breast’ as he calls him several times. In these cases, 
we become “fearful and hesitant” when confronted with and, in turn, influenced by “a fearsome 
clamour of real spectators who violently proclaim a judgement which is contrary to the one that the 
impartial spectator would have passed” (Broadie 2006, p. 184). We therefore sometimes overrule 
the  verdict  even  of  the  Impartial  Spectator  if  we  feel  insecure  about  opposing  opinions.  This 
phenomenon  arises  for  instance  in  situations  suitably  described  as  peer  pressure  when  our 
inclination to sympathise with our fellows in society conflicts with the moral judgement of the 
Impartial Spectator. It does not mean that he has to fight an internal opposition, it merely shows 
“that the real spectator’s judgement naturally prompts a question as to whether that [the Impartial 
Spectator’s] judgement is appropriate” (ibid., p. 185). Real spectators therefore seem to provide a 
controlling  instance  for  the  Impartial  Spectator  and  not  just  the  other  way.  Apart  from  these 
limitations,  the  Impartial  Spectator  is  the  closest  we  can  come to  an  unbiased  and  true  moral 
assessment  regarding our own conduct  as  it  is  also the only way at  our  disposal.  However,  in 
addition  to  our  Impartial  Spectator’s  set  of  information  being  limited  to  our  own horizon,  we 
sometimes seem to actively work against him to an extent, which prevents him to form the correct 
judgement. We simply seem to manipulate the information we have on hand until the Impartial 
Spectator can only come to a judgement that favours our character beyond what would have been 
appropriate in that situation. Under these circumstances, “the violence and injustice of our own 
selfish passions are sometimes sufficient to induce the man within the breast to make a report very 
different from what the real circumstances of the case are capable of authorising” (Smith 1759, III, 
4.1). In other words, we withhold information from the Impartial Spectator because it would reveal 
the true, morally less proper, nature of our conduct. Being denied these crucial clues, he cannot 
come up with the verdict adequate to the situation. We are capable of this kind of manipulation even 
regarding past behaviour. “Even in retrospect, I can exaggerate the wrong done to me to conclude 
that an impartial spectator would approve of my furious resentment” (Shaver 2006, p. 204). The 
Impartial Spectator therefore can be and often is deceived. Nevertheless, this ongoing deception of 
strict impartiality serves an important purpose. Smith sees self-deception as a necessity of everyday 
life. Although “this self-deceit, this fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half the disorders of 
human life”, we seem to need it to not surrender ourselves to absolute desperation. Our character 
seems to be so immensely flawed that we could not lead a happy life with full knowledge of the true 
nature of ourselves. “If we saw ourselves in the light in which others see us, or in which they would 
see us if they knew all, a reformation would generally be unavoidable” (Smith 1759, III, 4.6). We 
therefore seem to save ourselves from our true self by clinging to a more favourable picture of us. 
This  also  does  not  require  any exhaustion of  the  mind for  “since the  relevant  spectator  is  my 
creation, it is tempting for me to create one who will let me approve of myself” (Shaver 2006, p. 
204).  Again, we do that for the sake of being able to lead a reasonably happy life as “we could not 
otherwise endure the sight”. Our individual flaws would prevent us from progressing because we 
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would be overwhelmed by how manifold our shortcomings are. To not let the deception take over 
and completely thwart our judgement and that of the Impartial Spectator, we form basic rules and 
apply them universally. The result is the set of moral guidelines sketched above. Herein, we have an 
ever-present guide, reminding us of how our conduct appears to our fellows as the rules are forged 
out of our experiences from us observing others in the first place. “Those general rules of conduct, 
when they have been fixed in our mind by habitual reflection, are of great use in correcting the 
misrepresentations  of  self-love  concerning  what  is  fit  and  proper  to  be  done  in  our  particular 
situation” (Smith 1759, III, 4.6; 4.12). We keep our selfish desire to manipulate the moral view we 
have  on  our  conduct  in  check  by  following rules  we found on  our  observation  of  others.  Put 
differently,  “nature  leads  us  to  form  general  moral  rules  in  order  to  guard  against  such  self-
deceit” (Raphael 2009, p. 54). But these rules themselves can be bypassed. We can, by amending 
the rules we set to keep us on track of morality, alter them in such a way that they, in the end, again 
allow for  our selfish passions to overrule our proper intentions.  “General  rules  allow the same 
cheating as the creation of a spectator because induction from particular impartial judgements will 
rarely produce exception-less rules”. It seems very unlikely that we formulate universal rules as 
they are impractical and difficult to live by in everyday life. For instance, a rule that forbids any 
type of lying is likely to become tested many times during a day. A certain number of the instances 
which  make  following  the  rule  a  struggle,  prove  to  be  more  manageable  by  allowing  certain 
exceptions to the rule. Judging whether an exception is in order or not “seems as prone to self-
deception as my creation of a spectator”. The use of moral rules in our life is not to provide an 
infallible  instance  of  morality,  it  is  to  accompany  us  on  the  way  to  fully  enter  the  Impartial 
Spectator’s perspective. “General rules are necessary for society, not because they block the effects 
of  self-deception,  but  because  (…)  they  provide  a  ready  method  for  making  moral 
decisions” (Shaver 2006, p. 204). As such, they are only needed during the learning process which 
leads  us  towards  becoming  the  Impartial  Spectator  of  our  own  conduct  as  sketched  above. 
Consequently,  they  should  not  be  seen  as  commandments  with  an  absolute  character  but  as  a 
temporary framework. “One should, however, not overlook that relying on these rules for making a 
moral  self-judgment  is  second  best  in  comparison  to  properly  engaging  in  a  sympathetic 
process”  (Fricke  2013,  p.  196).  Furthermore,  religiously  sticking  to  rule-following  is  both 
impractical and improper. For Smith, “a benefactor thinks himself but ill requited, if the person 
upon whom he has bestowed his good offices, repays them merely from a cold sense of duty, and 
without any affection to his person” (Smith 1759, III, 6.4). It therefore seems “both difficult and 
pedantic to act entirely out of regard to the rule” (Shaver 2006, p.  207).  Another difficulty the 
Impartial Spectator seems to suffer from is his claim to universality. Smith himself seems to see his 
creation as a general tool for moral reasoning, applicable to and by any moral agent. “There exists 
in the mind of every man, an idea of this kind, gradually formed from his observations upon the 
character and conduct both of himself and of other people. It is the slow, gradual, and progressive 
work of the great demigod within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct” (Smith 1759, 
VI,  iii,  25).  This  is  an expression of  great  individualism as  the  person seems to  be somewhat 
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detached  from  the  society  he  lives  in.  “Smith  conceptualizes  this  imaginary  figure  as  an 
embodiment  of  universal  morality,  and  hence  not  limited  to  the  values  of  one’s  immediate 
community”. However, this claim is at least questionable. “The impartial spectator is inevitably a 
local figure, a judge who, while objective, adjudicates based on the context of one’s immediate 
social milieu” (Shin 2015, p. 1). This conclusion seems standing to reason, as Smith mentions, that 
the Impartial Spectator is based on the immediate experiences and observations of the moral agent 
himself. “Considering that humans are generally swayed by community norms, one’s decision to 
approve  another  person’s  traits  is,  more  often  than  not,  biased”,  even  through the  eyes  of  the 
Impartial Spectator. Depending on the environment a person grew up in, his judgement of what is to 
be considered worthy of approval might very well differ from that of another moral agent with 
another  cultural  background.  “Hence,  the  impartial  spectator  merely  echoes  one’s  culturally-
informed notions of approval-worthiness and blameworthiness”. He therefore seems to be reduced 
to “simply a figure who helps individuals receive praise and avoid blame from others” (ibid., p. 3). 
However, this criticism seems to miss a crucial point in the Impartial Spectator’s nature. Through 
our  experiences,  we  become  able  to  form  our  judgements  more  and  more  elaborately.  The 
observations we are left  with in the beginning do not  remotely resemble what  we have at  our 
disposal at a later stage in our lives. The Impartial Spectator has recourse to more information and is 
able to understand more sentiments as we ourselves gain experience throughout our lives. Part of 
the experience that, in the ideal case, leads to the evolution of the Impartial Spectator can be found 
in a comprehensive learning process of morality. This includes the formation of basic moral rules as 
a framework to support the creation of an individual morality. Through this, biases, unique to the 
cultural background of our upbringing, can be minimised. “The impartial spectator is in me, he is 
the man in my breast, but he has no particular relation to me, and he is not partial to me” (Urquhart 
2016, p. 345). The Impartial Spectator is, so to speak, a part of us but not solely constituted by us. 
Rather,  he takes part  in constituting our morality on the way to and after us fully entering his 
position. In that sense the Impartial Spectator seems culturally unbound to us because his vantage 
point is positioned above conceptions of particular civilisation’s morality. His impartial character 
does not depend on the confirmation of other agents in contrast to us until we reach the stage at 
which we enter his perspective. Once we are at that stage, however, the impartiality takes over and 
not  anymore  do  we  rely  on  the  guidelines  of  society.  “We appeal,  in  other  words,  not  to  the 
judgment  of  our  immediate  companions,  but  to  the  impartial  spectator,  who is  freed  from the 
limitations of their knowledge and experience” (Morrow 1927, p. 339). Put differently, we outgrew 
our cultural biases once we fully entered the perspective of the Impartial Spectator.
In addition to how the perspective of the Impartial Spectator is imagined, sympathised with and, in 
turn, adapted, it is important to fully appreciate the standards he himself applies to our behaviour 
and  behaviour  in  general.  In  other  words,  understanding  the  measurement  of  the  Impartial 
Spectator’s point of view is vital for grasping his whole character and the consequences his moral 
judgements have on how Smith sees the nature of individual human morality. Smith equips him 
with features that uniquely combine our individual conscience and a claim for universality. This 
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leaves the necessity of a solid foundation to build moral judgement on. So far,  judgement was 
founded upon principles of rationality. Decisions on matters could be reached through a cost and 
benefit analysis of the options at hand. But in spite of that common practice, morality seems to 
function  in  a  different  way  that  transcends  the  limitations  of  logics.  The  Impartial  Spectator 
therefore has to combine our capacity to infer rationally and our individual conscience into one 
apparatus of moral judgement. “Reason is the compass that guides [our] self-awareness beyond 
emotion, conscience representing an attentiveness to the conclusions drawn by reason(ing)” (Freiin 
von Villiez 2018, p. 261). In other words, the Impartial Spectator’s way of judging is as novel as his 
character. Indeed, its mechanics appear to be so different from other forms of judgement that “the 
‘measure of virtue’ also has to change.” As a result, “it can no longer be something extrinsic to the 
situation  but  rather  to  act  according  to  what  the  spectator  thinks  the  situation  deserves: 
propriety” (Carrasco 2011, p. 538). The consequence for Smith’s Impartial Spectator seems to be 
clear. “‘Propriety’ and ‘impropriety’ are, in principle, expressions for right and wrong” (Raphael 
2009, p. 23). Propriety, seen like that, therefore is a binary system, a black and white criterion for 
morality that appears to support itself. “In thinking someone’s action proper, in Smith’s sense, we 
are thinking that her reactions, and consequent actions, are (as we might put it) appropriate and 
called for, under the circumstances” (Sayre-McCord 2009, p. 4). We act properly if our behaviour 
was the right thing to do in any given situation and the right action is always the proper one. Smith 
differentiates two kinds of propriety. “One is perfect propriety, an ideal that cannot be attained in 
practice, so that a reference to it makes all human actions ‘blameable and imperfect’”. This view on 
propriety illustrates the binary character indicated above. As proper actions surely exist in Smith’s 
moral philosophy, the second understanding of propriety is more allowing. It serves as a threshold 
to  indicate  what  kind  of  behaviour  is  favourable,  basically  explaining  propriety  as  a  gradual 
concept. As such, its basis is “the level commonly attained (…) actions that surpass this are praised 
and those that fall below it are blamed” (Raphael 2009, p. 92). However, setting propriety as the 
criterion for the Impartial Spectator’s decision-making does not seem to send the message Smith 
wants to convey. When seen this particular way, propriety does not necessarily include the interests 
of our fellow agents. Smith recognises that when he writes “virtue is not said to be amiable, or to be 
meritorious, because it is the object of its own love, or of its own gratitude; but because it excites 
those  sentiments  in  other  men” (Smith  1759,  III,  1.7).  Propriety  is  not  an  end in  itself.  Quite 
oppositely, proper behaviour produces love and gratitude in other people. The expression of exactly 
that is what we then call praise. Merely acting in a proper way for its own sake does not suffice for 
an action or general behaviour to be of the kind that would be favoured by the Impartial Spectator 
as it is not an end in itself but one constituting part of virtuous behaviour. By just behaving properly, 
we have therefore not achieved anything but reaching a milestone towards praiseworthy conduct. 
Acting in a perfectly proper way while thinking about no one else but ourselves is not what Smith 
has in mind when he thinks of morally right actions. The interaction with other agents is essential 
for us to evaluate the moral value of our own conduct. How our fellow moral agents react to our 
behaviour  indicates  the  praiseworthiness  of  our  actions.  It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  Smith 
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understands praise in the quite literal sense of our fellows uttering their approval trough rewarding 
our actions with positive feedback. Praiseworthiness, on the other hand, appears for Smith in a more 
idealistic light. It represents whether or not we morally deserve to be praised. This distinction is 
vital  as  it  illustrates  our  motivation  to  act  in  a  proper  way.  Praise  by  itself  does  not  suggest 
praiseworthiness and vice versa. The response we receive by other people regarding our behaviour 
only points towards which part of our conduct is likely to be morally worthy of actual praise. It does 
not, however, necessarily express the morally right thing to do as the judgement of others is dyed by 
their individual biases. This everyday mirror which society provides us with is the foundation for 
the  framework  of  moral  rules  we  act  by  until  fully  entering  the  perspective  of  the  Impartial 
Spectator relieves us from the need of such a set  of guidelines.  We then become aware of the 
morally right thing to do in any given situation and, in turn, can adequately judge our conduct and 
that  of  others  by  ourselves  as  an  Impartial  Spectator  would  have  done.  But  then,  still, 
praiseworthiness is what we are after with everything we do as we define ourselves over how much 
praise we deserve, not how much we actually receive. This distinction is crucial as it depicts the 
motivation  of  our  morality.  An  agent  in  society  “comes  to  scrutinise  his  acts  and  attitudes  to 
determine not whether they will be praised, but whether they are praiseworthy” (Broadie 2006, p. 
186). Praise itself, apparently being the obvious reward for ‘good’ behaviour, becomes less relevant 
in Smith’s moral philosophy. “We are pleased, not only with praise, but with having done what is 
praise-worthy”.  The actual  expression of  approval  by other  people moves into the background. 
Most importantly, we seek the feeling of being worthy of it as without that feeling, the expressed 
praise itself becomes worthless to us.  “The most sincere praise can give little pleasure when it 
cannot be considered as some sort of proof of praise-worthiness” (Smith 1759, III, 2.5; 2.4). The 
expression of approval therefore still satisfies us but cannot do so without being backed up by us 
feeling worthy of it. This conviction is essential to the rewarding effect of praise. In other words, 
the character of proper recognition has changed. “It is no longer the ‘moral applause of society’ – its 
approbation or disapprobation – that is decisive, but rather the praiseworthiness of actions” (Freiin 
von Villiez 2006, p. 120). This shift in direction is essential. In addition to that, aiming for praise as 
motivation for morally right behaviour appears to be too uncertain as it can be given without merit. 
Smith sets the focus clearly on deserving praise rather than actually obtaining it. “To be amiable and 
to be meritorious; that is, to deserve love and to deserve reward, are the great characters of virtue”. 
This perception of deserving moral approbation cannot be given to us but must come from within. 
“We are pleased to think that we have rendered ourselves the natural objects of approbation, though 
no approbation should ever be bestowed upon us” (Smith 1759, III, 1.7; 2.5). Having our feeling of 
being worthy of praise confirmed by our fellows expressing their contentment and approval with 
our behaviour becomes even more enjoyable then. When both aspects, deserving praise and being 
presented with it, come together, we sympathise with the sentiments displayed by other people and 
draw pleasure from this mutual understanding in addition to the feeling of being worthy of praise in 
general.  The  worth  we  assign  to  praiseworthiness  even  holds  if  we  cannot  expect  any  actual 
recognition at all in a particular situation. The mere conviction of being worthy of it suffices to 
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reward us adequately for right actions although this pleasure is amplified when we receive actual 
praise for behaviour we are already convinced was worthy of it. “Though a wise man feels little 
pleasure from praise where he knows there is no praise-worthiness, he often feels the highest in 
doing what he knows to be praise-worthy, though he knows equally well that no praise is ever to be 
bestowed upon it” (ibid., III, 2.7). This is vital as it has the potential to motivate anyone to act 
morally regardless of the response he receives as long as he is convinced of his course. Smith makes 
a difference between the wise man who is driven towards praiseworthiness and the mass of society. 
Although this stage of Smith’s ‘wise man’ is not reached by everyone, it rests as a potential in 
everybody  waiting  to  be  realised.  This  gives  a  foundation  in  ourselves  for  holding  on  to  our 
principles  without  having  to  turn  to  any  external,  potentially  divine  entity  that  overlooks  and 
controls, motivates and possibly rewards us. The mere knowledge of having become the proper 
object  of  praiseworthiness  is  enough  to  reward  us  for  moral  actions  and  prompt  further  such 
conduct in us. “What does satisfy the desire for praiseworthiness is knowing that one would secure 
the  approval  of  an  appropriately  informed  spectator,  whether  or  not  one  actually  enjoys  such 
approval”. That relation between praise and praiseworthiness is central to Smith’s moral philosophy 
as  it  entails  the  nature  of  how Smith  sees  self-interest.  Determining our  action,  self-interest  is 
directed at what we want to achieve ourselves. This might be influenced by external entities but 
ultimately is the result of an individual attitude and conviction. It just so happens that our goal 
somewhat involves the opinions of others towards us. Yet while we need to rely on these external 
sources to some extent, “Smith points out that the desire to be praiseworthy is not satisfied when we 
secure the praise of those who are not appropriately informed impartial spectators” (Sayre-McCord 
2014, pp. 32, 31). Consequently, the objective seems to be a more universal trait than the opinions 
of spectators around us. “Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be that 
thing which is the natural and proper object of love”. Vice versa, should we be convinced of our 
own behaviour’s praiseworthiness,  we can neglect others blaming us for we already firmly feel 
confirmed. “When he is perfectly satisfied with every part of his own conduct, the judgement of 
other people is often of less importance to him”. Smith postulates that praiseworthiness must be the 
measure of the Impartial Spectator as he is the only criterion which leads us towards it. To become 
“the impartial spectators of our own character and conduct” (Smith 1759, III,  2.1; 2.17; 2.3) is 
effectively the only way for us to judge whether or  not  one of our actions or attitudes can be 
considered praiseworthy since the Impartial Spectator is the expression of proper behaviour in any 
given situation. “On the basis of the distinction between praise and praiseworthiness, [Smith] shows 
how each of us judge ourselves, and in turn each other, from the assumed point of view of an 
impartial spectator” (Sivertsen 2017, p. 106). The sole criterion which is applied by the Impartial 
Spectator for judging our conduct morally seems to be praiseworthiness as a measure of propriety 
of  actions.  This  is  vital  as  it  also  points  out  how highly  Smith  regards  individuality.  Because 
praiseworthiness is the criterion the Impartial Spectator uses to come to a moral evaluation, even an 
overwhelming public opinion cannot, by its own, move us to alter our conduct from what we came 
to see as the morally right thing to do. “The praiseworthiness of an action or disposition rather 
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results  from its  being  apt  to  excite  the  sympathetic  sentiments  of  the  well-informed  impartial 
spectator”  (Freiin  von  Villiez  2006,  p.  127).  Aligning  our  behaviour  with  a  strictly  impartial 
evaluation of our choice of actions therefore seems to necessarily lead us towards a conduct which 
can be considered praiseworthy. In other words, we are interested in acting in a praiseworthy way 
and the Impartial Spectator shows us the proper course of action in any given situation. So once we 
sympathise with him, we necessarily act praiseworthy as the Impartial Spectator is the standard of 
propriety. Our self-interest then guides us towards the morally right conduct because it is directed 
towards “not only praise,  but praise-worthiness;  or to be that  thing which,  though it  should be 
praised by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of praise”. Receiving praise without 
being or feeling like the adequate addressee of it cannot give us any fulfilment. What really matters 
is being or feeling worthy of praise, regardless of whether or not it actually occurs. It is worth 
pointing out that the value Smith assigns to praiseworthiness is to a large extent founded on the 
observation that we seem to be obsessed with how we appear to our peers. “Humanity does not 
desire  to  be  great,  but  to  be  beloved”  (Smith  1759,  III,  2.1;  5.8).  We seem to  aim for  being 
perceived as we want to perceive ourselves. If our own evaluation of ourselves matches with the 
image we represent to other people, we are able to sympathise with them in regard to how we view 
ourselves. This mutual sympathy then reassures us in the judgement we reached earlier and, as a 
result, pleases us. Through that, it becomes clear that self-interest cannot be the same as selfishness 
for selfish behaviour does not serve us on the way to be worthy of praise. “Acting from unrestrained 
selfish passions stands in the way of being approved by others” (Fricke 2013, p. 180). As a result, 
selfishness is not fit to motivate us properly. Rather, what motivates us to act in a morally proper 
way is a deeply rooted self-interest in being worthy of praise or, as Smith puts it, “the love of what 
is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters” (Smith 
1759, III, 3.4). Our desire of praiseworthiness therefore seems to be rooted in the deeper longing for 
sympathising with our fellows. When our image of ourselves does not correspond with the one 
others  have  of  us,  we  anxiously  revise  it  until  we  reach  sympathetic  concurrence  with  them. 
Accordingly, we adjust our entire behaviour towards feeling praiseworthy. The greatest motivation 
for us to act morally therefore is to seem like, and to attain, the image of the person we want to be 
seen as, in order to be able to sympathise with our fellows. This, in turn, is the foundation of our 
desire to be the proper object of praise. “The love of praiseworthiness is the desire for a state in 
which you, as an impartial spectator, are able to go along with yourself, as an agent, in what you are 
doing,  feeling  and  thinking”.  It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  this  also  seems  to  make  sympathy 
something that  cannot  be faked,  as  we instantly  realise  the  lack of  praiseworthiness  ourselves. 
Similarly, receiving recognition which is unearned cannot please us for we are aware of the fact that 
we are not worthy of it.  “To accept unmerited praise is to accept appearing to other people as 
someone we are not. Letting praise trump praiseworthiness is vanity, plain and simple” (Sivertsen 
2017, pp. 112, 108) and, in turn, not praiseworthy conduct. Despite the focus Smith seems to set on 
how we appear to our fellow moral agents, the origin of praiseworthiness, the way it occurs as a 
criterion for the Impartial Spectator, seems to lie elsewhere. Here, again, it is helpful to differentiate 
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praiseworthiness from actual praise. “Praise is bestowed by factual spectators – the man without, 
while praiseworthiness is a function of the man within” (Freiin von Villiez 2011, p. 72). Just like the 
figure of the Impartial Spectator himself, the criterion he applies to morally judge our behaviour and 
attitudes towards issues therefore seems to come from inside us. The question is, from which place 
exactly our inherent desire to act and be regarded as praiseworthy originates. The obvious answer to 
that question might be found in a deeply rooted love of praise. Nevertheless, the distinction between 
praise and praiseworthiness, which Smith builds on and maintains throughout his thought process, 
makes  this  explanation  seem quite  unlikely.  Both  notions,  of  praise  and  praiseworthiness,  are 
varying in  such a  way that  aligning our  behaviour  towards  a  pattern  that  leads  us  to  the  one, 
necessarily would lead us away from the other. We cannot achieve praiseworthiness by aiming for 
praise  and,  vice  versa,  we  do  not  necessarily  get  praise  out  of  acting  towards  the  goal  of 
praiseworthiness. Pursuing both at the same time seems to be impossible “since if praise comes 
apart  from praiseworthiness,  love  of  praiseworthiness  will  guide  you  away  from actual  praise 
toward self-approbation through the judgements of the impartial spectator” (Sivertsen 2017, p. 109). 
In  addition  to  that,  Smith  himself  negates  a  direct  correlation  altogether.  “The  love  of  praise-
worthiness is by no means derived altogether from the love of praise” (Smith 1759, III, 2.2). An 
explanation  that  seems  more  probable  focusses  on  the  love  of  praiseworthiness  instead  of 
attempting to find a relation between and thereby appreciates the dissimilarity of both. “The love of 
praiseworthiness is in some ways Smith’s answer to the age-old question ‘why be moral?’ – at least 
if this is understood as a question about why we should care about what is right, or, alternately, as a 
request for an explanation for why we, in fact, do care” (Sivertsen 2017, p. 103). This approach 
seems to elegantly avoid the discrepancy between the love of praise and that of praiseworthiness by 
not presuming any relation at all. The mere fact of praise resulting from praiseworthiness does not 
necessarily imply that we love praiseworthiness because of our love of praise. However, the two 
desires in fact do seem to be related as Smith stresses that they do not altogether depend on each 
other.  Indeed,  as  was  indicated  above,  our  love  of  praise  results  in  an  even  deeper  love  of 
praiseworthiness as the “love of praiseworthiness is derived from love of praise in the sense that it 
is our desire to be approved of by others that teaches us, by turns, to view ourselves as others see us 
from the point of view of an imagined spectator, predicting what others will judge, then what they 
would judge had they only been well-informed, and, finally, what they should judge, as impartial 
spectators” (ibid.,  p. 109). In other words, the combination of the world without and the world 
within  us  to  a  certain  extent  facilitates  a  relation  of  the  love  of  praise  and  the  love  of 
praiseworthiness. Loving to be the worthy object of praise, decided upon by the Impartial Spectator 
within us, is therefore partly conditioned by what factual spectators, from without us, are likely to 
bestow praise on. Put differently, we seem to love praise because it indicates what is worthy of it. 
This, in turn, leads us to praiseworthiness which we love even more. Blame and blameworthiness 
seem to behave in the same way as praise and being worthy of praise. What has been said regarding 
praiseworthiness can therefore be equally applied to being worthy of blame vice versa. “Neither is it 
(…) so much the thought of being hated and despised that we are afraid of, as that of being hateful 
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and despicable”. Again, the views of others play a vital part in the determination of our image of 
ourselves  and,  at  the  same  time,  does  not  represent  the  sole  condition  of  it,  as  the  Impartial 
Spectator, the instance of morality within ourselves, decides on the moral value of our behaviour 
and attitudes. Just as with regard to praise, we are sensitive to whether we deserve to be blamed or 
not, and acknowledge blame where it is due in order to sympathise with our fellow moral agents. 
People feeling the weight of being worthy of blame “voluntarily submitted themselves both to the 
reproach and to the punishment which they knew were due to their crimes, but which, at the same 
time, they might easily have avoided” (Smith 1759, III, 2.9; 2.10). In the end, praiseworthiness 
seems to have two components. Both worlds, the opinions and judgements of outside spectators and 
the Impartial Spectator within us, lead us towards moral conduct.  Thereby, the first serves as a 
motivation for us to seek praiseworthiness and strive towards it, the second gives us the means to do 
exactly that. “It is our desire to be approved of by others that drives us to view ourselves from 
without, which in turn lets us see the difference between something being praised and something 
being worthy of praise” (Sivertsen 2017, p. 104). So, the impact of our everyday contact with other 
people on how we come to judge our own conduct morally is only partly responsible for our self-
evaluation. Our drive towards being the proper object of other people’s praise is complemented by 
us striving towards it  using the Impartial Spectator as an internal instance of moral judgement. 
“This superior human desire for praiseworthiness locates proper moral judgment yet beyond  the 
horizon of popular opinion” (Freiin von Villiez 2006, p. 121) and thereby places it in our individual 
conception of morality. One underlying condition for praiseworthiness seems to be the sacrifices we 
had to endure in order to act in a morally right way. Engaging in morally right conduct, and thereby 
acting praiseworthy, on occasions which do not test our discipline and will-power does not entirely 
prove the praiseworthiness of our character. “The situations in which the gentle virtue of humanity 
can be most happily cultivated, are by no means the same with those which are best fitted for 
forming the austere virtue of self-command” (Smith 1759, III, 3.37). The praiseworthiness of our 
behaviour rather consists of two components. An action is worthy of praise if it is virtuous and 
chosen above a less virtuous but easier to achieve alternative. We ought to act morally for its own 
sake and not with a potential reward in mind. “A person of high character is honest not because the 
law forbids theft, nor because the person has calculated the advantage of appearing trustworthy. A 
person of character loves virtue itself” (Wight 2007, p. 351). Virtuous behaviour is the end of a 
praiseworthy action.  In  other  words,  the  very  lack of  any agenda apart  from acting virtuously 
creates the highest amount of praiseworthiness in our conduct. For Smith, there are a number of 
virtues to morally qualify an action. One virtue he recognises is prudence. It consists of the care and 
attention we give to issues concerning ourselves. “The care of the health, of the fortune, of the rank 
and reputation of the individual (…) is considered as the proper business of that virtue which is 
commonly called Prudence” (Smith 1759, VI, i, 5). In other words, we act prudently by putting 
effort  into  bettering  our  situation  in  general  and  taking  care  of  us  as  agents.  “The  moderate 
expression of the care for one’s self is, according to Smith’s ethics, morally good” (Witzum 1998, p. 
506). This often means maintaining the present standard. Smith seems to primarily deem prudence a 
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virtue of defending the position we are in and only after that moving up from there. “We suffer 
more (…) when we fall from a better to a worse situation, than we ever enjoy when we rise from a 
worse to a better”. The most important trait for the prudent man is therefore a steady wariness. 
Prudence “is rather cautious than enterprising, and more anxious to preserve the advantages which 
we already possess, than forward to prompt us to the acquisition of still greater advantages” (Smith 
1759, VI, i, 6). Although being one virtue, Smith does not value it the highest among them. The 
praiseworthiness of prudent actions is limited as it is in our own interest to take care of ourselves 
anyway. “Since we have a natural inclination to be concerned first and foremost with ourselves, it is 
the least difficult virtue to cultivate”. Beneficence is another virtue Smith sees as being apt to lead to 
praiseworthy  behaviour.  The  degree  of  it  in  our  actions  “determines  the  proper  level  of 
prudence” (Otteson 2000, p. 56) in them for it is the virtue of caring about other people. While 
prudence is concerned with ourselves only, beneficent actions are directed towards anyone but us. 
As such, Smith sees it decreasing with physical and mental distance. “After himself, the members of 
his family, those who usually live in the same house with him (…) are naturally the objects of his 
warmest affections” (Smith 1759, VI, ii,  1.2).  Smith understands this relation also gradual.  The 
closer a person is to us, the more proper is our display of beneficence towards this person. “The 
impartial spectator approves of an increasing level of beneficence toward others in direct proportion 
to our familiarity with them” (Otteson 2000,  p.  54).  Accordingly,  we most  benefit people with 
whom we “regularly consort” and being apart from them for an unusually long time “inevitably 
diminishes  the  natural  feeling  of  affection”  (Raphael  2009,  p.  77).  Family  ties,  so  Smith,  can 
decrease the impact of distance on this connection. “The general rule is established, that persons 
related to one another in a certain degree, ought always to be affected towards one another in a 
certain manner”.  These relationships formed through family connections are also more resilient 
regarding long distances. “Even during the separation, the father and the child, the brother s or the 
sisters, are by no means indifferent to one another” (Smith 1759, VI, ii, 1.7; 1.8). Justice is the third 
virtue in Smith’s canon. He regards just conduct as important as it is the condition for a certain 
reliability in everyday interaction. Its degree in our behaviour is, for Smith, defined through the 
response to our actions by the other members of society. “The propriety of reward and punishment 
consists in the approval by spectators of the natural reaction of those affected, gratitude for being 
benefitted,  punishment for being harmed”.  Differently to prudence and beneficence,  justice is  a 
standard. Acting justly is expected from every agent but breaking with justice is the proper object of 
blame. “Justice differs from other virtues in that it is attended by a degree of obligation to conform; 
consequently  a  breach  of  justice  renders  the  offender  liable  to  the  enforced  imposition  of  the 
punishment it  deserves” (Raphael 2009, p. 74). Smith sees justice as the more important virtue 
compared to beneficence as it “is less essential to the existence of society than justice. Society may 
subsist,  though  not  in  the  most  comfortable  state,  without  beneficence;  but  the  prevalence  of 
injustice must utterly destroy it”. Within justice, Smith orders the rules governing the interaction of 
people with each other according to their respective importance for society as a whole. “The most 
sacred laws of justice (…) are thelaws which guard the life and person of our neighbour; the next 
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are those which guard his property and possessions; and last of all come those which guard what are 
called his personal rights” (Smith 1759, II, ii, 3.3; 2.2). The dominant feature of justice is a sense of 
fairness (similarly to how John Rawls defined its nature more than two hundred years later (see 
Freiin  von  Villiez  2006)).  Self-command completes  Smith’s  catalogue  of  virtues.  However,  its 
character is distinct from prudence, beneficence and justice in the sense that it  seems to enable 
them.  “Although  Smith  considers  self-command a  virtue  along  with  the  other  three,  it  is  best 
understood  as  the  necessary  quality  a  person  must  have  in  order  to  act  on  the  other  three 
virtues” (Otteson 2000, p. 56). Its character as basis for virtuous behaviour in general makes it stand 
out among the other three virtues Smith mentioned. “Self-command is not only itself a great virtue, 
but from it all the other virtues seem to derive their principal lustre” (Smith 1759, VI, iii, 11). The 
otherwise virtuous conduct needs to be contested to make it praiseworthy, therefore we have to 
struggle and make sacrifices in order to act fully virtuously. “Virtue appears when an unusual effort 
has been made in the tuning up, when the distressed shows more fortitude or the bystander shows 
more feeling than could ever have been expected” (Bonar 1926, p. 337). This extends to the entirety 
of our behaviour, including the interest in ourselves as “a healthy self-interest implies the discipline 
of self-control and a regard for the rights of others” (Wight 2007, p. 344). Without the presence of 
self-command,  virtuous  behaviour  by  itself  cannot  achieve  praiseworthiness.  A virtuous  action 
draws its  value  from the  self-command necessary  to  perform it.  In  the  case  of  prudence,  “the 
impartial spectator approves of [prudence], not on account of its success or failure in obtaining 
goods but because of the self-command that frugality and industry are thought to imply” (Mehta 
2006, p. 261). Self-command is therefore a direct criterion for the moral judgement of the Impartial 
Spectator. “The virtue of self-command is judged by the supposed impartial spectator, by our moral 
alter ego, and it is reflected in our sense of propriety” (Montes 2004, p. 107). He morally evaluates 
the propriety of our actions on the basis how the virtues of prudence, beneficence and justice feature 
in them but behaviour becomes truly praiseworthy through the exercise of self-command. Both 
components, the presence of one or more of the three virtues Smith lists as well as a certain degree 
of self-command, need to concur in order to lift an action to the level of being the proper object of 
praise morally.  Consequently, we must be tested to really confirm the validity of our character. 
Being exposed to extreme conditions and having to commit to difficult decisions shows how much 
we truly internalised the perspective of the Impartial Spectator in our everyday thinking. “Virtuous 
behavior is that which receives the approval of the disinterested outlooker” (Grampp 1948, p. 317) 
so what the Impartial Spectator points us towards. To follow his guidance in difficult situations is 
what demands self-command as “the partial spectator is at hand, the impartial one at great distance” 
(Smith 1759, III, 3.42). To really prove our morality, we need to practice how firmly it stands under 
severe circumstances as “morality recommends and approves self-control and moderation” (Sayre-
McCord 2009, p. 11). We are, however, very easily deceived into avoiding the trouble of virtuous 
behaviour and indulging our own passions. Smith defines two kinds of passions which are apt to 
mislead us. “Fear and anger (…) constitute the first class. The love of ease, of pleasure, of applause, 
and  of  many  other  selfish  gratifications  constitute  the  second”  (Smith  1759  VI,  iii,  3).  The 
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withholding from these constitutes  true self-command.  Moreover,  Smith considers  praiseworthy 
behaviour to be more enjoyable and pleasurable if self-command was an essential element on the 
way to  it.  “The  reward  which  Nature  bestows upon good behaviour  under  misfortune,  is  thus 
exactly proportioned to the degree of that good behaviour”. In other words, the praiseworthiness of 
an  action  and,  in  turn,  the  pleasure  and  pride  we  retrieve  from  engaging  in  it  increases  “in 
proportion  to  the  degree  of  self-command  which  is  necessary  in  order  to  conquer  our  natural 
sensibility” (ibid., III, 3.27). It seems that praiseworthiness is a gradual concept that depends on 
both, virtuous conduct as well as self-command. Good behaviour must, and in most cases is, be 
accompanied by self-discipline to make it praiseworthy as “the man of the most exquisite humanity, 
is naturally the most capable of acquiring the highest degree of self-command“. So following Smith 
here, a person who is not naturally or by fate exposed to challenging circumstances seems to be 
unable to engage in praiseworthy conduct no matter how morally right his behaviour might be, 
unless he actively puts himself into potentially precarious situations. “Hardships, dangers, injuries, 
misfortunes, are the only masters under whom we can learn the exercise of this virtue. But these are 
all masters to whom nobody willingly puts himself to school” (ibid., III, 3.36). For this reason, 
Smith  sees  challenging  situations  as  opportunities  to  prove  our  self-command.  Regarding  the 
overcoming of fear and the display of courage “war is the great school both for acquiring and 
exercising this species of magnanimity” (ibid., VI, iii, 7). However, deliberately risking our physical 
and mental integrity and health is not necessary to attain praiseworthiness as Smith seems to offer 
alternatives.  Firstly,  the  relation  of  praiseworthiness  and  self-command seems to  work  in  both 
directions. “Morality valorizes limitations on the expression of grief at the loss of a loved one, 
calmness  in  the  face  of  danger,  as  well  as  restraint  when  in  the  grip  of  love  and  controlled 
enthusiasm in the face of good fortune” (Sayre-McCord 2009, p. 11). Even the person depicted 
above, who never had to face hardships and whose character was never tested in a way that would 
require  self-command  in  order  to  adhere  to  praiseworthy  behaviour,  can  still  attain 
praiseworthiness.  He,  in  his  luck  and  bliss,  needs  to  restrain  from  showcasing  his  fortunate 
circumstances  to  others.  Modesty  is  therefore  the  self-command  asked  of  him.  Moreover,  the 
emphasis on self-command as one virtue of praiseworthy behaviour does not render untested moral 
behaviour completely worthless. Rather, it is a way to scale up praiseworthiness beginning from a 
certain foundation. Smith sees it as a learnable skill as “a very young child has no self-command”. 
Gradually, we attain the knowledge of how to control our emotions in a process that continues 
throughout  our  lives and is  very unlikely to end before we eventually die.  The child therefore 
“enters into the great school of self-command, it studies to become more and more a master of 
itself, and begins to exercise over its own feelings a discipline which the practice of the longest life 
is very seldom sufficient to bring to complete perfection” (Smith 1759, III, 3.22). Just like adopting 
the perspective of the Impartial Spectator in general, learning to control our emotions and individual 
weaknesses through self-command becomes a subconscious companion to us once we reached a 
certain level in it. “The man of real constancy and firmness, the wise and just man who has been 
thoroughly bred in  the  great  school  of  self-command (…) maintains  this  control  (…) upon all 
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occasions”.  In  this  context,  as  with  the  perspective  of  the  Impartial  Spectator,  Smith  does  not 
differentiate between cases or situations in which the obtained ability of self-control might vary. 
This man he describes, once having reached a certain level of self-command, or entered fully into 
the perspective of the Impartial Spectator, no matter what situation he might see himself confronted 
with, “whether in solitude or in society, wears nearly the same countenance” (ibid., III, 3.25). Once 
attained, we therefore rarely lose this capacity. 
The Impartial Spectator was, although in its comprehensiveness and final form firstly formulated by 
Smith, already sketched in earlier works by other authors. The term ‘spectator’ was present in moral 
philosophy long before Smith published the TMS with his own construction of the figurative tool of 
the Impartial Spectator as it was briefly outlined above. The concept of a spectator, from whose 
perspective  a  moral  evaluation  of  behaviour  is  conducted  especially  occurred  in  British  moral 
philosophy  as  “Lord  Shaftesbury  and  Bishop  Butler  both  argued  for  disinterested  motives”  to 
morally evaluate an agent’s behaviour. Although they could not “fully shake off the conviction that 
a judgement to justify doing (…) must in the last resort be based on self-interest” (Raphael 2009, p. 
27), this was a first advance towards introducing impartiality into the process of moral evaluation 
and indeed into moral theory in general. Also, it laid the main emphasis not on the evaluation itself 
but on the spectator as the origin and the initiator of the evaluative process. Thereby the ultimate 
judgement came to depend on the observer’s individual point of view and intentions. Hutcheson and 
Hume, as Smith’s companions in the era of Scottish Enlightenment, took up this thread of thought 
and followed it further. They introduced the notion of the spectator as a third instance that, through 
its  disinterest,  can  come  to  more  profound  moral  judgements  and  verdicts  than  any  spectator 
involved in the situation could. Moreover, this kind of spectator can more directly and purely judge 
our behaviour than just any bystander could. This is where Smith comes into play by promoting this 
entity to the ultimate tool of self-evaluation. To fully analyse and adequately evaluate the earlier 
sources of influence on Smith’s moral philosophy would exceed the scope of this thesis. As before 
with sympathy, the comparative focus will rest on Hutcheson and Hume. In the following, their 
positions will be briefly sketched and differentiated from each other and from Smith.
When talking about what influenced Smith in his life and moral philosophy, there is no way around 
Hutcheson. As with sympathy, it is a far fetch to see Smith’s Impartial Spectator as a direct response 
to Hutcheson’s thoughts, having been mentoring Smith and maintaining contact with him until his 
death, it nevertheless seems fair to say that Hutcheson played a significant role in the evolution of 
Smith’s  considerations  on  moral  philosophy.  This  becomes  apparent  from the  points,  in  which 
Smith seems to agree with Hutcheson but perhaps even more so from those, in which their opinions 
diverge. “Francis Hutcheson (…) was the first to insist that there are disinterested judgements about 
the moral character of actions as well as disinterested motives for doing or refraining from those 
actions”. In contrast to Lord Shaftesbury and Bishop Butler, who did reserve space for self-interest 
in this form of moral evaluation, Hutcheson eliminated it completely. In doing so, he seems to have 
set neutrality and impartiality as necessary conditions for arriving at a morally right judgement in 
the end. “Hutcheson struck out a new path in saying that a judgement of approving another person’s 
Page !50
action could be quite disinterested, uninfluenced by any thought of benefit to oneself” (Raphael 
2009,  pp.  27,  28).  This  importance  that  he  placed on the  impartiality  of  an  evaluation can be 
rediscovered in Smith. The Impartial  Spectator derives parts of his normative force from being 
uninfluenced by our personal biases and, at the same time, being a part of us. The disinterestedness 
towards  individual  convictions  and  advantages  therefore  seems to  be  a  defining  feature  of  the 
Impartial Spectator’s moral reasoning. Hutcheson’s ‘moral sense’ is inherent to the moral agent and 
not imagined. This is a contrast to Smith’s Impartial Spectator, whose standard of moral judgement 
is gradually internalised following a step by step learning process. Differently from Hutcheson’s 
‘moral sense’, the Impartial Spectator’s viewpoint therefore is not inborn but acquired over a period 
of moral education. However, Hutcheson’s qualified his ‘moral sense’ in a way that not only is the it 
impartial,  but  also  only  “naturally  evoked  when  we  come  across  the  disinterested  motive  of 
benevolence, and a similar feeling of disapproval for motives with a tendency opposed to that of 
benevolence” (ibid.).  This means the ‘moral sense’ operates significantly different from Smith’s 
Impartial  Spectator.  Being  inherent  to  every  human  being,  Hutcheson’s  ‘moral  sense’ prompts 
reactions automatically. The Impartial Spectator, on the other hand, as not being inherent to us, 
creates moral behaviour in us as a result of the learning process we went through to internalise his 
perspective.  Also,  for  Hutcheson,  the  sole  concern  and  criterion  of  a  behaviour’s  evaluation, 
therefore seems to be benevolence. Any self-regarding in our motivation would diminish its moral 
value entirely. “Hutcheson had argued that moral virtue consisted in pure benevolence, and that any 
admixture  of  self-interest  tended  only  to  take  away  whatever  merit  an  action  might  have 
had” (Otteson 2000, p. 55). The reactions evoked by the ‘moral sense’ therefore only depend on the 
occurrence or lack of benevolence. This becomes clearer when Hutcheson’s considerations towards 
beauty  are  considered.  He  was  “as  much  interested  in  aesthetics  as  in  ethics”  and  clearly 
distinguished the reference points of morality and aesthetics. “In Hutcheson’s view, moral approval 
is directed upon benevolence, and aesthetic admiration is directed upon unity-in-variety” (Raphael 
2009, pp.  82,  28).  Accordingly,  the ideal  for each of these desirabilities,  be it  beauty or moral 
approval, is the emergence of a particular signal resulting in the occurrence of the wanted result. 
Benevolence  and  unity-in-variety  are  triggers  for  approval  or  beauty  respectively.  “Virtue  is 
benevolence  approved  and  beauty  is  unity-in-variety  admired.  The  reaction  of  a  spectator  is  a 
necessary though not a sufficient condition” (ibid.). Hutcheson’s focus on benevolence with regard 
to moral evaluation has implications for his influence on Smith, for it expresses how he sees ethics 
in general which seems to be quite different from Smith’s understanding. “By reducing virtue to 
benevolence he [Hutcheson] necessarily focuses on the consequences of the actions/characters for 
the whole system rather than for the individuals affected by them, and this leads his theory to a 
particular metaethical model which, without being the same, will have many similarities with the 
subsequent  utilitarian  tradition  and  will  mark  an  unbridgeable  difference  with  Adam  Smith’s 
philosophy”.  Not  only  does  the  concentration  on  benevolence  make  Hutcheson’s  moral  theory 
appear  in  a  Utilitarian  light,  it  also  seems  to  needlessly  weaken  his  whole  account  of  moral 
philosophy by being too exclusive regarding moral motivations. “If only disinterested benevolence 
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counts  as  virtuous,  any  other  motive,  even  if  it  is  not  hurtful  to  the  whole,  will  unjustifiably 
diminish the excellence of an action or character” (Carrasco 2011, pp. 525, 526). Smith on the other 
hand  seems  to  have  found  a  way  to  circumvent  that  by  introducing  another  criterion.  “Smith 
specifically criticizes that theory of morals (…) which would recognize as the only motives to moral 
action purely disinterested benevolence” (Nieli 1986, p. 618). For him the only way to virtuous 
conduct and moral approval is propriety. Entering the Impartial Spectator’s perspective enables us 
to attain the status of being worthy of praise by showing us the proper behaviour in any given 
situation. It is because Smith changes the focus of the Impartial Spectator from benevolence alone 
to propriety, which indicates and is indicated by praiseworthiness, that he manages to solve his 
mentor’s conundrum. “In order to reach propriety, however, ‘benevolence' is not enough for human 
beings;  thus  Smith  supplements  his  mentor’s  sole  motive  with  the  virtue  of  self-
command” (Carrasco 2011, p. 528).  He thereby complements benevolence, along with the other 
virtues,  with  self-control  as  stepping  stones  to  propriety  and,  in  turn,  praiseworthiness.  It  also 
becomes clear, why Hutcheson could not come up with an Impartial Spectator as his disciple Smith 
did decades later. The figurative person of the Impartial Spectator is a perspective that needs to be 
entered. But it is not the insight that we gain after we adopted the point of view which helps us 
evaluate  our  conduct  morally,  it  is  the  process  of  entering  itself.  “This  is  not  the  case  with 
Hutcheson [and his ‘moral sense’]. The internalization of an imaginary impartial spectator and the 
sympathizing and judging as an impartial spectator would do, radically distances Smith's TMS from 
his contemporaries’ sentiment”. This narrow view on benevolence as the only criterion for moral 
evaluation also impacts  his  understanding of  disinterest.  Hutcheson uses  the term ‘impartiality’ 
differently from Smith in the sense that it seems for him, it expresses a principle intimately related 
to, if not identical with, utilitarianism. Everyone in society counts as one and should be treated as 
such.  Individual  circumstances do not  count  as  much,  as  the value of  every conduct  is  judged 
exclusively  according  to  how it  is  able  to  increase  the  overall  happiness  of  society.  And  this 
contribution is judged by applying the measure of benevolence. “An action is morally good not 
because it has the best consequences but mainly because it originates in benevolent affections (or a 
disinterested desire for universal happiness)” (ibid., pp. 541, 547). That is as long as an action is 
benevolent, it is to be approved. Although this generalisation seems to contradict the presentation of 
Hutcheson as utilitarian, however, it even intensifies this perception of him. As only benevolent 
behaviour results in moral approval, it is to be favoured above all other. The consequences, via the 
diversion of generalisation, still are decisive for the value of an action. Impartiality for Smith, on 
the other hand, describes the complete opposite. “Smith goes out of his way to reject the idea that 
utility either explains or sets the standard for our moral judgments” (Sayre-McCord 2009, p. 2). The 
Impartial Spectator looks at the individual characteristics of the circumstances other people are in 
and is impartial only towards our own biases and attitudes. Smith claims that “it is not so much 
utility in the sense of the end or outcome of action as in the sense of the means to some end (…) — 
utility in the sense of functionality”  (Haakonssen 2002, p. xix). The mechanisms of judgement 
rather  than  the  ends  are  impartial.  Smith’s  Impartial  Spectator  sees  the  situation  regardless  of 
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individual  characteristics  of  the  agent  and is  disinterested  in  that  way only.  He therefore  even 
concentrates on the particular characteristics of a situation by making them the only conceivable 
material to go on from. Smith therefore includes far too many aspects into moral judgement as for it 
to be called utilitarian in any way. Smith explains this understanding of impartiality in the TMS. 
“Before we can make any proper comparison (…), we must change our position. We must view 
them [the circumstances of the situation at hand], neither from our own place nor yet from his 
[another moral agent], neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the 
eyes  of  a  third  person,  who  has  no  particular  connexion  with  either,  and  who  judges  with 
impartiality between us” (Smith 1759, III, 3.3). This third person is what Smith describes by the 
notion  of  the  Impartial  Spectator.  The  contrast  between  the  teacher’s  and  the  student’s 
understanding  of  impartiality  becomes  especially  clear  when  considering  their  respective 
understandings of the role punishment ought to play in a community. Smith defends an approach 
which takes into account the particular circumstances and kind of wrongdoing at hand and neglects 
capital  punishment  as  disproportionate  and improper.  “Smith says  that  punishment  ought  to  be 
proportionate to the injury done. Excessive punishment is revenge, and no spectator will go along 
with  it”.  Hutcheson,  as  a  result  of  his  different  take  on  impartiality  and  disinterest,  seems  to 
consider punishment as a more universal  subject.  “In several  places he insists  that  the ends of 
punishment are repelling injuries, compensation, deterrence, and, the most important and to which 
all the others are subservient, maintaining a regard to the safety and happiness of the community”. 
This is not only due to his interpretation of the term of impartiality but also a result of his focus on 
benevolence as the only end of moral judgement. “Since the public good, the greatest happiness to 
the greatest number (produced by the most extensive benevolence), is the overriding principle in his 
theory and the moral justification of actions, there is neither allusion to repentance and recognition 
of equality nor to proportionality” (Carrasco 2011, p. 546). Smith on the other hand “argues that 
even where the value of  the outcome is  not  in  question,  our  actual  interest  is  not  so much in 
securing the outcomes (in utility, that is) but in good design. The suitability of things to certain ends 
recommends them to our approval,  often more than what they might actually produce” (Sayre-
McCord 2009, p. 11). Another aspect in which Smith deviates from his teacher is the character of 
judgement  itself.  “Smith’s  main  concern  is  to  take  issue  with  Hutcheson’s  view  that  moral 
judgments are properly seen as strictly analogous to the other sorts of judgments we make. Smith 
thinks this fails to get right the distinctive nature of moral judgment and so mistakes the principle of 
approbation that underwrites those judgments” (Sayre-McCord 2009, p. 20). In Smith’s Impartial 
Spectator, reason and moral evaluation are combined into one tool of moral judgement. Since we 
long to engage in praiseworthy behaviour, the combination of these aspects makes sense because it 
consolidates our efforts towards that aim. By utilising  the intellectual means to initiate a process of 
observation and analysis  and the  capability  to  morally  judge,  the  Impartial  Spectator  therefore 
integrates  both  mentioned  components  in  one  unit.  This  marks  another  stark  diversion  from 
Hutcheson, for he does not see this identity at all. On the contrary, he considers reason and desire as 
quite distinct from each other, with each having separate purposes to serve in moral judgement. The 
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rational part, namely the domain of reason, serves us by providing the framework needed to morally 
agree or disagree.  Morality applies this capability to approve of morally right behaviour and to 
disapprove of  the morally wrong.  “Reason is  only in  charge of  the preparatory tasks of  moral 
judgments. (…) After doing this instrumental job, the ‘moral sense’ will approve or disapprove of 
the agent’s conduct” (Carrasco 2011, p. 543). For Smith both of these faculties are merged in the 
Impartial Spectator. 
As  with  Smith’s  understanding  of  sympathy,  the  Impartial  Spectator  as  well  is  in  large  parts 
building on the thinking and moral philosophy of Smith’s life-long friend Hume. Unlike Hutcheson, 
Hume went further in describing morality and added considerably more depth in his understanding 
of it. Hutcheson’s ‘moral sense’ relies on the occurrence of benevolence in an agent’s action and 
makes this the only condition for it being morally worthy or not. “Hume added to this theory an 
explanation  of  the  ‘moral  sense’  or  ‘moral  sentiment’,  the  capacity  to  feel  approval  or 
disapproval” (Raphael 2009, p. 29). Although it most certainly evolved from it and, from its name 
alone,  seems  to  take  a  lot  from its  pendant  in  Hutcheson’s  moral  philosophy,  Hume’s  ‘moral 
sentiment’ is in many ways different from Hutcheson’s ‘moral sense’. The most obvious difference, 
and perhaps the one Hutcheson would perceive as the most drastic diversion from his theory, can be 
found  in  the  scope  of  his  ‘moral  sentiment’s  foundation.  “Hume did  not  follow Hutcheson  in 
confining  virtue  to  benevolence”  but  opened  up  the  term  to  an  understanding  that  makes 
benevolence one component of many. In doing so, another difference to Hutcheson’s narrow ‘moral 
sense’ becomes apparent.  In Hume’s understanding,  moral  approval  is  based on sympathy with 
conduct. He worked with a conception of sympathy very similar but not quite equal to Smith’s. It is 
the foundation of Hume’s ‘moral sentiment’ or ‘point of view’ as he called it himself. Nevertheless, 
benevolence is by no means neglected in the course of this. On the contrary, Hume uses it as an 
illustration of how we interact with and come to moral judgements about each other. “Benevolence 
pleases the observer because he sympathizes with the pleasure that benevolent action brings to the 
benefited” (ibid.) and vice versa. Thereby it is worth noting that we do not need to be in some way 
identical with the benefited in any given situation to be able to engage in sympathy or, in turn, in 
moral judgement. It is perfectly possible for us to come to such a moral verdict regarding an action 
towards not us but another agent, even if we are just bystanders and observing the situation from 
outside. We need to widen our moral horizon in a way that allows us to come to moral judgements 
about agents who acted towards third parties. “We must take into account the effects of a person’s 
actions and character traits not just on ourselves but also on those, who have any commerce with the 
person we consider” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 89). The resulting concept is in its nature very similar to a 
spectator model as it does include many of them, who by the virtual combination of their individual 
perspectives eventually form a mutual standpoint,  which Hume then calls  ‘point of view’.  “On 
Hume’s  account,  spectators  approach  a  general  point  of  view  by  seeking  to  transcend  their 
individual positional or sentimental biases and striving to occupy the only ‘common point of view’ 
that can ‘appear the same to all’” (Hanley 2016, p. 9). This vantage point is described by Hume as 
“that of the person himself, whose character is examined; or that of persons, who have a connexion 
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with him” (Hume 1739, 3 3, 1.16). As a result of Hume’s definition of sympathy, the focus of the 
‘point  of  view’ lies  in the feelings of  the subject  of  observation.  In Hume’s view, engaging in 
sympathy successfully means the reproduction of my fellow’s feelings in me. In a way, we are 
understanding another’s perspective by ‘re-feeling’ his respective feelings and going through the 
same emotions as him. This, as has been pointed out, is a point in which Smith departs from his 
friend as he focusses on our own feelings towards another’s situation. However, for Hume’s ‘point 
of  view’ -  theory,  this  means that  spectators  by accumulating their  different  perspectives strive 
towards reproducing other’s feelings in their hearts to enter into the other’s perspectives towards the 
aim of one common ‘point  of view’.  “On this view, the mark of a good spectator is  not mere 
transcendence of particular biases, but also replication of the precise feelings experienced by the 
actual subject or subjects of her observation” (Hanley 2016, p. 9). Nevertheless, Hume’s ‘point of 
view’ is not only constituted by various spectators, it also seems to be closely connected to the 
concept of a spectator itself. Hume himself indicates that by using the terms interchangeably in 
multiple passages of the Treatise. “Hume occasionally links the concept of the general point of view 
with the standpoint  of ‘a judicious spectator’ or ‘every spectator’ or ‘every bystander’” (Hume 
1739, 3, 1.14; 3, 3, 1.30, Rasmussen 2017, p. 90). It should be mentioned that Hume in his Enquiry 
Concerning  Human  Understanding  later  departs  from his  remarks  in  the  Treatise  to  approach 
Hutcheson’s  belief  in  benevolence  as  the  criterion  for  morality.  However,  Smith’s  Impartial 
Spectator seems to be the logical next step of evolution and indeed, “the device of the ‘impartial 
spectator’ central to Smith’s ethics is similar in both its intentions and its operations to Hume’s 
‘general point of view’, and it has even been claimed that the concept, though not the precise name, 
of  an  impartial  spectator  is  there  already  in  Hume”  (Hanley  2016,  p.  8).  To  mention  another 
similarity between Hume and Smith, the ‘point of view’ in Hume as well as the Impartial Spectator 
in  Smith  “must  be  informed,  for  instance,  and  impartial,  and  engaged  by  the  welfare  of 
others” (Sayre-McCord 2014, p. 32). Their respective objectives seem to be aligned as well as both 
seem to seek an impartial standpoint. This should be uninfluenced as far as this is possible to form 
an  instance  of  moral  judgement  and  moral  self-evaluation  which  can  withstand  the  greatest 
manipulation from ex- and internal influences by, at the same time, allowing for enough contact to 
and close observation of the world to reach a position from which we can come to a profound moral 
judgement on other agents and ourselves. “Hume’s general point of view and Smith’s impartial 
spectator  are  each  conceived,  in  the  first  instance,  as  mechanisms  intended  to  assist  us  in 
overcoming the distortions endemic to our naturally partial perspectives” (Hanley 2016, p. 9). This 
plethora of agreement has further implications, for it shows itself in their respective perception of 
general  moral  questions  as  well  as  the  basic  structure  of  their  respective  models  of  moral 
judgement. “Smith agrees with Hume that right and wrong are established by the sentiments that we 
feel  when  we  adopt  the  proper  perspective,  one  that  corrects  for  personal  biases  and 
misinformation” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 89). In Smith’s terms, this is another description of entering 
into the perspective of the Impartial Spectator, as he is the ultimate instance of impartiality. This 
becomes  clearer  when  one  examines  the  nature  of  the  sentiments  proposed  by  Hume.  “The 
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‘sentiments’ that  Hume’s  spectator  expresses  are  impartial  and  (in  a  sense)  rational:  impartial 
because disinterested, and rational because universal” (Raphael 2009, p.  30).  Both philosophers 
therefore seem to explicitly stress the necessity of non-involvement for a perspective from which 
we are  able  to  form moral  judgements.  “The  basic  mechanism by  which  right  and  wrong are 
determined is the same for both: morality rests on disinterested sentiments” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 
90). Apart from the question of right and wrong, Smith seems to agree with Hume in the more 
structural points as well. An example of that is in what way each one sets the expectations that their 
respective model needs to live up to. Both, the ‘point of view’ and the Impartial Spectator are in 
their nature standards of moral judgement. As such, they “must be morally good, appropriate, or 
justified. This means that the standard we rely on (whether set by the general point of view or by the 
impartial spectator) must itself meet the standard it  sets” (Sayre-McCord 2014, p. 33). In other 
words, we must be able to deduce the Impartial Spectator from itself. There must be a way to think 
of him as a product of himself. The same holds for Hume’s ‘point of view’. Another similarity that 
is expressed in the semantics of each model is how both treat approval. “Hume and Smith share the 
idea that we should understand thinking of something as approvable in terms of the thing being 
such that it would secure approval”. An action or feeling therefore has to qualify to be worthy of 
approval. Smith would put it like this: something is not approvable unless it is a proper object of 
approval. As mentioned above, he sets praiseworthiness as the measure for the Impartial Spectator 
to judge by, this seems to be included in Hume’s account already. Thereby, both expand the scope of 
the propriety criterion beyond that. It includes specifics as the subject of it as well as the particular 
situation.  They  demand  for  worthy  approval  to  be  “not  approval  from just  anyone  under  any 
circumstances, but approval from someone appropriate under suitable circumstances” (ibid., p. 32). 
Nevertheless,  the  ‘point  of  view’ model  in  Hume’s  moral  philosophy  and  Smith’s  Impartial 
Spectator are not identical as the similarities in each of their thinking are accompanied by a number 
of differences. For example, Smith increases the scope of what his model, the Impartial Spectator, 
can be applied to. Where Hume’s ‘point of view’ was restricted to the moral evaluation of other 
people’s behaviour and the support  of our moral judgement regarding our fellow moral agents, 
Smith’s Impartial Spectator seems to be designed to exceed these boundaries. “What is original in 
Adam Smith is the development of the concept so as to explain the judgements of conscience made 
by an agent about his own actions”. Through the Impartial Spectator, we can come to unbiased 
moral evaluations about ourselves. This is something which Hume cannot provide. Since in his 
theory of moral philosophy, the ‘point of view’ is the accumulation of a number of members of a 
certain community, which may include our own, it necessarily contains the individual biases of each 
of those agents or particular spectators. Whether these preoccupations are aggregated in a ‘common 
point of view’ or not does not matter in that context. Hume therefore only helps as far as we are 
concerned with moral judgement about others and morally evaluating other agents’ behaviour. The 
reason for that, again, seems to be found in Hume’s interpretation of the term ‘sympathy’. “The 
sympathy to which Hume referred was a spectator’s sympathy with the feelings of the person or 
persons  affected  by  the  action  concerned”  (Raphael  2009,  p.  31).  Smith  directed  his  thinking 
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towards the feelings of the spectator if he imagined himself in the situation of the subject of his 
observation, the person affected by the action concerned. The reference point for Smith’s sympathy 
is the feelings of the spectator having imagined himself in the subject’s situation, not the subject 
himself. Instead of focussing on the passive part of an action, the person acted towards and his 
feelings, Smith seems to put more emphasis on the active part, the person engaging in the behaviour 
in question and what his feelings are towards it. It is his perspective that we have to enter and fill 
with our own feelings towards the situation at hand. We then, following Smith, use the Impartial 
Spectator to figure out what the proper reaction to it would be. The advantage over Hume’s ‘point of 
view’ is that we can apply this process to ourselves in the same way and thereby come to unbiased 
moral  judgements  about  ourselves.  Closely  related  to  that  point  is  another  one  at  which  the 
difference between Hume’s ‘point of view’ and Smith’s Impartial Spectator becomes clear. As has 
been crucial in the comparison of Smith and Hutcheson, the individual understanding of the term 
‘impartiality’ becomes again crucial in the discussion of Hume’s influence on Smith. Smith is ready 
to go beyond what Hume established in his ‘point of view’. “Smith suggests that the proper end of 
impartiality  is  something  other  than  a  mere  transcendence  of  self-preference  culminating  in 
replication of the sentiments of the person or persons principally concerned” (Hanley 2016, p. 9). 
This shows Smith’s different handling of the sympathy notion again. He sees it  as not being a 
reproduction of other’s feelings but focussing on our own feelings, were we in another’s situation. 
Thereby, he allows for unique own feelings in ourselves rather than limiting our morality to the 
reproduction of feelings that have been felt before. “Where Hume’s common point of view aims to 
replicate an already extant position—that of the person being observed—Smith’s impartial spectator 
occupies  a  new  position  that  was  known  to  neither  the  spectator  nor  the  person  principally 
concerned  prior  to  their  independent  active  exertions  to  achieve  a  commonly  accessible 
disposition”. It becomes clear once more that both philosophers build their individual ideas of moral 
philosophy  on  their  particular  understanding  of  sympathy.  Consequently,  the  character  of  their 
findings depends on the basis they laid in the development of the term sympathy. As has been 
mentioned when comparing the two sympathy understandings, “Hume aims at an ‘exchange’ where 
Smith strives rather for ‘convergence’”. The new conception of the term has implications for the 
Impartial Spectator himself. “In Smith’s account, (…) the actor and the spectator are engaged in a 
creative act as opposed to merely a mimetic act of replication“. The process of moral judgement is 
therefore  a  creative  one  with  Smith  while  Hume confines  it  to  one  of  reproduction.  It  is  this 
creativity  however  which gives  the  Impartial  Spectator  its  descriptive  power  and what  enables 
Smith to distinguish the merits of what is being praised and what is praiseworthy. This distinction is 
central  to  Smith’s  moral  philosophy for  it  is  the measure the Impartial  Spectator  evaluates  the 
propriety of behaviour by. The flexibility Smith establishes by giving the Impartial Spectator this 
creative room for interpretation widens the range to which he can be applied as a tool for moral 
judgement significantly. It “allows the impartial spectator, in a way Hume’s general point of view 
cannot, to accommodate not only ‘the emotions and attitudes of people as they are’ but also those of 
‘people as they might be’” (ibid., p. 10) and, in turn, it also provides the means to morally judge 
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ourselves from an impartial perspective. With the Impartial Spectator we can come to normative 
moral judgements about our fellows and ourselves precisely because Smith detached him from the 
actual  feelings  of  others  and  gave  him  the  freedom  it  has.  That  feature  makes  the  Impartial 
Spectator a creation original to Smith. “Hume had worked out the social functions of sympathy, as 
had  other  eighteenth-century  thinkers.  The  'impartial  spectator',  as  Smith  used  it,  is  all  his 
own” (Macfie 1959, p. 217).
IV. Smithian Invisible Hand
The second work of Smith, which was published in 1776, was long seen as a more mature academic 
contribution  than  his  TMS  had  been  seventeen  years  earlier.  Self-interest  features  much  more 
prominently and is even regarded as the sole motivation for agents in a community. Although Smith 
lays his main focus on an economic analysis of his days’ society and how it became what it was, the 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (WN) is in many ways not sufficiently 
grasped by reducing it to economics for the WN combines several fields into one comprehensive 
picture of centuries in European history. “This an economic work? It is far more than that; it is a 
history and a criticism of all European civilization” (Morrow 1927, p. 322). Smith begins the WN 
with what is likely to be the most precise description of economic processes up to Smith’s time and 
what probably even today serves as the foundation of economic theory. He then goes on to found 
this  account  on a comprehensive history of  the economic emancipation of  Europe of  over two 
hundred years. In addition to that, he includes perhaps the strongest case against mercantilism and 
in  favour  of  free  trade  ever  brought  forward.  He  builds  it  on  a  quite  detailed  discussion  of 
contemporary examples such as colonialism and slavery. Last but not least, Smith endeavours to 
political economy and sketches eighteenth century society from the ruling classes to the beggar. He 
also sheds light on the responsibilities of the sovereign and a justification of a publicly financed 
education system as well as principles of taxation and an explanation of public revenue. In short, in 
this book, Smith endeavours to explain the world as a whole, but the basic question that underlies 
all parts of it and that Smith posed to the world by publishing the WN is whether or not — and if so, 
how far — the state should interfere in everyday affairs of its citizens. He shows the tension, which 
develops between the individual and state authority in a society, by the nature and implications of 
every agent’s self-interest. “It would be difficult to deny that for Smith the flow of economic life 
depends on self-interest” (Mehta 2006, p. 249) but, on the other side, it would needlessly weaken 
Smith’s case by admitting to a diabolical nature of self-interest that simply is not there in neither of 
his works. Rather, self-interest should be considered a given drive in human nature that is present in 
every person. “It is this natural similarity and equality of all individuals that furnishes the basis for 
one of the theories of value found in the Wealth of Nations” (Morrow 1927, p. 332). Accordingly, 
Smith sees every agent in society unknowingly serving a common purpose. “The purpose of the 
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Wealth of Nations is to redefine the public good so that it reflects the equality of interests” (Mehta 
2006, p. 252). In other words, self-interested behaviour becomes a contribution to a mutual project 
in which every member of society takes part.  Rather than being self-serving, it  is directed at a 
common purpose. This chapter will briefly introduce the WN. In it, each of Smith’s main work’s five 
books is summarised shortly. Subsequently, a few selected main motives of the WN, namely Smith’s 
remarks on self-interest and market economy and his resulting opposition against trade regulations, 
as well as the figure of the frequently cited invisible hand analogy itself, are briefly sketched and 
clarified in a little more detail. After that, a few main inspirations which influenced Smith in the 
writing process of the WN will shortly be introduced which is to help seeing the book in its historic 
context. This historic embedding also should illustrate the evolution of economic thought, starting 
with Bernard Mandeville’s literary remarks on economics having progressed to the influences of 
Smith’s contemporaries Hutcheson and Hume.
To summarise the WN  appropriately would and did indeed fill many books by itself.  The sheer 
comprehensiveness of Smith’s major work makes it difficult to boil down the Scottish philosopher’s 
thoughts  to  a  concise  statement.  Following,  such an attempt  is  made by highlighting the main 
findings for each book separately.
Smith describes the essence of the first book of the WN as “the causes of this improvement, in the 
productive powers of labour, and the order, according to which its produce is naturally distributed 
among the different ranks and conditions of men in the society” (Smith 1776, Introduction, 6). He 
addresses  two issues.  Firstly,  in  coming up with the segmentation of  production processes  and 
assigning each task to a number of people, Smith single-handedly revolutionizes production and 
introduces the need and opportunity for more particularly trained workers. This division of labour 
brings a previously unknown production efficiency. But it reaches further than the specification of 
tasks, as it opened up new opportunities of cooperation between industries. The division of labour 
“has led to specialisation being introduced, not just within trades, but between them” (Butler 2012, 
p.  9).  Secondly,  he also looks at  the implications this development has.  “Smith is  interested in 
finding the causes of the standard of living of the population”. As it turns out, both factors that 
determine living-standard in a society, “the share of citizens employed in productive labour and the 
productivity of their labour” (Pagliari 2011, p. 135), are increased by the introduction of division of 
labour.  As  Smith  explains  himself,  “it  is  the  great  multiplication  of  the  productions  of  all  the 
different arts, in consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, 
that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people” (Smith 1776, I, i.10). 
This  emancipating  character  the  division  of  labour  has  for  landless  citizens,  giving  equal 
opportunity to everyone, leads him to suggest free trade later in the WN. “Smith is first and foremost 
a  champion  of  commercial  society  on  the  grounds  of  its  capacity  to  maximize  opulence  and 
freedom  and  especially  to  maximize  the  opulence  and  freedom  available  to  the  poorest  and 
weakest”  (Hanley  2009,  p.  8).  He  sees  specialisation  of  production  processes  allowing  every 
individual to perform the task he is most talented in. Thereby, everyone can earn enough to sustain 
himself and his family from the occupation, which he and his particular set of skills are most suited 
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for. The special character of these strengths varies, the level to which they amount does not. “Smith 
appears  to  have  been  committed  to  a  remarkably  strong  version  of  the  claim  that  people  are 
essentially equal in abilities” (Fleischacker 2004, p. 76). However, Smith also sees downsides of 
this  mode  of  production.  “The  division  of  labour,  which  is  for  Smith  the  principle  source  of 
universal opulence, is not in itself an uplifting spectacle”. Performing a single action for years of 
one’s life places that person “at risk of psychological mutilation” . Smith sees one solution to this 
problem in a universal education system. In an industrial nation, at least the majority of the citizens 
“should be instructed in reading, writing, counting, and even in the more ‘sublime’ principles of 
science” (Rothschild 2006, p. 321). Labour division and, by extension, production efficiency are 
conditioned by the extension of the market. “When the market is very small, no person can have 
any encouragement to dedicate himself entirely to one employment” (Smith 1776, I, iii.1). Smith 
sees a “direct proportionality between the level of the productivity and the level of labour division, 
and then, he demonstrates that it depends on the extension of [the] market itself”. The market size 
determines the motivation of production immediately. Without the prospect of a buyer for a product, 
the incentives increasing production efficiency are limited. “Hence, according to Smith, productive 
efficiency depends both on the labour division and on the extent of the final market outlet” (Pagliari 
2011,  p.  137).  We are motivated to improve the means of production solely by the returns we 
expect. “These gains from exchange, and our natural willingness to do it, stimulate the division of 
labour”. The price for a produce on the market is determined by “the quantity of the product that 
sellers bring to market, and the size of the demand from potential buyers” (Butler 2012, pp. 12, 18). 
Also, as Smith points out, the closeness to a market and the resulting transportation costs have an 
impact on the final price as “by means of water-carriage a more extensive market is opened to every 
sort of industry than what land-carriage alone can afford” (Smith 1776, I, iii.3). Given the absence 
of natural catastrophes, political or societal events “prices are always gravitating towards the cost of 
production under competition” (Butler 2012, p. 18). A consequence of the division of labour is the 
establishment of money. Because of our specialised qualification, we cannot hope to produce all 
goods we need ourselves anymore. “Every man thus lives by exchanging (…) and the society itself 
grows to be what is properly a commercial society”. As we frequently do not possess exactly what 
the people who hold goods we want to acquire desire, we “cannot be their merchant, nor [we] their 
customers”. Money became a medium to enable everyday trade amongst people in society and “has 
become in all civilized nations the universal instrument of commerce, by intervention of which all 
goods can be bought or sold”. Another reason and need for a device of transferring goods is the 
material itself. Many trading goods can perish and, in turn, not be used for transactions over long 
distances. “Consumable commodities, it is said, are soon destroyed; whereas gold and silver are of a 
more durable nature” (Smith 1776, I, iv.1; 2; 11; IV, i.19). Money is therefore a potent amplifier of 
trade in a society. “Smith indeed compares money (…) to an immense highway which circulates all 
the produce of a country” (Rothschild 2006, p. 323). It is not the sole reason for commerce, nor is it 
necessary for it but money accelerates trade and makes markets more efficient. However, money 
does not make the value of goods as labour remains “real measure of the exchangeable value of all 
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commodities”. The price of a good is therefore twofold. One, which expresses all efforts which 
went into the production of it, is the real price of the produce, this is labour. “Labour (…) is alone 
the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can (…) be compared” (Smith 
1776, I, v.1; 6). Money, as the expression of the nominal price, varies depending on the value we 
put in the medium of transaction we use. While the real price by definition always must stay the 
same,  the  nominal  price  can vary  significantly.  Production efficiency,  of  which the  division of 
labour is a result, is itself a consequence of our desire as human beings to better ourselves. “Smith 
believed  there  are  universal  principles  of  human  nature,  including  the  desire  to  better  one’s 
condition  and  the  disposition  to  conversation,  or  persuasion”  (Rothschild  2006,  p.  362).  By 
improving the living situation and conditions of the poor in a society, we support society as such. 
“What improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an inconveniency to 
the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the 
members are poor and miserable” (Smith 1776, I, viii.36). This leads back to the assumption of a 
general  universality  of  all  human beings.  “Smith  is  resolute  in  his  presumption  of  the  natural 
equality of all individuals”  so different levels of wealth must have resulted from societal failure. 
Such a shortcoming can even “obstruct the dispositions on which opulence is founded” (Rothschild 
2006, p. 324). Also, through the urge to better their situation, the poor can contribute to the good of 
the whole of society much more efficiently if they were supported by the better off. “The wages of 
labour are the encouragements of  industry,  which,  like every other human quality,  improves in 
proportion to the encouragement it receives” (Smith 1776, I, viii.44). In addition to the universal 
disposition in human nature to better our situation and the division of labour as a way to increase 
the efficiency of production, Smith also turns to the factors of income. It  is,  following Smith’s 
system, divided in rent of land, wages of labour and profits of stock. Wages are the first factor he 
sheds light  on.  They are  paid to  the members  of  society who are  living from employing their 
workforce into labour. Workers have generally very little influence of their own wages. “When the 
demand for labour is rising, however, the workers have the advantage, and competition between 
employers  bids  up  wages”  (Butler  2012,  p.  21).  In  these  cases,  “they  sometimes  enter  into 
(clamorous) combinations to increase or maintain wages, which are almost always crushed by the 
combined power of the masters or employers” (Rothschild 2006, p. 328). Profits, as the second 
factor of wealth, are generated by merchants who employ their stock. “Profit is so very fluctuating 
that the person who carries on a particular trade cannot always tell you himself what is the average 
of his annual profit” (Smith 1776, I, ix.3). The profits of merchants generally depend “on market 
prices, on how competitors are faring, and on the many problems that can occur in the production, 
transportation and storage of goods” (Butler 2012, p. 23). The business of merchants can turn out 
highly speculative. Smith does not seem to have the highest opinion of merchants. He describes 
them as “sneaking hypocrites” but they are “intelligent, and they have an acute knowledge of their 
own interests” (Rothschild 2006, p. 328). In the WN, merchants are depicted as ruthless, advantage-
seeking defectors in society. “On most points, Smith’s opinions were precisely the opposite of the 
mercantilists’. Where they favored low wages as a spur to industry, he favored high wages for the 
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same reason” (Grampp 1948, p. 325). Their focus on their own gains makes them “say nothing 
concerning the bad effects of high profits. They are silent with regard to the pernicious effects of 
their gains”. Furthermore, so Smith, they “have generally an interest to deceive and even oppress 
the public” (Smith 1776, I, ix.24; I, concl..10). This results in goals that are “not identical with, and 
are often opposed to, the interest of the society”. Despite their strong self-interested motivation, 
“the credit of the trader depends on the way in which he is judged by other people”. A merchant 
therefore engages in and tries to maintain good relations with their business partners. This, however, 
is not caused by a prudent character but is “rather a consequence of self-interest, in the particular 
circumstances of a mercantile society” (Rothschild 2006, pp. 328, 329). The third factor of income 
is rent, which is classified by Smith as “the price paid for the use of land” (Smith 1776, I, xi.1). 
Land owners  live from the rent  their  land property provides for  them. It  is  in  their  interest  to 
“improve their land and enjoy the tranquility of mind” (Rothschild 2006, p. 327) which they stick to 
if they are agreeable. The generation of “rent is different from wages, which must be laboured for, 
or the profits of capital,  which must be carefully accumulated and managed”. The income of a 
landlord on the other hand “is derived merely on account of ownership, rather than any care and 
effort” (Butler 2012, p. 28). Differently from wages and profits, rents are not constituting the price 
of a good but a direct consequence of it. “High or low wages and profit are the causes of high or low 
price;  high or  low rent  is  the effect  of  it”  (Smith 1776,  I,  xi.8).  It  usually is  determined by a 
percentage of the price the produce brings forth on the market. Owners of large portions of land are 
considered less agreeable by Smith as he sees them cementing or reestablishing feudal structures 
and preventing individual liberty in favour of their own interests. Although “it is possible for two or 
more of these revenue streams to belong to the same person” (Butler 2012, p. 17), it does not appear 
likely and frequently practiced. All three groups, which each depend on another sort of income, in 
the end work together in a society and provide it with productiveness of the workers, the circulation 
of goods by merchants and the provision of food by the landowners.
The second book of the WN focusses on capital and describes its essence in more detail. Smith 
introduces this part of his work as dealing with “the nature of capital stock, of the manner in which 
it  is gradually accumulated, and of the different quantities of labour which it  puts into motion, 
according to the different ways in which it is employed”. He divides capital into two parts. “The 
part which, [the agent] expects, is to afford him his revenue, is called his capital. The other is that 
which supplies his immediate consumption” (Smith 1776, Introduction, 7; II, i.2). How our capital 
is distributed depends on a multitude of conditions and is entirely open. The part that is utilised to 
generate more revenue, or income, is the productive part which is utilised and helps us to generate 
income. The other is consumed by us to satisfy our particular and immediate needs, it is therefore 
unproductive. To invest capital and thereby use it productively, Smith presents two options. On the 
one hand we can employ it “in raising, manufacturing, or purchasing goods, and selling them again 
with a profit”. Doing that, we accept that our capital “yields no revenue or profit to its employer, 
while it either remains in his possession, or continues in the same shape”. Revenue is in that case 
generated by modifying and selling the capital or stock, goods in our possession do not generate 
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income until they are exchanged for money. The other type of employing one’s capital lays “in the 
improvement of land, in the purchase of useful machines and instruments of trade” (ibid., II, i.4; 5). 
This  way,  capital  does  not  become  revenue-generating  itself  either.  Rather,  it  supports  us  in 
generating revenue. The way capital is actually put to use form four categories. “Different branches 
of trade use these different kinds of capital in different ways. Agriculture, mining, manufacturing, 
wholesale trade and transportation, and retail trade have different needs and different relationships 
to the society”. The main three sorts that Smith specifies are landowners, manufacturers and traders. 
The  way  capital  is  invested  is  different  in  each  of  the  categories  and  frequently  overlap.  For 
example,  manufacturers  and traders  employ their  capital  to acquire resources for  production of 
goods in the manufacturer’s case or stock to resell with profit in the case of a trader. But while the 
trade does not use the stock he acquires, the manufacturer modifies the material and thereby adds 
value to it. Manufacturers even use the second option of investment as well by purchasing machines 
to improve production efficiency. “Each [of these] order[s] has its own idiosyncratic way of life, its 
own interests, and its own way of thinking” (Rothschild 2006, pp. 331, 327) and is looked upon 
differently by Smith. One form of capital usage is engaged in by the landowners or countrymen. 
They  invest  in  improving  their  land,  thereby  increasing  the  output  and  the  revenue  they  can 
generate. Smith sees them at the very basis of his whole construct as “unless a capital was employed 
in furnishing rude produce to a certain degree of abundance, neither manufacturers nor trade of any 
kind  could  subsist”  (Smith  1776,  II,  v.4).  The  achievement  of  this  class  therefore  cannot  be 
appreciated too little and “Smith is warm in his praise of the country gentleman” (Rothschild 2006, 
p. 332). He himself writes that “no equal capital puts into motion a greater quantity of productive 
labour than that of the farmer” (Smith 1776, II, v.12). He directs this appreciation also at the people 
belonging to that class generally. “The small proprietor is of all the owners of capital the most likely 
to  improve  his  stock  in  a  lasting  and  useful  way”  (Rothschild  2006,  p.  332).  The  group  of 
manufacturers is itself divided into the employers and the workers they pay wages to. The “master 
manufacturer”  invests  in  “instruments  of  his  trade”  which  he  employs  to  generate  revenue. 
Additionally, he purchases the materials needed for production. Value is created by modifying or 
augmenting the purchased material in order to produce goods fit for use. Smith’s opinion of this 
class is reasonably high. “Unless a capital was employed in manufacturing that part of the rude 
produce which requires a good deal of preparation before it can be fit for use and consumption, (…) 
it would be of no value in exchange, and could add nothing to the wealth of the society” (Smith 
1776, II, v.11; 5). However, Smith is generally not in favour of the employers as they “complain 
about the bad effects of high wages and attempt to make their employees overwork”. At the same 
time,  he  is  “admiring (…) the  skill  and dexterity  of  the  workmen” (Rothschild  2006,  p.  333). 
Traders have “occasion for no machines or instruments of trade”. Their capital is in continuous 
motion and they collect their revenue every time their capital changes hands. “The goods of the 
[trader] yield him no revenue or profit till he sells them for money, and the money yields him as 
little till it is again exchanged for goods” and “it is by only means of such circulation (…) that it can 
yield  him any profit”.  Smith  distinguishes  traders  into  retailers  and merchants.  The merchant’s 
Page !63
function in a society, so Smith, lies in the distribution of goods from the manufacturer to the user or 
consumer as their capital is “employed in transporting either the rude or manufactured produce from 
the places where it abounds to those where it is wanted”. Retailers, on the other hand, makes goods 
approachable to the consumer and invests his capital in “breaking and dividing certain portions (…) 
into such small parcels as suit the occasional demands of those who want them” (Smith 1776, II, i.
6; 4; II, v.6; 7). Both bring value to society by providing mobility of goods and resources. The 
traders  occupy  a  very  prominent  position  in  the  WN  as  “it  is  the  merchant,  or  the  owner  of 
mercantile capital, in whom Smith is most interested, and by whom he is most disturbed”. Smith 
sees their motivations as ambiguous and least transparent of all of the classes. “They are bold, and 
they are at the same time in search of security and reassurance. They are indifferent citizens, and 
they at the same time seek political advantage from every government” (Rothschild 2006, pp. 333, 
334). The same way Smith divides productive and unproductive capital, he distinguishes our labour. 
“There is one sort of labour which adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed: there 
is another which has no such effect”. According to this classification, two groups of professions can 
be established. While “the labour of a manufacturer adds, generally, to the value of the materials 
which he works upon (…) the labour of a menial servant, on the contrary, adds to the value of 
nothing”. One must therefore always make sure to invest capital at disposal, when employed in 
labour, in the productive kind as “a man grows rich by employing a multitude of manufacturers: he 
grows poor by maintaining a multitude of menial servants”. Here, again, Smith’s appreciation of 
workers  becomes apparent.  Wages paid to  productive workers  are  not  to  be considered a  loss. 
“Though the manufacturer has his wages advanced to him by his master, he, in reality, costs him no 
expense, the value of these wages being generally restored” (Smith 1776, II, iii.1). The opposite is 
true for the unproductive worker. However, unproductive labour still has value for society. “The 
army and judiciary, for example, serve the public, and their professions are honourable, but their 
labour  of  today  purchases  nothing  tomorrow”.  Lawyers  and  civil  servants  as  well  as  doctors 
therefore provide a bonus although they do not produce anything. “The realisation that services 
have value, as well as manufactures or agricultural products, is another Smith innovation” (Butler 
2012, p. 35). 
In Book III of the WN,  Smith sets out to recapitulate European history and the progress of the 
continent’s main nations. As he states in his introductory remarks, “since the downfall of the Roman 
empire, the policy of Europe has been more favourable to arts, manufacturers and commerce (…) 
than to agriculture”. While the former three promote the creation and rise of cities and towns, the 
latter supports the country population. Consequently, over the period Smith considers, he observes 
an increased number  and power of  cities  and lays  out  the effect  of  this  development.  He also 
presents the different approaches various nations have been following to generate wealth.  “The 
policy of some nations has given extraordinary encouragement to the industry of the country; that of 
others to the industry of towns” (Smith 1776, Introduction, 7). Not all European nations are on the 
same economic level and their resources are used in different degrees of efficiency. Book III is also 
dedicated to shedding light on the reasons for that discrepancy of progress. As a whole, this part of 
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the WN can be described as “a historical narrative describing how the feudal order (…) gave way to 
a liberal, commercial order” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 163) and how that brought about a progress of 
opulence in Europe. It also depicts one theme central to Smith’s thinking as it supports his view that 
“the progress of opulence consists in the victory of the individual spirit, over the oppression of legal 
institutions” (Rothschild 2006,  p.  335).  Wealth of  cities  is  based on the provisions the country 
provides them with. It is there that they are traded and turned into products and that these products 
are used to provide specified services. “We must not, however, (…) imagine that the gain of the 
town is the loss of the country”. Instead, Smith sees the relationship of towns to the country as a 
symbiotic interdependency. While “the country supplies the town with the means of subsistence, 
and the materials of manufacture”, towns or cities provide goods and services and thereby “repays 
this  supply  by  sending  back  a  part  of  the  manufactured  produce  to  the  inhabitants  of  the 
country” (Smith 1776, III, i.1). The necessity of agriculture and produce of the country to enable the 
industries of towns results in a clear priority for investment.  “When people are allocating their 
capital, therefore, they prefer to put it first into land, then into manufactures, and only then into 
foreign trade, with its many risks (Butler 2012, p. 42). Smith narrates in detail the rise of feudalism 
after the fall  of the Roman Empire.  He describes the assignment of certain privileges to estate 
owners  as  “the most  absurd of  all  suppositions” because it  presupposes  “that  every successive 
generation of men have not an equal right to the earth (…); but that the property of the present 
generation should be restrained and regulated according to the fancy of those who died perhaps five 
hundred years ago” (Smith 1776, III, ii.6). Out of this system, feudalism emerged and put farmers 
without own property in a situation of dependance to their landlords. “The leases of tenant farmers 
were precarious and their security limited. They were obliged to provide arbitrary and irregular 
services to their landlords” (Rothschild 2006, p. 335). Consequently, feudalism is of great concern 
for  Smith and he especially  engages with the situation of  the individuals  bound by indentured 
servitude. “Smith forcefully draws the reader’s attention to the serfs’ almost total lack of personal 
freedom: they could have no private property (…), they were bought and sold with the land and so 
were unable to move freely” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 163). The ongoing practice of it solidified this 
system even further  to  an  extent  where  they could  “be  legally  outed  of  their  lease,  by  a  new 
purchaser” and “if they were turned out illegally by the violence of their master, the action by which 
they obtained redress was extremely imperfect”. Due to the weakness of kings, destitute people 
rarely had a chance to escape injustice as they had no one to stand up for them. Smith states that 
“the sovereign of perhaps no country in Europe was able to protect (…) the weaker part of his 
subjects from the oppression of the great lords”. As a result, those “who were not strong enough to 
defend themselves were obliged to have recourse to the protection of some great lord” and become 
dependants of him. The situation of the cities’ inhabitants was “not more favoured than those of the 
country” as they “seem, indeed, to have been a very poor, mean set of people, who used to travel 
about with their goods from place to place, and from fair to fair” (Smith 1776, III, ii.14; III, iii.8; 1; 
2). While the farmers on the country were sliding into dependancy to land owners, the citizens in 
the larger settlements struggled to earn their living through trade and “had only limited freedom to 
Page !65
travel and inherit, to buy and sell” (Rothschild 2006, p. 335). However, despite the difficult starting 
position they shared with their fellows from the country, people living in cities “arrived at liberty 
and independency much earlier than the occupiers of land in the country”. This is largely favoured 
by the political situation which citizens used to their advantage and make a case for their desire of 
freedom. Powerful land owners and country noblemen feared the inhabitants of cities “whom they 
considered not only as a different order, but as a parcel of emancipated slaves” and the growing 
wealth of the burghers “never failed to provoke their envy and indignation” (Smith 1776, III, iii.3; 
8). Likewise, the burghers “naturally hated and feared the lords” and, luckily for them, “the king 
hated and feared them too” for his ability to raise and finance armies depended to a large extent on 
their contributions. The citizens utilised the tension between king and noblemen and “gradually they 
won privileges and self-government — helped in part by the desire of weak kings to make them 
allies against the rich landowning barons” (Butler 2012, p. 43). The king was readily granting them 
these liberties for he saw it as an opportunity to rid himself of the overwhelming influence the lords 
enjoyed upon him. At some point, the power of the cities and towns had become “so considerable 
that the sovereign could impose no tax upon them” (Smith 1776, III, iii.11). Eventually, the success 
of towns and cities spread to the country. “The commercial progress of the cities in turn helped to 
introduce liberty and security, even into the countryside” (Rothschild 2006, p. 336). The market 
cities provided increased the profit in the country as well and “gave encouragement to its cultivation 
and further improvement”. Additionally, rich traders from the city bought formerly uncultivated 
land and set out to make it profitable. “Merchants are commonly ambitious of becoming country 
gentlemen, and when they do, they are generally the best of all improvers”. Another way in which 
the upcoming cities benefitted the population of landless farmers was the flourishing commerce and 
sudden availability of formerly unreachable goods and services. In this way, trade contributed to 
end feudalism because lords were given incentives to spend their money on other things than to 
maintain  serfs  and  dependants.  “For  a  pair  of  diamond  buckles  perhaps,  or  for  something  as 
frivolous and useless, they exchanged the maintenance, or what is the same thing, the price of the 
maintenance of a thousand men for a year, and with it the whole weight and authority which it could 
give them” (Smith 1776,  III,  iv.2;  3;  10).  In turn,  they simply could not  afford the number of 
dependants anymore which lead to their freedom. 
Smith dedicates the whole of Book IV to an introduction of different systems of political economy. 
He writes: “I have endeavoured, (…) to explain, as fully and distinctly as I can, those different 
theories, and the principle effects which they have produced”. This translates into an elaborate case 
against mercantilism and trade regulations. Smith begins with analysing the general meaning of 
money and states “that wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver, is a popular notion” and “to 
heap up gold and silver in any country is  supposed to be the readiest  way to enrich it” (ibid., 
Introduction, 8; IV, i.1; 2). Consequently, economists equalled money with wealth and treated both 
synonymously. Part of Smith’s mission in Book IV is to dismantle this as a basic misunderstanding 
by explaining how the meaning of wealth differs significantly from that of money. “With respect to 
the nature of wealth, the mercantilists often confused gold and silver, the makers of wealth, with 
Page !66
wealth itself”.  Smith,  on the other hand, “regards it  as obvious that real wealth consists not in 
precious metals but in an abundance of affordable goods and services” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 167). 
He  even  partly  denies  money’s  accuracy  of  value  representation  as  it  gold  itself  can  become 
desirable enough to divert our focus away from the actual good behind the money. “Gold is in 
general,  for  Smith,  associated  with  illusion  and  self-deception”  (Rothschild  2006,  p.  338).  It 
therefore cannot represent the wealth of a nation as it is only the means by which the mobility of 
wealth in a society is ensured. Smith sees this as “too ridiculous to go about seriously to prove that 
wealth does not consist in money, or gold and silver; but in what money purchases, and is valuable 
only for purchasing” (Smith 1776, IV, i.17). Nations like Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, 
France and England, based on this flawed perception of the nature of wealth, pursue policies to 
prevent  gold  to  leave their  country.  Consequently,  a  chain  reaction was  put  into  motion.  “The 
obsession  with  gold  and  silver  (…)  leads  to  an  obsession  with  the  balance  of  trade,  and  the 
obsession with the balance of trade leas in turn to (…) policies to discourage imports and encourage 
exports”  but “to watch over the balance of a country’s exports and imports was at least as foolish, 
for the government, as to watch over the export of gold and silver” (Rothschild 2006, pp. 340, 339). 
As Smith puts it,  “the attention of the government was turned away from guarding against the 
exportation of gold and silver to watch over the balance of trade” . He does not especially hide his 
opinion as he states that the nation’s sovereign’s vigilance was turned “from one fruitless care (…) 
to another care much more intricate, much more embarrassing, and just equally fruitless” (Smith 
1776, IV, i.10). As, for Smith, the real wealth consists in the affordability and availability of goods, 
“the primary source of prosperity is not a favorable balance of trade, as the mercantilists held, but 
rather the division of labor” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 167). In addition to the general deconstruction of 
the system of mercantilism, Smith describes in detail the negative impact mercantile policies have 
with regard to trade, the financial market and banks in particular. When a selection of central themes 
of Smith’s work is addressed later in this chapter, the fourth Book of the WN will be considered in 
more detail. Especially the colonies and the benefits of free trade, which Smith turns to in later parts 
of Book IV, will be dealt with more thoroughly then.
Book V of the WN “treats of the revenue of the sovereign, or the commonwealth”. Firstly, Smith 
looks at the nature of “the necessary expenses of the sovereign” and from where they should be 
drawn. Secondly, he introduces “different methods in which the whole society may be made to 
contribute”. Thirdly, Smith describes the nature of debt and “the reasons and causes which have 
induced almost all modern governments to mortgage some part of [their] revenue” (Smith 1776, 
Introduction, 9). The sovereign, for Smith, has two faces. One is the official face as head of the state 
governing his subjects. Another side of a nation’s ruler is the person behind the office. Smith depicts 
both in the last book of his work. “The sovereign is distinct (…) from the person of the individual 
sovereign and may also  be  described as  the  ‘state  or  commonwealth’”.  He points  towards  the 
possible conflict of interest that can arise when the personal interest of the ruler interferes with the 
interest of the sovereign of the nation and, in turn, its subjects. Many mistakes therefore can be 
traced back to the improvidence and thoughtlessness of few. Unfortunately, rulers often “share the 
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predilections  of  other  great  lords,  in  [Smith’s]  description:  vanity,  gaudy  finery,  insignificant 
pageantry, frivolous passions, and costly trinkets” (Rothschild 2006, p. 347). The state on the other 
hand  consists  of  many  civil  servants  working  together.  The  sovereign  in  this  sense  therefore 
includes  “all  the  officers  both  of  justice  and  war  who  serve  under  him,  the  whole  army  and 
navy” (Smith 1776, V, ii.e.17). It seems obvious that this huge apparatus features inefficiencies and 
unnecessary ways. However, “Smith is generous, in general, with respect to these armies of the 
inadvertently unproductive” (Rothschild 2006, p. 348). He states: “it is the system of government, 
the situation in which they are placed, that I mean to censure; not the character of those who have 
acted in it” (Smith 1776, V, ii.k.65). The sovereign, so Smith, has three functions to fulfil. Firstly, he 
is responsible for the protection of the realm against invasion. As it is crucial for maintaining the 
integrity of the nation, Smith regards it as very important that its assertion is always ensured. “The 
first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other 
independent societies, can be performed only by means of a military force”. Even in times of peace, 
it is important to maintain a professional military force for “where a well-regulated standing army 
has been kept up, the soldiers seem never to forget their valour”. Also, the severity of the matter 
requires the sovereign to be prepared at all times as “when a civilised nation depends for its defence 
upon militia, it is at all times exposed to be conquered by any barbarous nation which happens to be 
in its neighbourhood” (ibid., V, i.a.1; 38; 39). The cost of warfare has increased, as Smith describes 
in a concise military history of Europe, from rudimentary beginnings of hunting societies through 
ancient Greece and Rome to that of civilised nations of the eighteenth century (see ibid., V, i.a.
6-37). As armies no longer consist of part-time soldiers who each have individual other professions 
in peace time, the division of labour has been introduced to the military sector.  “War has also 
become  more  expensive  as  a  consequence  of  the  mercantile  or  commercial  system  itself”  as 
“modern or civilized wars (…) have commercial causes and commercial effects” (Rothschild 2006, 
pp. 348, 349). Smith shows that at the example of the Seven Years war as motivated by colonial 
conquest. Smith criticises the British sovereign for engaging in wars to amuse the population as the 
people in London “enjoy, at their ease, the amusement of reading in the newspapers the exploits of 
their own fleets and armies” and are “commonly dissatisfied with the return of peace, which puts an 
end to  their  amusement”.  But  defending  the  country  is  not  the  only  purpose  of  an  army.  The 
sovereign also needs his military to enforce his law and maintain order and discipline. “As it is only 
by means of a well-regulated standing army that a civilised country can be defended, so it is only by 
means of it that a barbarous country can be civilised”. This way, the sovereign can be assured and 
“the  rudest,  the  most  groundless,  and  the  most  licentious  remonstrances  can  give  little 
disturbance” (Smith 1776, V, iii.92; V, i.a.40; 41). The second task of a sovereign is the upholding 
inner security and order. Maintaining a system of justice is very important in a society. “Justice is 
also an end in itself, or an essential constituent of the human spirit” (Rothschild 2006, p. 350). As 
Smith already states in his earlier work, justice is “the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice” 
without  which  the  “immense  fabric  of  human  society  (…)  must  in  a  moment  crumble  into 
atoms” (Smith 1759, II, ii, 3.4; VII, iv, 36) and “civil society would become a scene of bloodshed 
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and disorder”. In the WN, he builds on that sense of justice. The sovereign has a duty “of protecting, 
as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other 
member of  it”.  Cases of  injustice are motivated by “envy,  malice,  or  resentment” as “the only 
passions  which  can  prompt  one  man  to  injure  another”.  In  modern  societies,  Smith  observes, 
members are likely to come across one or more of these once in a while. He takes the example of 
wealth. “Wherever there is great property there is great inequality”. A well-organised law system is 
therefore essential to keep violence and injustice at bay. “It is only under the shelter of the civil 
magistrate that the owner of that valuable property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, 
or perhaps of many successive generations, can sleep a single night in security”. However, Smith is 
very critical towards the strict enforcement of property rights as “civil government, so far as it is 
instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the 
poor”  (Smith  1776,  V,  i.b.1;  2;  12).  Thirdly,  the  sovereign  is  to  set  up  and  maintain  public 
institutions “to facilitate commerce, the education of the young and the instruction of people of all 
ages” (Butler 2012, p. 62). The reason the state should provide these services is that the “profit 
could never repay the expense to any individual”. Significantly, Smith notes that these public works 
“may easily be so managed, as to afford a particular revenue sufficient for defraying their own 
expense, without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the society” (Smith 1776, V, i.c.
1; V, i.d.2). In other words, they should generally not aim to be profitable but stay as affordable as 
possible. In terms of infrastructure, Smith “believed communication to be a necessary condition for 
the progress of opulence” (Rothschild 2006, p. 351). Consequently, Smith sees “the erection of 
public works which facilitate the commerce of any country, such as good roads, bridges, navigable 
canals,  harbours,  etc.”  (Smith  1776,  V,  i.d.1)  in  the  domain  of  the  sovereign.  Because  private 
investors cannot endeavour in uneconomical projects as they depend on earning a living. However, 
Smith acknowledges that public services have to be provided in a society. “In the freest of markets 
individual enterprise will not find it profitable to supply certain indispensable goods and services, 
and their provision must be undertaken by the state” (Grampp 1948, p. 335). Another institution in 
the sovereign’s responsibility is an education system. Smith defended an education system financed 
by the state in which the “public can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the 
whole body of people, the necessity of acquiring most essential parts of education” (Smith 1776, V, 
i.f.45). Surprisingly, Smith defends his demand for a general education system not in ensuring a 
basic level of culture or even literacy. Rather, it is to enable “the people to make disinterested and 
reflective  judgements  about  the  government’s  own conduct”  (Rothschild  2006,  p.  352).  Private 
teachers made a significant part of Smith’s education system. The public part is to be confined to 
“paying part, but not all, of the salary of the teacher; of giving prizes to children; and of setting 
public  examinations”  (Rothschild  2006,  p.  353).  In  addition  to  that,  Smith  mentioned  “social 
opportunities (…) which are set up by society to guarantee that individuals can effectively take part 
in social and economic life” (Pagliari 2011, p. 142). To be in a position that allows to properly meet 
these tasks, the sovereign has to generate revenue to support the growing needs of the population. 
“Government becomes more expensive as countries become more opulent” (Rothschild 2006, p. 
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353). The main source of the sovereign’s income is taxes. “There is no art which one government 
sooner  learns  of  another  than  that  of  draining  money  from the  pockets  of  the  people”.  Smith 
specifies four basic principles for taxation. Firstly, it should be bound to the income. “The subjects 
of every state ought to contribute (…) in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy 
under the protection of the state”. Smith introduces a general income tax which was to his time still 
new to Britain. He also connects everyone’s contribution directly to what the state provides for its 
citizens. Secondly, to ensure the individual security and freedom of every member of society, taxes 
must be “certain, and not arbitrary” with regard to “the time of payment, the manner of payment 
[and] the quantity to be paid”. Thirdly, “every tax ought to be levied at the time, or manner, in 
which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it”. This is to ensure that members 
of society can employ their capital to the highest possible degree before paying taxes. The fourth 
and last point Smith mentions is concerned with overtaxation and ensures that a tax works to “take 
out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible” (Smith 1776, V, ii.h.12; V, ii.b.
3; 4; 5; 6). This principle makes sure that taxes are spend economically and that “the cost of taxes to 
the taxpayers should not exceed by too much their benefits to the sovereign” (Rothschild 2006, p. 
353). Smith sees overtaxation critically because the citizen of such a society would be likely “to 
abandon the country in which he was exposed to vexatious inquisition, in order to be assessed to a 
burdensome tax, and would remove his stock to some other country” (Smith 1776, V, ii.f.6). In the 
case of the sovereign borrowing money to maintain the expenses of the public sector, public debt is 
accumulated. In these cases,  “private capital  that is  intended for the maintenance of productive 
labour is diverted into the support of unproductive labour” (Butler 2012, p. 74). Nevertheless, as 
Smith observes, “the progress of the enormous debts which (…) in the long run probably ruin, all 
the great nations of Europe has been pretty uniform” (Smith 1776, V, iii.10). This dire outlook 
seems justified considering that “borrowing has enfeebled every state that has done it” (Butler 2012, 
p. 76) which Smith backs up with examples from European history (Smith 1776, V, iii.11f). The 
sovereign should therefore try to limit his dependency lent capital for it almost certainly backfires.
The  WN  at  the  same  time,  delivers  not  only  a  very  detailed  description  of  the  nature  of  the 
eighteenth century’s economic system, it also encompasses an outline of central developments in 
European history and on the mechanics and functioning of a society. Following, some of the most 
prominent themes captured by Smith in the WN are depicted in a little more detail. While doing so, 
they are set into context to the whole of the work and very briefly, where applicable, to the TMS as 
Smith’s previous book.
One point that seems to become clear while looking at the content of the WN as a whole is that 
Smith held high beliefs in us as individual moral agents. As he did already in the TMS when he gave 
his account of how agents interact with each other,  in the WN,  again, he sets his focus on our 
individuality and that of our fellows in a society. “Smith always looks at society in his inductive 
thinking from the angle of the individual” (Macfie 1959, p. 218). Consequently, the competence on 
matters concerning us must also be located in us as individuals. Smith is convinced that we are in a 
position to judge best  regarding our  personal  needs and desires.  He “presumes that  the person 
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whose interest is in question must be regarded as the best judge”. Consequently, Smith advocated 
giving “those whose interest is in question more authority over its fulfilment” (Mehta 2006, pp. 251, 
250).  Smith himself  formulates  this  thought  out  of  the perspective of  the individual  and as  an 
opposition to a sovereign. “The law ought always to trust people with the care of their own interest, 
as in their local situations they must generally be able to judge better of it than the legislator can do” 
(Smith 1776, IV, v.b.16). In society, we do not need our sovereign to regulate every detail of our 
lives but to establish and maintain a situation in which we can pursue our own interests for we 
know  better  than  anyone  else  what  they  are  consisting  of.  For  this  reason,  he  naturally  sees 
interference by authorities into the life of individual members of society very critically. “Too often, 
legislators or others presume to know best how interests are to be served” (Mehta 2006, p. 251). 
Smith noticed a conflict between the two roles of the sovereign as an individual and as the ruler of a 
state. He did not see the state as an abstract body that announces decrees but as the particular people 
whose decisions lead to these decrees. Smith therefore distrusted the authorities not only because 
the individual citizens can look after themselves more adequately by their own than any authority 
could, he also accused officials of being too corrupt to properly serve the interest of the state and the 
whole society. “It is the greatest impertinence and presumption, therefore, of kings and ministers, to 
pretend to watch over the economy of private people.  (…) Let them look well  after  their  own 
expense, and they may safely trust private people with theirs. If their own extravagance does not 
ruin the state, that of their subjects never will” (Smith 1776, II, iii.36). In a slightly radical manner, 
Smith seems to have generally questioned the constitution and the status of the sovereign in it. In 
course  of  that,  he  suggested  drastic  change  in  how power  is  exercised  and  by  whom towards 
authority,  as  far  as  possible,  to  the  person  affected  by  the  particular  decision  in  question.  Put 
differently, Smith “sought to replace the interests of those who exercise power over others with the 
interests of those over whom such power is exercised” (Mehta 2006, p. 250). Another pivotal reason 
for Smith to promote the interests of single members in a society and defend individual liberties 
against the infringement done by authorities was his basic understanding of society as such. Here 
Smith  argues  that  every  discrimination  must  have  a  proper  foundation,  otherwise  it  should  be 
labelled as an abuse of power. “To hurt in any degree the interest of any one order of citizens, for no 
other purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to that justice and equality of 
treatment which the sovereign owes to all the different orders of his subjects” (Smith 1776, IV, iii.
30). For Smith, every agent is entitled to an equal amount of consideration. He sees self-interest as 
inherent to every member of society individually. By infringing on this, our initial position in our 
community  would  artificially  be  altered  by  a  group  of  people  who,  for  Smith,  are  evidently 
incompetent  when  it  comes  to  our  personal  needs  and  desires.  This  does  not  make  him  an 
egalitarian, rather it illustrates once more the trust Smith places in us as the individual moral agents 
in a society as, for Smith, everyone should be empowered on an individual level. Seen in this light, 
Smith  would  be  a  strong  proponent  of  instruments  like  a  universal  basic  income  for  we  as 
individuals know best where to set our priorities, although it is debatable how he would go about to 
facilitate such an arrangement. In any case, the point is that Smith is prepared to minimise the 
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power a sovereign has on its subjects for he believes no ruler can ever know and facilitate their 
personal needs and wishes. In order to ensure a society to prosper, certain liberties therefore need to 
stay with us as individuals and who are most able to adequately decide on matters that impact us 
directly. However, Smith does not, as one might assume, see us as completely oblivious towards our 
fellow agents in a society or indeed the good of society as a whole. “Adam Smith’s world is not 
inhabited by dispassionate rational purely self-interested agents, but rather by multidimensional and 
realistic human beings” (Ashraf 2005, p. 142). Accordingly, the needs and desires of other people, 
whether we can sympathise with them or not, seem to be incorporated into our own agenda so that 
by pursuing our own aims, we also work towards achieving other agents’ goals. This, in turn, leads 
us to work towards the achievement of the mutual goals of society as a whole.  “It  is  his  own 
advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own 
advantage  naturally,  or  rather  necessarily,  leads  him to  prefer  that  employment  which  is  most 
advantageous  to  the  society”  (Smith  1776,  IV,  ii.4).  Smith  therefore  not  only  describes  the 
uniqueness of our character and interests, he also observes the positive impact pursuing them can 
have on how we act towards other members of our community. “The prosperity of a nation can best 
be advanced, according to Smith, by allowing each individual to pursue his own interests as he sees 
them” (Morrow 1927, p. 326). He even sees the individual drive as the most important instrument to 
impact society positively. As Smith states himself, “the natural effort of every individual to better 
his own condition (…) is so powerful, that it is alone (…) capable of carrying on the society to 
wealth and prosperity” (Smith 1776, IV, v.b.44). At the example of a market economy, which will 
be examined a bit more detailed later, Smith does not exclusively look at the individual gain a 
transaction has for us as the seller or buyer, he also sees the benefit for the agents we interact with 
as he “focuses at least as much on the way in which these commercial exchanges prompt us to focus 
on other people’s interests and the mutuality involved in doing so” (Mehta 2006, p. 250). Smith 
goes as far as disregarding intervention by the sovereign generally for it frequently even worsens 
the situation. He builds on the idea that individual self-interest practiced freely by every individual 
leads to the greater good of society more than actions directed towards the public good itself ever 
could. “I have never known much good done, by those who affected to trade for the public good. It 
is  an  affectation,  indeed,  not  very  common  among  merchants,  and  very  few  words  need  be 
employed in dissuading them from it” (Smith 1776, IV, ii.9). Actively working towards the greater 
good apparently does not achieve it. Rather than that, it even seems to deteriorate the situation more 
than strictly self-interested agents in society ever could. “The bulk of The Wealth of Nations  is 
devoted to the thought that for much of their history human beings have not acted on their interests” 
— at least not without certain regulations in place which restricted the free pursue of their self-
interest. This, so Smith, has led to injustice and inequality. Another aspect of Smithian self-interest 
in the WN is that of self-worth. “Would anybody but a beggar choose to depend on the benevolence 
of others?” (Mehta 2006, pp. 255, 250). It is our picture of ourselves that demands us to better our 
situation. Self-interest therefore corresponds with self-worth and an urge for independence inherent 
to every individual. “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
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expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their 
humanity  but  to  their  self-love,  and  never  talk  to  them  of  our  necessities  but  of  their 
advantages” (Smith 1776, I, ii.2). We are drawing our ability to respect ourselves from the feeling 
of giving something in return for what we received. Thus, sustaining ourselves does not depend on 
receiving alms but acquiring goods through fair exchange. Furthermore, the character of self-worth 
extends to our counterparts as well. “What would be more appropriate than to address the butcher 
and the baker by offering them something in return for what they might have to give?” (Mehta 
2006,  p.  250).  By  extension,  our  self-interest  corresponds  with  the  understanding  and  respect 
towards other people’s integrity and self-worth and through this, again, incorporates their individual 
perspectives in our agenda. As a result of this integrating character of individual self-interests, they 
are intertwined with each other on multiple occasions to the extent that they become inseparable. 
This  is,  as  was  sketched  in  a  previous  chapter,  the  way  Smith  sees  as  the  nature  of  human 
interaction in general. Sympathising with our neighbours in the Smithian sense presupposes the 
willingness  to  engage  with  other  people’s  views  and  expressed  emotions.  Analogously,  Self-
interestedness must include the interests of our counterparts to achieve a benefit for both sides. In 
this sense, the WN  builds strongly on the findings Smith already formulated twenty-three years 
earlier in his TMS.
Out of this interconnection arises the necessity to somehow structure the plethora of interests in a 
society. “People do not simply act on instincts but create institutions and moral laws to harness 
them” (Wight 2007, p. 345). Self-interested behaviour in a society therefore leads to a fundamental 
need for a structural foundation which supports the individual ways of the citizens of a society to 
prevent potentially negative implications of their conflicting interests. “On the most competitive 
markets  the  consequences  of  [the  agent’s]  acts  can  be  undesirable  and  require  social 
intervention”  (Grampp  1948,  p.  336).  The  consequence  is  that  “in  Smith  we  have  both  self-
interested behavior and the control of self-interest by moral and legal rules. Self-interest exists only 
within social control”. Smith sees this foundation given in and the resulting social control executed 
by a market economy. When a number of people engage in any kind of transaction, a market is 
created. Markets for Smith are frameworks for human interaction of any given kind that contain the 
extreme forms self-interested behaviour otherwise could turn into. “Smith viewed the market as a 
regulatory  system,  itself  an  institution  of  social  control”  (Samuels  1977,  pp.  199,  196).  This 
becomes clearer by means of an example. Two hunters meet each other after a day of hunting in the 
woods. One is short of arrows because he used them all while he was out hunting. He even lost his 
bow on his last shot. On the upside, he came across many animals and hit his target quite often 
which bestowed a lot of fresh meat on him. The other hunter had a less lucky day. He did not see 
one animal so his storage of arrows is still full. Nevertheless, he also does not have any meat which 
leaves him hungry and thirsty. “Smith uses the moral side of human nature to help him explain why 
voluntary agreement and not violence takes place when these two hunters meet” (Young 1997, p. 
62). The market between these hunters in this author’s example prevents the one with the weapon to 
force the other  into sharing his  meat  with him or  even kill  him and take it  all.  It  serves  as  a 
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controlling mechanism in this  society of  hunters  through its  regulative character.  Markets  arise 
naturally as an implication of the division of labour and the resulting need for exchange but they 
also serve to restrain the agents active on them. Smith “articulates the role of the market  as a 
regulatory system which performs well or not, depending upon the role of institutions and other 
forces of social control” (Samuels 1977, p. 205). He therefore seems to assess the success of a 
market  not  necessarily  regarding  how  well  the  overall  liberties  of  the  actors  are  ensured  but 
primarily  on  the  functionality  of  its  institutions.  Smith  acknowledges  that  self-interest  can  be 
misguided. “Self-love or self-interest, for Smith, is often in conflict with reason” (Rothschild 2006, 
p.  362).  Consequently,  the  function  of  a  market  is  not  only  to  harvest  the  positive  impact  of 
individuals’ self-interest mentioned above for society, it also has to deliver a framework to enable 
that in the most frictionless way.  “It is the business of morality and law, as well as of the market, to 
regulate  the  detailed  realities  of  freedom  and  of  exposure  to  freedom”.  The  market  serves  a 
controlling purpose but needs to be regulated itself  in order to fulfil its  full  potential.  “Smith’s 
emphasis is not solely, or not so much, upon the self-regulatory character of the market as upon the 
regulation of self-interest by the market” (Samuels 1977, pp. 198, 196). In other words, “the instinct 
for  fitness  and  order  can  be  trusted  because  it  produces  results  that  ultimately  (in  the  right 
institutional  setting)  are  harmonious  and  beneficial  to  society”  (Wight  2007,  p.  347).  Markets 
therefore work to  moderate  the self-interested behaviour  of  agents  in  a  multitude of  ways that 
encompass all parts both of Smith’s main works. “Self-interest not only is operated upon by the 
market but also is defined, channeled, and restrained by moral and legal rules and by the operation 
of benevolence, sympathy, and the principle of the impartial spectator”. From this, it follows that 
market regulations played a pivotal role in the Smithian idea of economy. “He does not propose, let 
alone  establish,  the  exclusive  or  a  priori  presumptive  optimality  of  market  solutions”.  Rather, 
markets need to be regulated by an external instance. The market can only serve to its best capacity 
if it  is adequately regulated and these regulations are sufficiently enforced. For Smith, this task 
comes  to  the  sovereign  or  the  authorities  in  a  society.  The  authorities  declaring  the  rules  and 
regulations of the market must be in a position to enforce them when needed and the sovereign has 
the authority to enforce rules on all of his subjects equally. “Market order is achieved only within 
the  structure  of  power.  Both  the  market  and  power  govern  whose  interests  will  count  in  the 
economy” (Samuels 1977, pp. 200, 205, 192). The particular regulations, in order for them to be 
reliable, must be proposed, executed and, in turn, enforced in decisive moves of the sovereign. 
Controlling markets therefore “will require a conscious act of the will of the virtuous legislator to 
bring it about”  as “good law must be the result of an intentional action” (Young 1997, p. 205, 177). 
Having said that, regulation of a market is by no means a straightforward task. “There is a complex 
set of distributional, hierarchical, and aggregate-income level trade-offs and related choices to be 
made through [market-] institutions”. However, the right amount and kind of regulation is the only 
way to ensure the positive effects of self-interest can arise for “the order produced by markets can 
only arise if the legal and moral framework is operating well”. For Smith, this does not mean a set 
collection of firmly standing rules but rather a more flexible collection of guidelines governing 
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behaviour on the market. “The market must be seen as qualified in its operation by the impact of 
moral and legal rules and other institutions which are themselves a matter of choice and evolution”. 
This allows for a steady evolution of governing principles and, by extension, for the adaptation of 
new circumstances. “It is truly a process of cumulative causation or general interdependence and 
not one in which particular rules or particular patterns of socialized behavior may be taken as given 
once and for all” (Samuels 1977, pp. 198, 196, 200). Instead of providing a complete system of set 
economic statutes, Smith therefore aims at formulating underlying principles which are to be filled 
with individual practices based on the particular situation at hand. Again, it becomes clear that the 
system  of  market  economy,  as  developed  in  the  WN,  is  not  detached  from  Smith’s  former 
considerations on morality brought forward in the TMS. On the contrary, this model of economy, 
which still very much dominates the way economy is seen today, is based on and closely affiliated 
with the main topic of his previous book. It is an embodiment of Smith’s view on how different 
agents in a society should and indeed do interact with each other. “For Adam Smith, a mixture of 
concern about fairness (enforced by the fear of negative appraisal by the impartial spectator) and 
altruism played an essential role in market interactions, allowing trust, repeated transactions and 
material gains to occur” (Ashraf 2005, p. 136). The result is the process of sympathising with one 
another applied to the environment of a competitive market. “It is Smith’s message that these issues 
need to be worked out through the principles of approbation, disapprobation, the impartial spectator, 
and so on”.  This character  Smith assigns to a functioning market  regulation system extends to 
market institutions which are important and necessary components in Smith’s market model as well. 
They too need to be adaptable and flexible enough to offset even sudden and disruptive changes in 
the market landscape. “He treats institutions not as inevitable, but as subject to redesign and change, 
as the product of past choice and subject to revised choices”. Smith’s economical considerations are 
therefore so powerful precisely because they do not stick to certain dogmatic principles but allow 
for flexibility and pragmatism when needed. “The greatness of his analysis is that it is an open 
system in much the same sense that the market economy itself is an open system” (Samuels 1977, 
pp. 205, 201, 207).
The next major theme in the WN is Smith’s case against the mercantilist doctrine, gaining popularity 
in his time, and a passionate advocacy in favour of free trade. This topic, primarily discussed in 
Book IV but in alignment with and beaming into the work as a whole, is one of the most persistent 
influences Smith had on modern society and the developments in nineteenth and twentieth century 
Europe as well as still today. Mercantilism is the doctrine of aiming at supremacy over another 
country in trade. Its principles are formulated towards keeping wealth inside a country as far as 
possible while at the same time directing the global flows of goods and capital into one’s own 
nation.  Seen that  way,  the  prosperity  of  one  country  means  the  disadvantage  of  its  neighbour. 
Theoretically, practiced mercantilism therefore results in the attempt to force other countries into 
dependencies by gradually drawing all the capital out of them and making their production rely on 
the  home  nation’s  exports  to  them.  However,  Smith  does  not  display  mercantilism,  or  the 
commercial  system as  he calls  it  multiple  times,  as  being opposed to  foreign trade in  general. 
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Rather, he argues that mercantilist policies are inherently mistaken due to a universal confusion 
over how to handle trade in favour of the country as a whole. “That foreign trade enriched the 
country,  experience  demonstrated  to  the  nobles  and  the  country  gentlemen  as  well  as  to  the 
merchants;  but  how, or in what manner,  none of them knew”. The fundamental  idea is  that  of 
competition amongst nations. Smith sketches two ways the doctrine of mercantilism suggests to 
achieve its end. Following that, he disregards both in the most drastic fashion. Firstly, he outlines 
the idea of banning the exportation of gold and silver. An entirely isolated nation, Smith says, does 
not have the necessity to engage in such policies because “if a nation could be separated from all the 
world, it would be of no consequence how much, or how little money circulated in it”. However, the 
world mainly consists of “countries which have connections with foreign nations, and which are 
obliged to carry on foreign wars”. Such countries cannot neglect the amount of money they give to 
other nations as it could well finance their future enemies and, as a result, European countries use 
“every possible means of accumulating gold and silver in their respective countries”. Smith sees no 
use in these efforts. He even goes further and questions the worth of gold beyond its function as 
money. “A well-regulated paper money will supply it, not only without any inconveniency, but, in 
some cases, with some advantages” (Smith 1776, IV, i.10; 4; 5; 15). Apart from that, gold and silver 
as materials also appear to have a strong effect on people. “Gold is in general, for Smith, associated 
with illusion and self-deception” (Rothschild 2006, p. 338). Consequently, he refuses to assign to it 
the value it is commonly holding. The second embodiment of mercantilism is, so Smith further, that 
of pursuing a positive trade balance. Merchants complained about the restraints on the exportation 
of gold as “they could frequently buy more advantageously with gold and silver than with any other 
commodity” and thereby enable the acquisition of even more gold in the longer run. In turn, they 
demanded a policy that was more favourable to their trade. Granting these wishes, “the attention of 
government was turned away from guarding against the exportation of gold and silver to watch over 
the balance of trade”. Smith sees this move very critically. “From one fruitless care it was turned 
away to another care much more intricate much more embarrassing, and just equally fruitless”. In 
essence, it meant that the policy’s focus widened from gold and silver in particular to all the capital 
in the country. The import of goods and commodities draws capital out of the country. “When two 
places trade with one another, this doctrine supposes that, if the balance be even, neither of them 
either loses or gains; but if it leans in any degree to one side, that one of them loses and the other 
gains in proportion to its declension from the exact equilibrium” (Smith 1776, IV, i.6; 10; IV, iii.c.
2). Mercantilistic policy was thereby aiming at increasing the own country’s trade balance and, in 
extension, considered import restrictions a well-suited tool to achieve this aim. Smith disagreed 
heavily. He argued that “trade is not a zero-sum game” and that “nations can benefit by trading with 
one another” (Rasmussen 2017, p.  166).  An exchange that,  following the mercantilistic system, 
outbalanced in the other country’s favour, can still be beneficial for the home country. “Though it 
were certain that in the case of a free trade between France and England (…) the balance would be 
in favour of France, it would by no means follow that such a trade would be disadvantageous to 
England” (Smith 1776, IV, iii.a.2). Mercantilism therefore hinders trade, prevents needed or more 
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favourable  goods  to  be  imported  and,  by  extension,  effectively  hurts  the  economy.  It  also 
incentivises traders to smuggle goods as “the interest of merchant importers, in a system of import 
duties and bounties on exports, [is] to declare very little” (Rothschild 2006, p. 339). Another point 
of criticism Smith brings forward is that it is by no means clear how to measure the balance of 
trade. “There is no certain criterion by which we can determine on which side what is called the 
balance between any two countries lies or which of them exports at the greatest value” (Smith 1776, 
IV,  iii.a.4).  Even if  mercantilism was furthering the wealth of  a  nation,  quantifying its  success 
would  be  difficult.  Additionally,  Smith  criticises  the  separating  and  escalating  character  of 
mercantilist  policies  as  it  initiates  and  propels  national  rivalries.  This,  in  turn,  can  lead  to  an 
atmosphere which causes trade wars between nations once “mercantile jealousy is excited, and both 
inflames,  and  is  itself  inflamed,  by  the  violence  of  national  animosity”.  Seen  in  this  light, 
mercantilism  can  become  a  means  to  pursue  political  interests  and  directly  evokes  hostilities 
between nations. “Each nation has been made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of 
all the nations with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss” (ibid., IV, iii.c.13; 9). 
Its main purpose, therefore, seems to be to “exacerbate national prejudice and animosity” as “the 
balance of trade has very little  to do with national  advantage” (Rothschild 2006,  p.  339).  This 
character of triggering potential conflicts is what Smith sees as a consequence of the motives of 
individuals  as  single  merchants  use  the  mentioned  uncertainty  to  their  advantage.  “National 
prejudice  and  animosity,  prompted  always  by  the  private  interest  of  private  traders,  are  the 
principles which generally direct our judgement upon all questions concerning it” (Smith 1776, IV, 
iii.a.4). It could be argued that “that pride is the cause of injustice, irrationality, and folly. War is 
harmful but sustained by pride; colonies are detrimental but held onto because of pride; slavery is 
economically  irrational  but  sustained by the  love of  domination” (Mehta  2006,  p.  252).  Smith 
shows his frustration when he must conclude that nations hold on to mercantilistic policies despite 
their obvious ineffectiveness. “After all the anxiety, however, which they have excited about this, 
after all the vain attempts of almost all trading nations to turn that balance in their own favour and 
against their neighbours, it does not appear that any one nation in Europe has been in any respect 
impoverished by this cause” (Smith 1776, IV, iii.c.14). Smith uses the example of sustaining of 
colonies to support his objections against trade restrictions and the mercantile system in general. 
While in ancient Greece colonies were founded out of need for settlement space and Romans sought 
political stability through assigning land to its subjects, “the establishment of he European colonies 
in America and the West Indies arose from no necessity”. Colonies set up by European nations were 
an expression of mercantile trade politics. They were kept to provide goods which would otherwise 
have had to be imported from other nations. This, in turn, would have had affected the trade balance 
of that particular country. Especially, the prospect of gold and silver made European states engage 
in colonialism in the first place. The new world “was represented as a country abounding in gold, 
and, upon that account (…) an inexhaustible source of real wealth to the crown and kingdom of 
Spain” (ibid.,  IV, vii.a.4; 14) by Columbus upon his return to make up for the expenses of his 
journey.  Subsequently,  colonialism is  the  last  in  a  series  of  mercantilistic  policies  that  aim at 
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competing with other trading nations. “Gold, the balance of trade, the restriction of imports and the 
subsidy of exports, the establishment of colonies — one commercial illusion leads to the next, in a 
succession of ever more oppressive policies” (Rothschild 2006, p. 341). Referring to the American 
independence  war,  which  started  around  a  year  before  the  WN  was  published,  Smith  clearly 
opposed a military enforcement of overlordship as “Great Britain derives nothing but loss from the 
dominion which she assumes over her colonies” (Smith 1776, IV, vii.c.65). Instead, he proposes to 
integrated  Britains  possessions  in  America  completely  into  the  nation  and  make  the  American 
settlers,  still  looked down on  by  the  British  establishment,  British  citizens.  “Smith  proposes  a 
constitutional union between Britain and America on the model of the union 1707 between England 
and Scotland”. This was a major divergence from public opinion as “such a union would have 
allowed for full American representation in the British Parliament and granted Americans the same 
rights (and burdens) as all other British subjects” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 180) and made Americans 
equals.  Another way Smith illustrates the disbenefit of mercantilism is by showing the positive 
effect free trade has on a society. Smith assigns trade a pivotal role in ending feudal structures and 
the  upholding of  a  well-functioning system of  justice.  “Commerce and manufactures  gradually 
introduced  order  and  good  government,  and  with  them,  the  liberty  and  security  of 
individuals” (Smith 1776, III, iv.4). Through trade, society opens up and allows the empowerment 
of people, not only commercially but also socially. Consequently, as was mentioned when looking 
at Smith’s view on market economy, within a framework of certain regulations, freedom serves as 
an amplifier, the more liberties are left to the people. “In general, if any branch of trade, or any 
division of labour, be advantageous to the public, the freer and more general the competition, it will 
always be the more so”. Trade restrictions, for Smith, have the opposite effect. “A trade which is 
forced by means of bounties and monopolies (…) commonly is disadvantageous to the country in 
whose favour it is meant to be established” (ibid., II, ii.106; IV, iii.c.2). By actively influencing 
trade and restricting or penalising certain transactions, mercantilism not only fails to help commerce 
of a country, it actively undermines it. For Smith, any form of interference cannot be beneficial in 
the long run. “Attempts to form human behavior through state regulation were likely to deal only 
with symptoms; the proper way was to cultivate a commercial society whose citizens would be free 
and responsible only to themselves” (Mehta 2006, p. 255). Taking initiative seems only favourable 
when it prevents trade restrictions. “Removing impediments to international trade would promote 
the division of labour within the trading countries and globally” (Pagliari 2011, p. 138), thereby 
leading to a more efficient production process by enabling a specialisation of production across 
borders.
The WN, and in turn Smith himself, are most known for the invisible hand analogy Smith brings 
forward as part  of  his  rejection to trade interferences by the sovereign.  However,  because it  is 
mentioned only once in the entirety of the WN’s five books, the significance of it was frequently 
questioned.  Following,  one  of  these  challenges  to  the  pivotal  character  of  the  invisible  hand 
metaphor, highlighted in Emma Rothschild’s article Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand, is briefly 
sketched and critically assessed. Rothschild argues that the invisible hand is a figure of speech 
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Smith takes advantage of  where he deems it  fitting and denies  any further  significance for  his 
philosophy. “[The invisible hand’s] political importance consists, in fact, in its public loveliness”. 
She begins with pointing out the mere three times Smith himself mentions the invisible hand. In his 
History of Astronomy, written before 1758 and originally published in 1795, Smith is “talking about 
the credulity of people in polytheistic societies” (Rothschild 1994, pp. 322, 319). The citizens of 
such  communities  imagine  the  causes  of  natural  phenomena  to  belong  with  divine  figures  or 
“intelligent though invisible beings” and are ignorant to the scientifically proven theories of the 
Western world “nor was the invisible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended to be employed in those 
matters” (Smith 1795, p. 49) by them. The next passage in which Smith uses the famous analogy 
features in his TMS. “Smith is describing some particularly unpleasant rich proprietors, who are 
quite unconcerned with ‘humanity’ or ‘justice’” (Rothschild 1994, p. 319). Albeit  they do most 
likely not intend to, the rich in a society “in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity (…) divide 
with the poor the produce of all their improvements” . Smith states that “they are led by an invisible 
hand (…) [to] advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the 
species” (Smith 1759, IV, 1.10). This list of references is completed by the most famous one in the 
WN. Regarding his critique on mercantilism, Smith employs the invisible hand of the individuals 
involved  in  trade  to  show  the  superfluous  and  potentially  harming  character  of  government 
interference. “He argues strongly against restrictions on imports, and against the merchants who 
support them”. Smith insists that government regulations on trade are not necessary as a merchant, 
even without import tariffs, “would still prefer to support domestic industry” (Rothschild 1994, p. 
319). The reason for this, so Smith, lies in everybody’s desire for stability and safety. He writes 
“[the merchant] intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value, (…) he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention”. By doing so, the merchant “neither 
intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it” (Smith 1776, IV, ii.
9) and is following his own interests only. Rothschild argues that the invisible hand is a mere means 
by which Smith attempts to illustrate his point  in every particular incident separately.  “Smith’s 
attitude to the invisible hand was ironical on each of the three occasions”. In other words, Smith 
utilises the invisible hand as a handy and eloquent metaphor. Following that, not only regarding the 
WN,  it  cannot be seen as a major theme of Smith’s whole work. Rothschild points towards the 
nature of the occasions he employs the invisible hand analogy. “Smith’s three uses of the phrase 
have in common that the individuals concerned are quite undignified; they are silly polytheists, 
rapacious  proprietors,  disingenuous merchants”  (Rothschild  1994,  pp.  319,  320).  This  indicates 
Smith’s  intention to leaven his  language and make his  writing less  monotonous.  This  becomes 
slightly more likely when Rothschild brings up popular literature Smith could have used to make 
the  particular  point  he  wants  to  convey become more  approachable.  “There  is  a  more  famous 
invisible hand in Anglo-Scottish literature, with which Smith was almost certainly familiar. It is 
invoked by Macbeth, who asks the night ‘with thy bloody and invisible hand’ to cover up the crimes 
he is about to commit”. Also, the word invisible itself is used by Smith in different contexts more 
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than thrice.  “He associates  the invisible  on several  occasions with heathen religion”.  This  also 
seems to support Rothschild’s interpretation. Another point she raises concerns the actual meaning 
of the word. “The classical Latin word which is translated by ‘invisible’ is caecus,  which in its 
literal sense means blind” (ibid.,  pp. 319, 320).  An object being invisible to a person therefore 
deems the person to be ignorant towards this object.  This does not seem to fit in Smith as the 
advocate  of  individual  freedom  who  he  was  but  expresses  Smith’s  intended  meaning  of  the 
metaphor  at  all  three  times  he  uses  it.  The  polytheists  do  not  see  the  gods  they  made  up  as 
explanations for the movement of Jupiter, neither do the rich property owners see the way they 
without intending it shared the advantages of land-improvements with the poor. Similarly, regarding 
the last mention, the merchants of a country are blind to the ways pursuing their interests leads to 
contributing to achieving society’s goals. The etymologic argument seems to support the prominent 
role which was assigned to the metaphor. However, Smith himself seems to support Rothschild’s 
view. He talks in a posthumously published essay on philosophical subjects, which also entails his 
History of Astronomy, “disparagingly of those who fall for the temptation of letting a nice analogy 
become the great hinge upon which everything in a system turns (Smith 1795, Sivertsen 2018, p. 
436) is based. Indeed, it only in relatively recent literature acquired the status as an expression of 
the essence of Smith’s thought as “commentators on his work, too, mentioned it only infrequently 
prior to the 20th century” (Rothschild 1994, p. 319). However, Rothschild’s interpretation stands 
against  an  established  literature  promoting  the  invisible  hand  as  the  embodiment  of  Smith’s 
liberalism.  Firstly,  the  invisible  hand  could  be  a  frame  for  Smith’s  emphasis  on  self-interest 
throughout his two books. “Adam Smith’s invisible hand represents the unseen instincts of human 
nature that motivate and direct behaviour” (Wight 2007, p. 341). Because he “regards self-interest 
as the basis of the economic order, and as the main psychological factor in industrial prosperity”, it 
would make sense for him to make this prominent theme of his stand out as much as possible. 
Following that, the metaphor could have been intended as a slogan for his central message that “the 
individual  is  necessarily  interested  in  securing  those  ends  of  which  his  fellow-men 
approve” (Morrow 1927, p. 326, 341). This interpretation also acknowledges Smith’s distinction of 
self-interest from selfishness as “the invisible hand does not constitute an endorsement of selfish 
individualism” (Wight 2007, p. 353). Secondly the invisible hand could serve as an explanation for 
the evolution of the division of labour and, in extension, the market. “The individual finds it more to 
his interest to exercise his strength and develop his skill in one occupation and exchange the surplus 
of what he produces for the products of other men’s skill than to attempt to supply all his various 
needs by the labor of his own hand” (Morrow 1927, p. 327). In other words, rather than producing 
every commodity ourselves, we are led by the invisible hand to focus on our particular talents and 
thereby  form  a  functioning  market  as  our  produce  necessarily  does  not  cover  all  our  needs. 
Eventually, this drives us to exchange our products on a larger and larger scale.  “Progress is a 
natural  feature  of  human history,  with  an  expected  progression  from hunting  and  gathering  to 
pasturing to agriculture to industry, and eventually to foreign trade” (Wight 2007, p.  348).  The 
prominent status this analogy has acquired over time could therefore be based in Smith using it to 
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explain the development of the market and its institutions as a whole. “Economic institutions arise 
naturally, i.e., spontaneously”. But not only is their evolution led by an invisible hand, “they are 
socially useful in proportion to the degree to which they have been allowed to arise naturally, i.e., 
through the operation of self-interest” (Morrow 1927, p. 329). This suggests a holistic meaning of 
the invisible hand. Smith, following this thread, uses it to illustrate both, individual self-interest and 
the  market  with  its  institutions.  “The  invisible  hand  is  not  simply  the  instinct  of  self-interest 
operating alone. Nor is the invisible hand the market or competition or efficiency — although these 
institutions and concepts may work synergistically with it” (Wight 2007, p. 347). The general and 
non-directed nature of our drive to improve supports this interpretation, as “for Smith, action is not 
motivated necessarily  by the  desire  to  attain  any particular  end or  by considerations  of  utility. 
Rather,  we  are  motivated  by  the  pleasure  arising  from  the  employment  of  the  means  to  that 
end” (Mehta 2006, p. 264).
With his whole WN, Smith raises economic thought and general policy-making from rudimentary 
and scattered findings to a comprehensive branch of philosophical  analysis.  His comprehensive 
coverage of society as a whole sets new standards in treating economical and political thought. 
“Adam Smith’s moral philosophy exhibits its sharp divergence from all ascetic theories, and its 
willingness to cope with the problems of human welfare in all the concrete conditions of the modern 
world” (Morrow 1927, p. 325). With the completeness of this inquiry, he unintentionally invented 
economics as the social science as which it is practiced today. Due to Smith having received a 
comprehensive  education  but  especially  because  he  enjoyed  the  opportunity  to  travel  through 
Europe, he was exposed to a number of influences throughout his life and career. Regarding the two 
major components of his moral philosophy in the TMS, namely the notion of sympathy and the 
figure of the Impartial Spectator, Smith’s inspirations have been sketched above. It  has become 
clear that his findings, at least temporarily, marked the peak of a development of moral philosophy 
which span over more than a century. Similarly, the WN set a benchmark for economic thought. It, 
too, was inspired by thinkers who came before Smith and to whom he owes a great deal of the 
genius of the WN. While economic thought, at least in a basic form, is as old as humanity itself, this 
paper concentrates on the major influences on Smith’s WN in particular. It will look at Mandeville 
who, influencing Hutcheson but also directly, most definitely made a strong impression on Smith 
very early in his career as a scholar. Thereafter, Hutcheson’s influence on the WN will shortly be 
sketched before Smith’s inspiration taken from his lifelong friend Hume is examined in a little more 
detail.
Undoubtedly, one major source that led Smith to write the WN in its actual form is Mandeville’s The 
Fable of the Bees (FB) as it is “a source with special claims to influence” and “Smith was intimately 
acquainted with it”. Mandeville’s influence on Smith’s WN is twofold. Firstly, and more evidently, 
he set the foundation for Smith’s economic thoughts as he was perhaps the first inspiration for the 
examination of the division of labour in the first book of the WN.  In fact, in the FB, Mandeville 
formulates the very essence of this thought quite explicitly to the extent that Smith seems to have 
simply reformulated integral parts of Mandeville’s work. “One of the most famous passages on this 
Page !81
matter in the Wealth of Nations — that about the labourer’s coat — is largely a paraphrase of similar 
passages in the Fable” (Kaye 1924, pp. cxxxiv, cxxxv). And indeed, the similarity is striking at the 
very least. “What a number of People, how many different Trades, and what a variety of Skill and 
Tools must be employed to have the most ordinary yorkshire Cloth?”. He even goes on to explain 
the beneficial effects of specialisation of production processes at the examples of other commodities 
such as bread or beer and illustrates how this economic development made goods available to a 
greater  number  of  people  from  social  classes  which  formerly  were  not  able  to  afford  them. 
Mandeville draws a direct connection between the division of labour and, in extension, markets to a 
distribution of goods that benefit even those who formerly did not have a chance of acquiring basic 
luxuries at all. “Many things which were once look'd upon as the Invention of Luxury, are now 
allow’d  even  to  those  that  are  so  miserably  poor  as  to  become  the  Objects  of  publick 
Charity” (Mandeville 1714, I, p. 169). In addition to inspiring Smith to the idea of the division of 
labour as such, he also seems to have inspired the concept of global trade and an international 
market economy explained in the WN. He foresees the scale of production’s needs when he writes: 
“What a Bustle is there to be made in several Parts of the World, before a fine Scarlet or crimson 
Cloth can be produced, what Multiplicity of Trades and Artificers must be employ’d! Not only such 
as are obvious, as Wool-combers, Spinners, the Weaver, the Cloth-worker, the Scourer, the Dyer, the 
Setter, the Drawer and the Packer; but others that are more remote and might seem foreign to it”. 
Mandeville here becomes aware of the sheer extent to which the threads of production lines and 
resource supply chains have to be woven into each other to enable the production and, in extension, 
consumption of a final product. He also considers the necessity of international supply chains for 
the production of goods and thereby anticipates Smith’s reflections on global trade. “How widely 
are the Drugs and other Ingredients dispers’d thro’ the Universe that are to meet in one Kettle!”. 
Mandeville thereby also sees the individual sacrifices that have to be made in order to enable this 
supply of goods and resources. “While so many Sailors are broiling in the Sun and sweltered with 
Heat in the East and West of us, another set of them are freezing in the North to fetch Potashes from 
Russia” who all go through “the Variety of Toil and Labour, the Hardships and Calamities that must 
be undergone to compass the End I speak of” (ibid., I, pp. 356, 357). The second influence which 
can be awarded to Mandeville concerns Smith’s findings on the nature and role of the sovereign in a 
nation which Smith outlined in Book V of the WN. It also is connected to Smith’s understanding of 
self-interest  in  a  society  of  moral  agents.  However,  it  also  marks  a  point  where  Smith  clearly 
diverges from Mandeville and leans more towards his teacher Hutcheson. While Smith holds a 
somewhat  optimistic  and  positive  view  on  us  as  individuals  and  therefore  encourages  the 
empowerment of the single agent, Mandeville’s view is more critical. He disregarded all human 
intention  and,  in  turn,  behaviour  as  solely  motivated  by  selfish  desires.  An  agent,  for  him,  is 
motivated by no consideration that concerns anyone else but the agent himself. Consequently, he 
came to conclude that virtue cannot exist at all. “Mandeville was notorious for the claim that all 
instances  of  virtue  were  simply  self-interest  in  disguise”  (Mehta  2006,  p.  258).  Where  Smith 
distinguishes between self-interest and selfishness, Mandeville’s view is less nuanced in that sense. 
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“His conception of virtue proclaimed that no action was virtuous if inspired by selfish emotion; and 
this assumption, since Mandeville considered all natural emotion fundamentally selfish, implied the 
ascetic position that, no action was virtuous”. The only way he could appreciate human behaviour 
comes from its unique ability to reach decisions through reason. “Mandeville’s definition of virtue 
declared that no action was meritorious unless the motive that inspired it was a ‘rational’ one”. 
Evidently, this view is not the most allowing one as it excludes all motivations which are remotely 
concerned with the improvement of one’s own situation. Instead, so Mandeville, strictly rational 
considerations are paving the only path to a morally valuable conduct. “As he interpreted rational to 
imply an antithesis to emotion and self-regard, both aspects of his ethical code — the ascetic and 
the  rationalistic  — alike  condemned as  vicious  all  action  whose  dominant  motive  was  natural 
impulse” or, put differently, “acts as were caused by the traits men share with the animals” (Kaye 
1924, cxx). Out of this somewhat radical conviction arouse his sophisticated view of the nature and 
the duties of the sovereign in a society. “All sound Politicks, and the whole Art of governing, are 
entirely built upon the Knowledge of human Nature. The great Business in general of a Politician is 
to promote, and, if he can, reward all good and useful Actions on the one hand; and on the other, to 
punish, or at least discourage, every thing that is destructive or hurtful to Society” (Mandeville 
1714, II, p. 320). While Smith proposes a slightly eased approach when it comes to the personal 
lives of subjects, Mandeville suggests a more engaging role for the sovereign. In his view, the task 
of the ruler is to educate his subjects by showing them the way which is most beneficial for society. 
However, he acknowledged that self-interested or, as he would have put it, selfish passions are the 
drivers of progress. “The vices of men, said Mandeville — luxury, ambition, desire for worldly gain 
in  all  its  forms  —  are  the  causes  of  the  wealth  of  modern  times”  (Morrow  1927,  p.  324). 
Nevertheless, this is not due to a concession he made to human motivations. On the contrary, he 
followed  that  every  benefit  we  enjoy  means  disadvantaging  another  member  of  society. 
“Mandeville’s paradox was meant not only to show that private vice (…) led to public benefit, but 
also that the wealth of some was born out of the poverty of others” (Mehta 2006, p. 262). As a 
result,  so Mandeville,  the only possibility for  the head of a nation to achieve the execution of 
individually undesirable actions like hard work in his subjects, was to somehow make them seem 
desirable or create an urgency around them. This way only, the citizens of a society selfishly engage 
in  activities  that  promote  the  public  good  because  to  reach  and  maintain  the  needed  level  of 
production, a large workforce is needed in a society. “The only way to sustain production was to 
make it necessary for the mass of mankind to labor” (Mehta 2006, p. 262). Mandeville therefore 
argued it would be too risky to leave agents a considerable amount of freedom for he saw agents as 
too immature and emotional to be left without guidance and control. “The Chief Thing, therefore, 
which Lawgivers (…) have endeavour’d, has been to make the People they were to govern, believe, 
that it was more beneficial for every Body to conquer than indulge his Appetites, and much better to 
mind the Publick than what seem’d his private Interest”. In addition to this suggestion, Mandeville’s 
advice for sovereigns of nations becomes even more Orwellian. He reasons that in order to control 
citizens in this  manner,  they have to be in a  state  which makes them most  convenient  for  the 
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sovereign to be kept in check. For Mandeville, this means a sovereign should be motivated to avoid 
wealthy and educated citizens. “To make the Society happy and People easy under the meanest 
Circumstances,  it  is  requisite  that  great  Numbers  of  them should  be  Ignorant  as  well  as  Poor. 
Knowledge both enlarges and multiplies our Desires, and the fewer things a Man wishes for, the 
more easily his Necessities may be supply’d” (Mandeville 1714, I, pp. 42, 287). This could not be 
further from Smith’s remarks in the WN. Instead of denying virtue in our attitudes and behaviour 
altogether,  “Smith (…) does not  dispute the existence of  virtuous conduct,  nor  our  capacity to 
recognise it” (Wilson 2006, p. 265). Although Smith, too, spends a large part of his book on the 
nature of self-interest, his conclusions differ significantly. “Mandeville had argued that all men are 
naturally more concerned with their own interests than with those of others; so far, Smith agrees. 
Mandeville argued further, however, that it was therefore impossible for a person to prefer anyone 
else's interest to his own, from which he concluded that all man’s activities are at bottom driven by 
self-interest” (Otteson 2000, p. 56). At this point, Smith diverges from Mandeville. Self-interest for 
Smith is not directed at itself but at being the proper object of praise. Consequently, purely self-
regarding motivations do not represent what Smith calls self-interest. As indicated in the previous 
chapter when discussing the treatment of virtues in the TMS,  Smith sees self-interest as distinct 
from selfishness in a conceptual way. The drive to better our situation does, for him, not conflict 
with our consideration for others. Quite oppositely, it even necessarily promotes public interest as 
the desires of the people we interact with are interwoven with ours to an extent that makes pursuing 
our interests also beneficial  for society as a whole.  In the next chapter,  when showing Smith’s 
understanding of self-interest and its implications in a little more detail, this specific conception of 
self-regarding interests will be made clearer. Smith even allows for what could be called altruistic 
conduct.  “There is no claim here of the sort Bernard Mandeville espoused that all  instances of 
benevolence  really  turn  out  to  be,  on  close  inspection,  self-interested”  (Mehta  2006,  p.  250). 
However, as much as Smith diverges from Mandeville, their differences come down to the direction 
of self-interest. While Mandeville sees it as a destructive trait and confuses it with the embodiment 
of selfish desires, Smith understands it as encompassing the interests of our fellow agents as well as 
our own. We do not seek our own advantage in materialistic terms or in the sense of an external 
reward, we seek to be the proper object of approval by others. Self-interest, as Smith stated in his 
TMS, is not directed towards attaining a reward we receive from other people, its aim is modifying 
our behaviour and attitudes in a way that makes us able to sympathise with them. Mandeville could 
not  see  any  virtuous  form  of  self-interest.  Smith  on  the  other  hand,  made  it  a  virtue  and 
differentiated it from selfish passions and the vices resulting from them. “Given that it is prudence 
which  is  the  principal  force  behind  the  WN,  it  seems  as  if  Smith  has  refuted  Bernard  de 
Mandeville’s paradox of ‘private vice, public good’” (Witzum 1998, p. 503). The drives of striving 
for one’s own well-being and the good of others are not a contradiction anymore. For Smith, they 
even  benefit  each  other  because  we  fulfil  our  self-interest  by  earning  the  approval  of  others. 
Although we might not attain it in the end, being worthy of it suffices to satisfy us. “For Smith, 
Mandeville had simply failed to acknowledge the fact that not only do we desire praise, we desire to 
Page !84
be  praiseworthy”  (Mehta  2006,  p.  258).  Had  he  come  to  that  conclusion,  the  other-regarding 
character of self-interest most likely would have featured in Mandeville’s Fable already.
The self-proclaimed antagonist to Mandeville was Smith’s teacher in Glasgow. Hutcheson disliked 
Mandeville’s  assertion that  every person is  inherently driven by selfish desires  and not  able to 
escape this  pattern.  On the contrary,  his  main focus was set  on benevolence as  the  one virtue 
occurring in moral agents. “Francis Hutcheson had insisted that all virtue could be understood in 
terms of benevolence”. This is understandable as he saw everything but benevolence contaminated 
by a materialistic connotation which, for him, destroys every hint of virtue it could express. “In 
Hutcheson, the passive pleasures of beauty and virtue were severed from material life and industry”. 
Smith frees himself from this restricted view and extends the catalogue of virtues to self-love. Other 
than Mandeville, he does not characterise self-love or self-interest as the embodiment of vice and 
immorality. For Smith, it is not wrong for us to be concerned with our own problems because we 
are the most competent regarding them. “Smith insisted, against Hutcheson, that a prudential regard 
for  one’s  own affairs  could be a  virtue and that  it  was possible  to  distinguish a  self-regarding 
prudence from unmitigated selfishness or unalloyed vice” (ibid., pp. 258, 263, 259). As a result, he 
has the much more nuanced understanding of morality that he outlined in his TMS. When it comes 
to  his  picture  of  governance  and  the  relationship  of  a  sovereign  to  his  subjects,  which  Smith 
expounds in Book V of the WN, this leaves him considerably more room to argue. Self-love or self-
interest  motivates  to  better  our  situation  and  works  towards  other  people’s  interests  as  well. 
Consequently, we are perfectly motivated to bring forward society without having to be forced into 
it.  Hutcheson,  on the other  hand,  is  bound to benevolence as  the sole source of  virtue.  To his 
trouble, benevolence does not seem to be a strong enough motivator for hard work. Or, as he put it 
himself,  “bear Labour and Toil,  and many other Difficultys which we are averse to from Self-
love” (Hutcheson 1729, II, 7.8, p. 186). He therefore would be, as much as he despises his ideas 
otherwise,  forced  to  agree  with  Mandeville  to  the  extent  that  the  sovereign  has  to  control  his 
citizens to a certain degree or create particular incentives for them in order to make them do things 
needed or beneficial for society. This becomes necessary as they clearly would not be inclined to 
engage in the hard work of production out of benevolence.
Hume influenced Smith much more directly and decisively than Mandeville and Hutcheson ever 
could have, due to the fact that Smith and Hume very frequently exchanged their views with one 
another and the intimacy, with which they knew each other’s opinions and convictions. Hume’s 
significance is particularly obvious as he is mentioned by name in the finished work. “In The Wealth 
of Nations Smith cites Hume by name five times, and at another point he transcribes full paragraphs 
from The  History  of  England”  (Rasmussen  2017,  p.  161).  This  is  especially  noteworthy  since 
Hume’s  name does  not  appear  once  in  the  entire  TMS  which  Hume arguably  had  a  far  more 
significant influence on. Smith mentions Hume first when he describes the fall of feudalism in the 
third book of the WN. Smith assigns the miserable living conditions to the feudal structures which 
positioned  local  lords  in  a  position  that  allowed  them  to  rule  almost  unchecked  over  their 
dependants. He praises the upcoming cities for they, so Smith, eventually destroyed the power base 
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of the nobility (see above and Smith 1776, III, iv). Hume’s view on feudalism is equally dark as he 
“paints the feudal lords, even more than the clergy, as the chief enemies of liberty and security 
throughout much of European history” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 165). Like Smith, Hume goes on to 
reconstruct the development which led to the end of this restrictive system. Both describe how the 
rising and flourishing cities resulted in a new freedom of commerce. This, in turn, cut the power of 
local lords and enabled the king to assert his power more completely. “The settled authority, which 
he acquired to the crown, enabled the sovereign to encroach on the separate jurisdictions of the 
barons, and produced a more general and regular execution of the laws”. He celebrates the “secret 
revolution of government, and subverted the power of the barons” (Hume 1778, IV, pp. 384, 385). 
Unlike Smith, who assigns the largest part of the responsibility to the cities and the free commerce 
they gradually forced upon the country, Hume therefore sees the king’s ability to enforce the law as 
the most important factor. A second point, in which Smith concurs with Hume, is the rejection of 
mercantilism. The fourth book of the WN Smith’s passionate case for free global trade and argues 
vehemently against import restrictions. Once more, his friend proved to be his ideological brother as 
well. As Smith does in great detail, Hume attacks the very concept of mercantilism. “Hume argues, 
just  as  Smith  later  would,  that  nations  are  helped rather  than  hurt  by  having flourishing  trade 
partners” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 167). The objective of achieving a positive trade balance rests on the 
mistake of equalling wealth with money. Smith criticises this confusion harshly as wealth for him is 
the  availability  of  goods  and,  in  turn,  a  certain  quality  of  life.  Hume’s  view matches  Smith’s 
completely. He writes: “[Money] is none of the wheels of trade: It is the oil which renders the 
motion of the wheels more smooth and easy”. Consequently, he saw restrictions on imports and 
subsidies for export as harmful barriers for the success of the own nation as well as global trade in 
general. Hume even states explicitly that he cannot see why the success of other nations “even 
France itself” (Hume 1777, pp. 281, 331) could damage Britains trade., For Hume, as well as for 
Smith, freedom of trade was the foundation of the wealth of a nation. “While Hume took virtually 
no notice of the division of labor,  he too maintained that  prosperity derives principally from a 
productive citizenry and that a general policy of free trade is the surest means to that end”. He also 
matches Smith’s view that  a  strong government is  needed to ensure the frictionless procedures 
within a  society.  This  includes trade as  well  as  everyday social  interaction between all  agents. 
Furthermore, the sovereign has to be strong enough to defend national integrity against foreign 
invasions. Smith therefore agrees with Hume on “the need for government action for the sake of 
national defense, the administration of justice, the provision of certain public works, at the very 
least”. Justice is for both the cornerstone of every working society. “Both emphasized the need for 
the  government  to  be  strong  enough to  enforce  order  and rules  of  fair  play”.  This  view is  an 
extension of their remarks on feudalism as “the absence of such a government was precisely what 
had made the feudal era such a sad spectacle”. However, despite their clear agreement on the nature 
of trade and although Smith’s ideas were present in Hume’s thoughts already, the concentration on 
economics and the role of the sovereign make the WN  a  more comprehensive treatise of these 
matters  in  width  and  depth.  “Smith’s  case  on  behalf  of  free  trade  was  far  more  detailed  and 
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systematic than Hume’s; indeed, even today it remains one of the most comprehensive such cases 
ever made” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 168). Somewhat connected to their agreement on free trade and 
mutual opposition to mercantilism were their  views on colonialism. Smith,  in his inflammatory 
speech against  mercantilism in all  its  forms,  disregards the maintenance of colonies as another 
embodiment of this economic doctrine and even proposes an integration of American colonies into 
Britain  rather  than waging war  against  them.  Hume’s  view on this  was heading into  a  similar 
direction but slightly more radical as he took the side of the independence fighters in America and 
called for the granting of sovereignty. “While Hume never published anything on the topic, his 
correspondence reveals that he was among the earliest and most consistent advocates of American 
independence in all of Britain” (ibid., p. 178). However, his reasons for holding this view might 
have been somewhat less idealistic than the ones which convinced the colonists of their endeavour. 
He simply seemed to think upkeeping of colonies was little more than an unnecessary nuisance not 
worth the cost. “Whereas most Britons were sure that the colonies were a prime source of national 
wealth and power,  Hume believed that  they were an economic,  political,  and military burden”. 
Smith, as well, sees the war very critically and aims for an integration of America. He does not 
believe Hume’s solution to be in any way realistic as “he judges Hume’s preferred outcome, the 
voluntary  granting of  American independence,  to  be  a  wild  pipe  dream” (ibid.,  pp.  178,  180). 
Despite their consilience over many areas of the WN, there are still points where Smith diverges 
from his friend. For instance, while evidently in favour of commerce, he also sees its potential 
downsides.  Oppositely,  Hume’s  only  distress  regarding  a  commercialised  society,  apart  from 
imperialistic  fantasies  which  he  also  attacked  in  his  critique  of  the  treating  of  the  American 
colonies, seems to have been founded in the instrument of public debt. The whole system, so Hume, 
is built on the idea that “posterity will pay off the incumbrances contracted by their ancestors”. He 
was afraid of the potential loss of control over national matters and subsequent slide into “poverty, 
impotence, and subjugation to foreign powers”. His conclusion was a pugnaciously radical one. 
“Either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation” (Hume 1777, 
pp. 350, 360). Smith agrees with this view and indicates the same dire outcome for the sovereign in 
the  case  of  an  overwhelming  accumulation  of  debt.  However,  unlike  Hume,  Smith  sees  many 
potential drawbacks of a commercial society in addition to the matter of public debt. One of these 
points concerns the character of merchants. “Smith’s comments on the malicious activities of rich 
and powerful merchants could hardly be more disparaging” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 171). He does not 
see merchants in the most favourable light as their interests are, in a considerable number of cases, 
directly opposed to the public interest and that of the sovereign. Consequently, so Smith, they will 
actively work against what would be beneficial for society as a whole. This sentiment is not shared 
by Hume, who goes overboard with his praise for the merchants. He describes merchants as “one of 
the most useful races of men, who serve as agents between those parts of the state, that are wholly 
unacquainted, and are ignorant of each other's necessities” (Hume 1777, p. 300). Hume appreciated 
the function merchants fulfil in a nation and indeed globally. He did not, as Smith does, see the 
other  side  of  the  medal  as  their  selfish  interests  harming society.  Another  negative  side  Smith 
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notices is the workers’ situation. Despite being the target for a general critique of capitalism and 
being made responsible for the horrible working conditions during the Industrial Revolution and 
exploiting  companies  even  today,  Smith  indeed  considers  the  circumstances  of  the  individual 
worker and proposes certain benefits provided by the sovereign of a nation. He builds the necessity 
of a public education system on the dull daily routine of a factory worker. Smith therefore “suggests 
that when an individual spends the bulk of his life working at a single task (…), he has no occasion 
to utilize his mind” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 171). Hume did not consider commercial society having 
such  negative  effects  on  the  members  of  society  at  all.  On the  contrary,  he  praised  economic 
develpment as the more a nation progresses, “the more sociable men become: (…) They flock into 
cities;  love to receive and communicate knowledge” (Hume 1777, p.  271).  Smith also sees the 
danger that economic inequality poses in a society. “For every rich man, there must be at least five 
hundred poor” (Smith 1776, V, i.b.2).  He considers an unequal society as causing its agents to 
gradually build a romanticised picture of the well-off “leading them to admire and emulate the very 
rich and to neglect and even scorn the poor” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 172). This feature of human 
nature, so Smith, “though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and 
the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our 
moral sentiments”. Consequently, the well-off are the centre of attention whereas the worst of are 
ignored  and  avoided.  Even  education  and  talent  do  not  seem  to  overcome  this  bias  as  “we 
frequently see the respectful attentions of the worlds more strongly directed towards the rich and the 
great, than towards the wise and the virtuous” (Smith 1759, I, iii, 3.1; 3.2). For Smith, this leads to 
an even more hopeless  situation of  the  poorest  in  society  as  “they suffer  not  just  the  material 
deprivations of poverty but also the feelings of invisibility and even shame” (Rasmussen 2017, p. 
172).  Hume,  too,  sees  the  problem of  inequality  in  a  nation.  However,  rather  than  thoroughly 
examining this issue, he notes it along with a call for a fairer society. “A too great disproportion 
among the citizens weakens any state. Every person, if possible, ought to enjoy the fruits of his 
labour, in a full possession of all the necessaries, and many of the conveniencies of life” (Hume 
1777, p. 265). Smith also differs from Hume in his view on institutionalised religion. “Smith argues, 
in direct opposition to Hume, that a free market and competition would prove beneficial in the 
realm of religion”. He favours a system in which a multitude of different sects and religious groups 
keep  each  other  in  check  and  prevent  one  from  becoming  too  powerful.  In  contrast,  Hume 
advocated one strong church in a country that is powerful enough to enforce religious unity. “The 
problem, as Hume depicts it, is that competition among the clergy to attract followers would have 
the effect of inspiring intolerance and fanaticism” (Rasmussen 2017, pp. 176, 175). A single strong 
religious institution in a nation would avoid this dangerous potential for unrest. “There must be an 
ecclesiastical order, and a public establishment of religion in every civilized community” (Hume 
1778, III, p. 135). All in all, the similarities between Smith and Hume regarding economic theory 
and the nature of the sovereign by far exceed their discrepancies. The general agreement between 
the two Scottish philosophers can be traced back to their congeneric moral theories. “For Smith as 
for  Hume,  predictability  of  human behavior  was brought  about  by the continuity  generated by 
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stabilized  relationships  embodied  in  institutions”  (Samuels  1977,  p.  198).  This  also  becomes 
apparent with the letter that Hume wrote Smith upon the publication of the WN as it expressed a 
general “affection for Smith” and “satisfaction in his success”. Although he did mention points of 
disagreement, “the differences that he identifies are quite minor” (Rasmussen 2017, pp. 180, 181).
The WN as a whole, with all the status-quo challenging innovative thoughts it entails and although it 
is  still  of  greatest  relevance  today,  is  very  much  a  book  of  its  time.  In  accordance  with  the 
contemporary attitude, “individual liberty, in politics, in religion, in industry, was felt to be the first 
and  sometimes  the  only  thing  necessary  for  the  introduction  of  a  better  social  and  political 
order” (Morrow 1927, p. 325). Nevertheless, Smith does not ignore the situation of the individual 
agent as he “was clearly interested in other, nonmaterial dimensions of welfare; that he recognized 
the moral corruption of overemphasizing wealth and success; (…) and that he felt that self-interest 
is  not  to  be  equated  with  selfishness”  (Samuels  1977,  p.  200).  All  the  more  incredible  is  the 
accusation of being in favour of a ruthless capitalism.
V.  Smithian Account of Moral Philosophy and Das Adam Smith 
Problem
Smith was fortunate enough to enjoy fame and recognition during his lifetime and, in turn, was 
widely read throughout not only Britain but the rest of Europe as well. However, the foundation of 
his fame in his home country was of a different nature than that on the continent. Although in 
Britain the WN was turning out to be a major success eventually as well, the primary reason for 
Smith’s academic authority and also what he was mainly known for was his first book. The TMS 
positioned Smith as a moral philosopher along with his teacher Hutcheson and his friend Hume in 
the minds of the British people as “it was the publication of TMS, not WN, that made Smith’s name” 
(Wilson 2006, p. 264). The perception of Smith by the Continental European readers turned out to 
be  quite  different.  This  has  a  number  of  reasons.  Firstly,  the  TMS  was  not  as  successful  in 
Continental Europe as it was in Britain. Consequently, its translation did not receive the attention 
that the original in Britain enjoyed. Secondly, the WN did not suffer from this lack of attention as it 
was a major success, not only in Britain, but all over Continental Europe. This prominence of the 
WN outside of Britain led Continental European scholars to focus on Smith’s second work rather 
than taking into consideration the first equally much. Smith’s reputation throughout Europe became 
that of an economist and his endeavours into moral philosophy rarely moved into the focus of Smith 
scholars. “Sadly for Smith he’s been studied more often than not as an economist, and not as the 
moral philosopher he was. In doing so, his disciples in economics have lost sight of an essential 
dimension  of  his  moral  philosophical  vision”  (Evensky  2001,  p.  497).  When  the  TMS  was 
eventually re-discovered and started to feature more prominently in European literature on Smith, it 
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presented an apparent antithesis to the WN, the work Smith for which was known until then. The 
conclusion that has been drawn is that both books have to be seen separately, representing different 
stages  of  Smith’s  life  and  academic  career.  While  the  former  was  imputed  to  a  romantic  and 
inexperienced young idealist’s belief in the goodness of people and their drive to cooperate, the 
latter was recognised as the work of a more matured and disillusioned scholar who corrected his 
earlier mistake by assigning the main influence on human conduct to purely selfish passions. In 
other words, the TMS was considered as suggesting a general fondness towards other people, while 
the WN was taken to present human agents as strictly self-interested agents in society seeking their 
own advantage only. Consequently, Smith’s work was thought of as divided into two distinct parts 
in the development of his thoughts. This misconception developed into what was later called the 
Das Adam Smith Problem (ASP). In this chapter, it is examined how this construct, by dealing with 
the TMS and the WN separately, has missed entirely Smith’s overall message connecting both. “The 
puzzle implicit in the two great works of Adam Smith is whether, why, and how cooperation and 
noncooperation (classical competition) can coexist” (Smith 1998, p. 8). The economic thinking of 
WN cannot be detached from the moral philosophy of TMS, and Smith did not attempt to do so. 
Rather, he sets out to construct one comprehensive picture of how moral agents interact with each 
other in different settings, gradually forming the nature of society as a whole. “Implying that Smith 
emancipated economics from the restraints of morality is to miss the complex moral valences of 
self-interest” (Mehta 2006, p. 249). The misunderstanding that resulted in the ASP was founded on 
the idea “that Smith’s two books represented fundamentally different outlooks on the nature of 
man” (Nieli 1986, p. 611) while, quite oppositely, the TMS and the WN shape “a system of Moral 
Philosophy, in which Political Economy forms but a part” (Oncken 1897, p. 449). The deficiency of 
the  ASP  therefore  is  far  more  drastic  than  merely  being  a  “problem of  deciding  which  is  the 
appropriate intellectual-historical framework within which [Smith’s] arguments ought to be viewed” 
(Teichgraeber 1981, p. 122). It is a faulty perception to view Smith’s two published works as an 
evolution of sorts, in which the latter book was meant to redeem or mend the former, rather than as 
forming  one  message.  “If  those  who  believed  there  was  a  discrepancy  between  the  Moral 
Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations had but taken the pains to consult the former work thoroughly, 
a  great  deal  of  this  alleged discrepancy would have disappeared” (Morrow 1927,  p.  330).  The 
present chapter sets out to connect both works, presenting the TMS as the basis of Smith’s thought 
which was applied to economic life in the WN as its sequel. In the following, after briefly presenting 
the nature of the ASP and how it developed historically, this chapter will give a brief overview of 
the ASP’s current stage. Subsequently, a case against the interpretation of Smith’s work held by the 
ASP’s creators will be undertaken. Thereby, the role of self-interest in TMS and WN as well as the 
importance Smith assigns to restrictions of self-interest in a society will be discussed. Finally, this 
chapter will present the red thread, which forges one academic legacy by linking Smith’s thoughts 
together.  It  thereby will  also  clarify  how Smith’s  work evolved chronologically  and ends  with 
claiming that the WN must be seen as a TMS-sequel. During Smith’s life, a series of editions for 
both works (six editions for the TMS,  five for the WN) were brought to publication. Especially 
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regarding the TMS, Smith used the opportunity to change and update his thoughts which resulted in 
sometimes drastic modifications. The TMS “was one of the most popular books of the eighteenth 
century;  it  procured its  author immediate fame, not only in England and Scotland,  but even in 
France, where Smith became almost as popular in the salons of Paris as Hume had been” (ibid., p. 
336).  However,  adequately examining the differences between the editions of  either  of  Smith’s 
works would exceed the scope and purpose of this thesis; this was already done quite impressively 
and in great detail by Laurence Dickey (Dickey 1986).
The  ASP  is  founded  upon  an  alleged  discrepancy  between  Smith’s  two  works  and,  more 
importantly, the desire to reconcile the TMS with the WN. “The difficulties of the authorities result 
mainly from their determination to find a basis for complete concordance of the two books” (Viner 
1927, p. 201). The failing to achieve this unity gave rise to a discussion on the work of Smith in 
general as the ASP was an endeavour to “divide the indivisible, human nature, in two. Thus Moral 
Sentiments presupposed that humans were sympathetic in their interaction with others, while Wealth 
of Nations presupposed that the fundamental human motivation was selfish” (Tribe 2008, p. 519). 
Essentially, the problem is best formulated as the presumption that this discrepancy shows Smith 
changing his view on human nature completely between the publication of the two books. “The 
point of controversy was whether there is an inconsistency between the Moral Sentiments and The 
Wealth of Nations  on the psychology of human action” (Raphael 2009, p.  115).  Moreover,  this 
presumed change of mind regarding the nature of human morality was taken as a change of course 
altogether.  It  led to a conundrum among the ASP  theorists as “it  was precisely the question of 
relating two principles of human nature that aroused das Adam Smith problem” (Witzum 1998, p. 
494). Scholars contributing to the discussion of the ASP struggled to explain such a drastic shift in 
Smith’s view by still upholding the desired outcome of the two works being coherent. During the 
debate, a number of solutions to it were developed, two of which were held most fiercely. Firstly, a 
change  in  personality  was  suggested  as  the  cause  for  Smith’s  academic  shift.  “It  has  been 
maintained that the two works represent different stages of Adam Smith’s own development: the 
Moral Sentiments an earlier, altruistic stage; the Wealth of Nations, a later, cynical, materialistic 
stage, in which altruism has been replaced by selfishness, and virtue by material wealth” (Morrow 
1927, p. 329). The Smith who wrote the TMS was depicted as a believer in the moral human being. 
The  respective  theorists  of  the  ASP  held  that  Smith,  still  under  the  influence  of  his  teacher 
Hutcheson, set out to describe the human being as a virtuous creature whose motivation mainly is 
determined by benevolence. “Theory of Moral Sentiments, they held, was based on the view that 
man is  essentially a benevolent  or  altruistic creature who is  “idealistically” motivated to moral 
action by the sympathy he feels for his fellow creatures”. Having matured through the seventeen 
years between the two works, Smith, following this view, then set out to formulate his new view on 
human nature. “In the Wealth of Nations, (…) man is depicted as egoistic in nature, being motivated 
almost exclusively by self-love and a desire for material gain” (Nieli 1986, p. 611). The author of 
the  TMS  grew up  to  become the  man who was  able  to  write  the  WN.  The  second  prominent 
explanation  which  was  maintained  by  the  defenders  of  the  ASP  agrees  with  Smith  being  the 
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inexperienced young scholar, who, influenced by his teacher, clung to his romanticised view of the 
moral human being. However, following this view, Smith’s subsequent change of mind was caused 
by more than him growing up. Smith had the chance to travel France in the 1760s and the liberty to 
connect with the leading philosophers and economists during his stay. This view suggests that the 
inspiration which led to  the WN  may have come from his  several  conversations in  the French 
salons. “In 1764 Smith traveled to France as the tutor to the young Duke of Buccleuch and during 
his three year stay France — it was said — came under the influence of the French materialist 
philosophers (…) in addition to the leading physiocrats. It was as a result of his trip to France, 
according to this view that Smith changed his basic understanding of human nature” (ibid., p. 612). 
The stay in France supposedly was enough to entirely change Smith’s academic project and the WN 
is to be seen as a correction to his former view. This explanation attempt also implies that the WN is 
basically a product of French school of thought and that Smith’s contribution to it is limited. The 
view of Smith having changed his mind on the human nature is problematic as a whole and, despite 
the naturalness it was held initially, not easy to defend. One possible point of attack is the abrupt 
character with which Smith, according to the ASP, has changed his view. According to “Problem-
theorists,  Smith  claims in  WN that  individuals  motivated by self-interest,  and in  virtue  of  that 
motivation alone, are able to co-ordinate their activities, whereas in TMS he claims that benevolence 
alone is supposed to do the job” (Wilson 2006, p. 269). Even though the author of the TMS did 
consider four virtues, of which benevolence is only one, the selfish character of the human agent, as 
it was taken from the WN, is a drastic contrast to the sympathising moral agent of Smith’s earlier 
work.  “Smith  was  thus  depicted  as  having moved from the  position  which at  first  specifically 
criticized the egoistic view of human nature to one which fully embraced it” (Nieli 1986, p. 613). It 
appears at least doubtful whether or not a stay in France could have that much of an effect on an 
accomplished philosopher. Another aspect which seems to expose a weakness of the ASP  is the 
extreme character,  theorists  read into the individual  in the WN.  “The economic man for whom 
Smith is held responsible is an alarmingly rational creature who invariably seeks his own interest, 
who reacts with lightning speed to actual and anticipated changes in his real income and wealth, 
turning with ease here and there upon the slightest fluctuation in relative prices”. This unrealistic 
display of an individual agent evidently is not to describe Smith’s actual picture of the human nature 
but a model which he used to describe the general economic behaviour of agents in a society. “He is 
unencumbered by any personal  relations  which might  interfere  with  his  relentless  maximizing, 
being a disembodied creature without a soul and devoid of human compassion”. From the author of 
the TMS, this image of an individual almost seems to amount to an ironic remark on merchants as a 
group. “It is as alien to the thought of Adam Smith as it is to the observable facts of social behavior 
or to any reasonable preconception of them” (Grampp 1948, p. 315). Contrary to the claim that 
Smith  completely  turned  around  and  formed  a  new  view  on  the  human  being  as  such,  this 
description of the economic man in society rather serves to illustrate his former holdings of moral 
philosophy, as expanded upon in the TMS, on the field of economics, which is the subject of the 
WN. It seems therefore more likely that the economic man, ‘homo oeconomicus’, is a model Smith 
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uses to explain the division of labour especially and the nature of economic life in general. Apart 
from the two potential  weaknesses just  mentioned, the ASP  seems untenable for multiple more 
reasons, a few of which will briefly be addressed at a later stage in this chapter. 
The ASP as a term arose about a century after the publication of the WN in the heart of continental 
Europe.  “In the last  decades of the nineteenth century a group of German scholars coined that 
phrase to describe what they saw as a possibly fundamental break between the assumptions that 
guided Smith’s first work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), and those that supported the 
economic theory of his later work, the Wealth of Nations”  (Teichgraeber 1981, p. 106). It is worth 
noting that  despite the concentration of English literature on Smith’s later  work on economics, 
German scholars appear to have been the first ones to examine both of Smith’s works together, 
trying  to  establish  a  connection,  or  indeed  disconnection  between  them.  “During  the  century 
following  his  death  there  was,  with  only  two  or  three  notable  exceptions,  (…)  no  scholarly 
engagement  with  the  writings  of  Smith  in  the  English  language  that  went  beyond  that  of  the 
classical economists in the first two decades” (Tribe 2008, p. 515). The ASP therefore can be seen as 
the  first  comprehensive  attempt  to  understand  Smith’s  work  as  a  whole.  “Although  no  one  in 
Smith’s  own  time  seems  to  have  perceived  any  contradiction  between  the  assumptions  and 
philosophies underlying the two works” (Nieli 1986, p. 611), the scholars developing what has later 
been called the ASP enthusiastically engaged in showing exactly that presumed contradiction. The 
German scholars who contributed to its creation provided the starting point for a more profound 
academic  discussion  on  Smith.  By  criticising  the  very  originality  of  his  work,  they  laid  the 
foundation for a new chapter of literature on Smith. “Das Adam Smith Problem (…) was indeed a 
mistaken idea, but one which stimulated argument about the significance of Smith’s work and the 
nature of any project that he might have been pursuing”. To treat Smith’s academic writings each as 
part of one work and trying to find a connection between them instead of examining their messages 
separately from each other was a new idea. “Such argument was absent from English commentary 
on Smith” and “the placing of Smith in a wider intellectual context was first essayed by German 
scholars”  (Tribe  2008,  p.  518).  The  contributors,  mainly  economists,  were  for  the  most  part 
interested  in  Smith’s  ideas  on  political  economy  and  national  wealth.  Unlike  their  British 
counterparts, who were as well mainly economists focussing on Smith’s contribution to national 
economics, the German scholars, by including the TMS into their analysis of the WN, intended to 
add another dimension to their critique of Smith’s economic theory. As the ASP mainly “emerged 
among certain economists with socialist and social-reformist sympathies”, its main objective was 
not to shine light on Smith as moral philosopher but to expose fundamental flaws in his theory on 
economics. Accordingly, the main contributors to the ASP were “economists, who had become very 
critical of the dominant, Manchester-style, laissez-faire philosophy” (Nieli 1986, p. 611). However, 
the  efforts  made  in  the  debate  on  the  presumed  contradiction  between  Smith’s  two  works 
established  a  wider  image  of  Smith.  In  other  words,  by  enabling  the  TMS  to  occupy  a  more 
prominent position in literature, the ASP theorists reestablished Smith as a moral philosopher where 
he was threatened to be exclusively seen as an economist. “Despite the routine disparagement of 
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Smith by German historical economists, there was an increasing body of German-language writing 
which represented in the early 1890s an understanding of Smith considerably more sophisticated 
than anything to be found in English at this time” (Tribe 2008, p. 522). One of the first to mention 
the TMS and the WN in one context was the historic and political economist Karl Knies. In his work 
on the history of economics, he expresses his confusion regarding the two publications of Smith 
apparently contradicting each other. He then argues that the time Smith spent in France must have 
moved him to change his mind as he described him as an otherwise reliable academic who should 
have known better. “Smith himself had earlier been a teacher and author in the field of philosophy, 
specifically moral philosophy.” Consequently, “it certainly cannot be viewed as a mere accident, 
that between the publication of his Theory of Moral Sentiments and his economic Inquiry [the WN] 
there came his stay in France” (Knies 1853, p. 180, transl. S. Z.). The point was made somewhat 
more  vigorously  by  Witold  von Skarżyński  as  he  seemingly  set  out  to  discredit  Smith’s  work 
entirely. By questioning the authenticity of not only the WN  but also the TMS,  von Skarżyński 
denied Smith any academic credibility. His book on Smith’s legacy turned into “a ridiculously harsh 
critic of Smith, maintaining that Smith lacked originality, having learned his moral philosophy from 
Hutcheson and Hume, and his economics from the French Physiocrats” (Raphael 2009, p. 118). 
Regarding TMS, von Skarżyński concludes that it is in essence a jejune reproduction of Hume’s 
theory of moral philosophy. “All in all, this ‘system’ of Smith seems to be a rather clumsy and 
vague schematisation of the freer and logically strictly coherent Humean inquiry, this in reverse 
order,  with  an  oftentimes  superfluous  furnishing  of  unnecessary  details  of  all  sorts,  trivial  and 
outdated components and finally religious-mystical, so quite unscientific, impulses”. The WN, so 
von Skarżyński, is even more a result of Smith taking other scholar’s ideas and publishing them 
under his name. Von Skarżyński grants that Smith has revolutionised economics and still  holds 
influence a  hundred years  later.  However,  this  makes his  plagiarism even more severe for  von 
Skarżyński. “In no way do I negate the hardly deniable fact that a whole century and still today, a 
good part of economics rests on the teachings of Adam Smith, — I nevertheless do state that these 
teachings themselves rest on the findings of the Physiocrats, of Hume’s and [Anne Robert Jaques] 
Turgot’s,  a fact,  which until  today has not been brought to attention anywhere; mostly because 
Adam Smith  did  not  present  his  relation  to  the  physiocrats  in  the  right  light  and  because  he 
generally did not do his predecessors and teachers justice” (von Skarżyński 1878, pp.  74,  197; 
transl. S. Z.). This is but a rough sketch of the rigorous critique towards Smith’s works in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. It is displayed extensively and in more detail by Montes, Nieli and 
Tribe (Nieli 1986, Montes 2004, Tribe 2008). The insistence on the ASP by the German scholars of 
the late 1800s is, in addition to their own agenda to oppose British liberalism, partly due to the lack 
of knowledge about the TMS itself. Apparently, as it was highly unusual for German scholars to 
read the English original at the time, the extent of information they had at their disposal regarding 
the TMS was limited to its existence and general message. “Put more bluntly: most of those who 
wrote in German about Theory of Moral Sentiments had not read the book.” Although “two German 
translations of Theory of Moral Sentiments had been published in the eighteenth century (1770 and 
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1791/1795), (…) no new German edition was available to readers until [Walther] Eckstein’s edition 
of  1926”.  Consequently,  the  economists  in  Germany were  ignorant  to  the  exact  messages  and 
contents of the TMS and established the image of Smith on the basis of the WN, which was a much 
bigger success on the continent than its predecessor. However, the dominant standing of the WN and 
the therefore vague idea German scholars had of Smith’s general message caused by “the absence 
of a current edition of Moral Sentiments  had not obstructed discussion of its relationship to the 
argument of Wealth of Nations during the final decades of the nineteenth century” (Tribe 2008, pp. 
518, 523). The discussion on the ASP was somewhat discredited when Edwin Cannan published 
lectures Smith conducted in the early 1760s. Especially the theory of Smith having been inspired to 
the WN exclusively by the French physiocratic movement, which von Skarżyński asserted, “was 
dealt a fatal blow in 1896 with the publication by the English economist Edwin Cannan of notes 
that a student of Smith had taken of lectures Smith delivered at the University of Glasgow in 1763, 
the year before Smith left for France” (Smith 1896, Nieli 1986, p. 614). This showed clearly the 
evolution of Smith’s thought process and the scope of the academic legacy he was building on. The 
Lectures entailed not only Smith’s thoughts on jurisprudence and politics, the compilation of the 
notes included main parts of the WN already. Cannan even illustrated the close correlation of the 
Lectures and the WN by pointing out passages that appear unchanged in the final WN (Cannan 1896, 
p. xxxv). By that, he prompted the conclusion that the Lectures already marked the early stages of 
Smith’s second book. The Lectures therefore “showed clearly that Smith had formulated the major 
ideas of the Wealth of Nations, including the idea that economic relations are motivated by self-
interest rather than benevolence, before he had even embarked upon his French journey” (Nieli 
1986, p. 614). The significance of the Lectures for refuting the ASP will be addressed in a little 
more detail later in the present chapter. It should be noted that Cannan, by publishing the Lectures, 
did not mean to answer to the ongoing debate in Germany at the time. In fact, it is highly unlikely 
that he knew of it altogether and that, if he did, would have regarded it as relevant for his work. 
“Cannan  was  an  economist  interested  in  the  history  of  economics,  not  a  historian  of  political 
thought. That German scholars had debated the wider significance of Smith’s work since the later 
1860s went largely unremarked” (Tribe 2008, p.  524).  As the Swiss economist  August Oncken 
stated, the ASP as an academic debate was not recognised in Britain at all. “It does not seem to be 
understood  in  Great  Britain  that,  on  the  Continent,  there  is  a  difference  of  opinion  about  one 
fundamental point in Adam Smith’s system” (Oncken 1897, p. 444). Cannan therefore had no way 
of knowing of the significance his find had on the picture of Smith in Europe and, in turn, felt no 
urge to refer to it in his edited publication of the Lectures. “When a summary of August Oncken’s 
survey of the ‘Adam Smith Problem’ was published in the Economic Journal in 1897 this appears to 
have introduced to English readers for the first time arguments that went back forty years” (Tribe 
2008, p. 524). Not only does his article contribute to explain the different perceptions of Smith in 
Europe and in Britain, Oncken also established a connection between them. By linking Cannan’s 
publication of the Lectures with the discussion on the ASP, he made clear that one of the ASP’s 
main points, Smith having taken major parts of the WN from thinkers he met in France, could not be 
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true. “Oncken’s article was a turning point in Smithian scholarship because it marked the time when 
Smith scholars began to take for granted that the French Physiocrats had not changed Smith’s mind” 
(Otteson 2000, p. 52). The article directly addressed the misconception the German economists fell 
prey  to  and  rehabilitated  Smith  on  the  continent.  “It  is  quite  evident  that  Smith  needed  no 
introduction from the Encyclopesdists in France in order to give self-love that place among human 
motives for action which he has given it later on in the Wealth of Nations“ (Oncken 1897, p. 447). 
Through that, Oncken brought back the idea of an overall Smithian position, which encompasses 
the TMS as well as the WN. Thereby, he contributed hugely to the way Smith is seen today.
After Cannan published the notes from Smith’s lectures and Oncken established that the WN was 
not a result of Smith’s stay in France, the ASP as an academic concept seemed to be buried. “The 
old Das Adam Smith Problem is no longer tenable. Few today believe that Smith postulates two 
contradictory principles of human action” (Wilson 2006, p. 251). However, despite the refutation of 
the ASP of the late 1800s, a debate on presumed inconsistencies between Smith’s two works is still 
going on. Following, three contemporary approaches suggesting the incompatibility of Smith’s two 
works will briefly be displayed. The first and most obvious of these regards the apparent lack of 
continuity between the WN and the TMS. It is not out of this world to expect a number of references 
in Smith’s second book to the work, which established his academic standing. Nevertheless, no such 
references are made. Although Smith could have presented a relation multiple times in the WN as 
the central theme of the TMS, virtue and propriety of behaviour and the interaction of people with 
each other in a society, is primary subject to major parts of the WN as well, Smith does not see the 
necessity to relate his two works. Despite the seemingly evident touching points of the two works, 
for  example  the  interaction  of  moral  agents  in  an  economic  environment,  Smith  desists  from 
connecting his thoughts. “Nowhere in WN, for example, is reference made to TMS; nowhere in WN 
is mention made of the view championed in TMS that four principal virtues — justice, beneficence, 
prudence, and self-command — must be balanced in the virtuous person”. This naturally suggests 
that the virtuous person of the TMS is seen as somewhat disconnected from the economic man of 
the WN. “The problem is that in WN Smith seems to treat self-interest as the sole natural motive to 
act, to the exclusion of benevolence and the desire for mutual sympathy” (Otteson 2000, pp. 63, 
65). What is most striking about this lack of reference is its apparent implication that Smith either 
did not see touching points between the two works, which is highly unlikely given the multiple 
editions of the TMS after the publication of the WN, or intentionally disconnected his economic 
work from his  earlier  one on morality.  To view Smith’s  two books  as  being part  of  the  same 
academic project, they seem to necessarily build on and make connections to one another. Apart 
from the advertisement of the TMS announcing the WN, they do not. Whether deliberately or not, 
Smith seems to present the WN  as a separate work that does not rely on or develop further the 
findings of the TMS. Smith’s overall project to be evident seems to require a visible link between 
his only two published works. “When applied to human nature [Smith’s thought] requires the tying 
together  of  all  the  various  components  of  human  character.  These  include  capacities  (or 
dispositions), like sympathy or utility, as well as motives like own and other regard” (Witzum 1998, 
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p. 495). Secondly, Smith seems to actively work against a perception of him following one overall 
academic idea in both of his works. “It is true that Smith failed to put his two books together into a 
single coherent system of thought” (Smith 1998, p. 17). In the WN, he explains at large the nature 
and mechanics of a market economy. A reference to how this construct impacts the moral agent as 
depicted in the TMS would be a reasonable connection Smith easily could have made. He did not 
however and by that leaves room for the claim that “only the self-interested people of the WN are 
predisposed to this deception [of short-term economic gain] and would consider natural liberty as 
morally good — a view that no impartial  spectator would uphold” (Witzum 1998, p.  493).  He 
therefore never explained how moral agents act in market economies. “Thus the matter must still be 
addressed (…) of how morality mixes with markets”. This point also raises the question which work 
must be seen as primary to the other “because it highlights the tension between moral injunctions to 
beneficence and other virtues, on the one hand, and the apparent amorality of economic markets on 
the other” (Otteson 2000, pp. 70, 69). If Smith wants to establish a supremacy of the TMS, he must 
make clear how morality features in the market economy as explained in the WN. In the opposite 
case, Smith needs to clarify how the economic man relates to the virtuous behaviour. “While it is 
true that there is no problem of consistency, as all humans are capable of sympathy, some are likely 
to use it  for  a  less-than-admirable purpose” (Witzum 1998,  p.  492).  Smith seems to leave this 
conundrum  unanswered  intentionally  by  needlessly  separating  the  contents  of  his  two  works. 
Although it could be argued that it does not occur to Smith that this could be interpreted as an 
attempt to divorce his inquiry on economics from his work on moral philosophy, he supports this 
view himself by not taking any efforts to couple his two books into one approach incorporating 
both, the moral agent and the economic man. “The great difficulty in explaining this connection in 
Smith’s  thought  — and thus  also  the  reason for  being clear  at  the  outset  about  the  traditional 
humanistic notion of ‘virtue’ — is that he made no elaborate, direct argument linking the terms 
‘virtue’ and ‘commerce’” (Teichgraeber 1981, p. 114). A third way to see an ASP is by reversing the 
original from the end of the nineteenth century. “If there is any tension between the two books, it 
could be because The Theory of Moral Sentiments is more favorable to self-interest than The Wealth 
of Nations”. This view, instead of criticising the apparently boundless room given to self-interest the 
WN and identifying the supposedly resulting conflict with the TMS as a consequence of that, turns 
the narrative around and assigns to the TMS the role of the self-interest’s advocate. Self-regarding 
intentions of individuals are depicted as a hazard to society in the WN whereas they are seen as 
favourable  and  even  virtuous  in  the  TMS.  “In  The  Wealth  of  Nations,  self-interest  cannot 
successfully be constrained, leaving individuals and society more susceptible to its abuses. In The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, self-interest is always successfully constrained so that both individuals 
and society are, unlike in the later book, unquestionable better off by its presence” (Paganelli 2008, 
pp. 73, 79). Seen this way, it even seems like the earlier work is meant as an answer to the latter. 
“Within the treatment of the sympathetic and impartial spectator, Smith’s treatment of the prudent 
man seems a crucial  and telling example of  the way in which he tried to  cope with the main 
difficulty in all social theories, the obstinate selfishness of the individual” (Macfie 1959, p. 220). 
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Indeed, the Impartial Spectator is presented as an instrument to avoid selfish passions and lead the 
way towards a morally impeccable behaviour. “Our desire to be praiseworthy and to be praised, 
embodied in the impartial spectator that lives within us, overwrites all possible excesses of self-
interest”. Our striving for praiseworthy behaviour as depicted in the TMS is our natural way to 
avoid the dangers of selfish behaviour in a market society. “The desire to be approvable and to be 
approved  is  an  effective  constraint  on  self-interest”  (Paganelli  2008,  p.  81).  The  favourable 
characteristics of self-interest, which feature in the TMS more than in the WN, can even be seen as a 
direct answer to the allegedly selfish economic man of the latter work. “In this prudent self-love, the 
Moral  Sentiments  explicitly  mentions  the  economic  interest,  indeed  mentions  it  first,  and  so 
presumably of primary importance” (Macfie 1959, p. 223). By holding that Smith was anticipating 
the WN  in the TMS,  this view, unlike the other approaches to explaining the lack of reference, 
makes an overall idea, by which Smith had connected his two works, more likely. However, it also 
makes the alleged lack of connection between Smith’s two works seem even more enigmatic.
Despite  these  approaches  towards  reviving  the  ASP  by  presenting  it  in  a  different  light,  it  is 
overwhelmingly agreed to be an untenable position.  The view that  the WN  expressed a drastic 
change of thought to the extent of straightforwardly contradicting the statements made in the TMS is 
overwhelmingly agreed to be scientifically dubious. “Such crude interpretation of Smith’s thought 
could arise only from a failure to read his writings with care. The scholars who took up the alleged 
problem  were,  in  general,  interested  in  Smith’s  economics  and  not  well  versed  in 
philosophy” (Raphael 2009, p. 115). While not all Smith scholars agree that there is no discrepancy 
at all, the majority seems to assent that Smith’s two works can be seen as both contributing to one 
Smithian legacy and that Smith does not need to stick to one profession but can reconcile both, 
moral philosophy and economics, in his writings. “The practical act, like the act of artistic creation, 
is a complex unity. Feeling and thought, like colour and form, are aspects of this unity. To suggest 
that we can finally separate them, or explain the act by any one alone, is the major (and constant) 
error that the merely analytic intelligence commits” (Macfie 1959, p. 215). In the following, it will 
be shown how both parts of Smith’s academic achievement come together into one and connect the 
fields of moral philosophy and economics. This connection is explained by addressing a few major 
points of attack that the ASP theorists, both historic and contemporary, brought forward to question 
the continuity in Smith’s work. In the course of that, the natures of self-interest in both of Smith’s 
works are compared and related to each other before also shedding light on how Smith evaluates 
constraining self-interest  of  individuals  in a society.  After  examining the time gap between the 
original publications of the TMS and the WN by building on the historic context, this chapter will 
close with connecting all points made against the ASP thus far, illustrating the red thread that is 
evident throughout Smith’s work and suggesting the WN as a sequel to the TMS.
The nature of the ASP,  the foundation of the misconception that led thinkers at  the end of the 
nineteenth century to disregard Smith as an academic entirely, rests to a large extent on Smith’s 
understanding and discussion of self-interest. The ASP theorists’ reading of the WN, promoting self-
interest as an exclusively self-regarding motive, could not be reconciled with their reading of the 
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TMS  presenting  sympathy  as  representing  an  emotion,  which  is  solely  directed  towards  the 
advantage of others. “If self-interest is indeed selfishness, sympathy — interpreted as a genuine 
interest  in  the fortunes of  others  —cannot  be consistent  with it”  (Witzum 1998,  p.  502).  Both 
readings  are,  as  shall  be  explained,  perfunctory  and  simply  mistaken  as  Smith’s  unique 
understanding of sympathy, which he outlines in the TMS, encompasses the notion of self-interest as 
the basis for the economic man of the WN. Below, it is examined in what way sympathy indeed is 
the  foundation  of  and  does  entail  self-interest  through  the  virtue  of  prudence.  Moreover,  it  is 
explained how Smith establishes this correlation in his TMS by showing the natural inclination and 
competence we have regarding our own concerns, thereby suggesting the vital function of self-
interest Smith expands upon in the WN in great detail. Finally, the interpretation of self-interest in 
the WN as greed is examined and it is shown, how this understanding appears to be as misguided as 
the ASP as a whole. 
The objective of  Smith’s moral  philosophy is  to attain a comprehensive understanding on how 
people interact with each other. Smith makes clear that the pivotal role in our behaviour towards 
other  people  and  indeed  other’s  behaviour  towards  us,  as  well  as  our  picture  of  ourselves  is 
determined by sympathy. It  is the fundamental feature of all  relationships among moral agents, 
extending to all thinkable situations of human interaction. “For the Two Smiths (of TMS and WN 
respectively) there is but one principle that governs human behaviour—and that master-principle is 
sympathy” (Wilson 2006, p. 254). To see the notion of self-interest detached from sympathy is 
missing Smith’s point. The TMS “is not a book about a single character. It is a book about how 
diverse  tendencies  and  dispositions  generate  a  system  where  ethical  judgments  and  behavior 
interact” (Witzum 1998, p. 490). Everything we feel, do or convey towards others is directed by this 
moral  groundwork.  “We are  only  able  to  act  out  of  self-love  or  benevolence  because  we are 
sympathetic”.  This again shows the distinctness of Smith’s notion of sympathy, which the ASP 
theorists did not adequately appreciate. The contradiction they interpreted the relation of sympathy 
and self-interest as “dissolves, however, once it is admitted (and it must be) that Smithian sympathy 
is not benevolence” (Wilson 2006, p. 255). It is important to note that sympathy, in the Smithian 
understanding of the TMS, is not limited to a single emotion as it is the basis for all of them. This 
explicitly includes the self-love which is the basis of the WN. Sympathy is not exclusively the basis 
for favourable sentiments but serves to bring about all emotions. Smith values these emotions not 
for their own sake but for the underlying motivation by which they are driven. Seen in this light, 
even  initially  selfish  passions,  which  seem completely  unfavourable,  can  provide  a  productive 
function in society. “He shows very clearly how vanity itself has a social function and regard, being 
itself derived from sympathy (…) vanity can and does develop into a relatively worthy sentiment 
when it is allied to the desire for the esteem of others. Vanity so motived Smith considers capable of 
modified  approval,  as  pride;  not  in  itself  — for  in  itself  it  is  a  vice”  (Macfie  1959,  p.  221). 
Sympathy’s neutral character regarding the emotions it excites is illustrated once more by setting 
opposing motivations  into  context  with  one another.  “Once a  proper  relationship is  established 
between  the  own-regarding  motives  (…)  and  the  other-regarding  ones  (…),  the  relationship 
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between self-interest and special forms of sympathy will also become apparent” (Witzum 1998, p. 
501). Our motivations, although produced by it, are not impacted by sympathy in their character 
whatsoever.  The  very  process  of  sympathising  does  not  in  any way extend to  the  kind  of  the 
emotion it  excites,  it  rather  is  limited  to  bringing it  about.  This  is  how both,  self-interest  and 
benevolence, can be results of the same process. “Whether we act out of concern for self or for 
other, we are only able to act as we do because we are sympathisers” (Wilson 2006, p. 270). The 
defenders of the historic ASP did not see this character of Smithian sympathy. “The originators of 
‘das Adam Smith Problem’ misconceived an important part  of this problem when they equated 
Smith’s account of sympathy with benevolence alone” (Teichgraeber 1981, p. 116). Unfortunately, 
it is a crucial aspect of Smithian sympathy. All sentiments sharing this one sole source, it is likely 
that the emotions produced are essentially related although they seem to be quite the opposite to 
each  other.  One  example  of  such  a  case  is  the  collision  of  self-regarding  motives  and  other-
regarding ones. “Sometimes individuals may appear to be selfish (…), but in truth they do have a 
positive interest in others’ happiness at all times”. Once benevolence is one of the emotions brought 
about by our sympathy, it seems, every other feeling is to a certain extent connected to its other-
regarded objective. “No matter what motivates people’s behavior, there are some principles in their 
nature that interest them in each other’s fortune”. Put the other way, the motivation for us to engage 
in understanding other people, and, in turn, sympathising with them, is self-interest as agreement 
rewards us emotionally. “It is not inconceivable that it is our expected pleasure from the harmony of 
sentiments which dominates all other possible causes to our practice of the imaginary change of 
places” (Witzum 1998, pp. 500, 507).  A claim of sympathy and self-interest contradicting each 
other seems therefore internally inconsistent. “Only in theory, then, was it possible that our rational 
pursuit  of  self-interest  might  set  us  in  conflict  with  one  another”  (Teichgraeber  1981,  p.  115). 
Another  feature  of  sympathy  is  the  universality  which  Smith  assigns  to  it.  The  process  of 
sympathising, as our general way of creating feelings towards others, is not confined to certain 
situations. Rather, it must necessarily be applicable in all circumstances, in which we interact with 
moral agents for we cannot do so without it. “For Smith, sympathy constitutes human behaviour, 
always and everywhere” (Wilson 2006, p. 257). Economic exchanges are certainly not exempt from 
this  rule.  The  defining  feature  of  Smith’s  economic  man,  is  therefore  a  result  of,  and  not  a 
contradiction to, the sympathy depicted in the TMS. Self-interest, as “the topic of WN[,] concerns 
only a subset of human behavior, but it is human behavior nonetheless”. As such, it is derived from 
sympathy, the basis of Smith’s moral philosophy, and, in turn, features quite prominently in the 
TMS already. For this reason, self-interest cannot, as claimed by ASP theorists, contradict Smith’s 
earlier work by describing economics in his WN. “Hence it is clear that any critic who claimed that 
there was no accounting of self-interest in TMS (…) cannot have read all of TMS” (Otteson 2000, 
pp. 60, 55). 
In addition to seeing self-interest and sympathy, rather than opposing each other, as both being part 
of the same philosophical project, Smith even explicitly promotes it as a favourable trait already in 
the TMS. “Smith by no means deprecates all self-interested action; indeed self-interested action is 
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sometimes seen as a virtue” (Nieli 1986, p. 617). The self-interest depicted in the WN has been 
taken for Smith’s primary focus regarding the economic field as detached from moral philosophy. 
This interpretation, however, seems to be entirely mistaken. “We misconceive the nature of Smith’s 
intentions  if  we  understand  free  and  self-interested  ‘commerce’  (…)  as  a  ‘substitute  for 
virtue’” (Teichgraeber 1981, p. 118). Seeing it synonymously to selfishness is misreading the WN 
and failing to understand its character. “Smith is not replacing a public-spirited motive with a self-
interested  one”  (Mehta  2006,  p.  251).  Self-interest  and  selfishness  are,  even  in  the  economic 
context,  quite distinct motives for Smith. While the former is a virtue, the latter is a vice. The 
fundamental role self-interest plays in Smith’s first book even led to the ‘Reversed Adam Smith 
Problem’, which was briefly outlined above. Indeed, Smith is very clear about his favourable view 
of self-interest in his work on moral philosophy. “Regard to our own private happiness and interest 
appear  (…)  very  laudable  principles  of  action.  The  habits  of  oeconomy,  industry,  discretion, 
attention and application of thought are generally supposed to be cultivated from self-interested 
motives, and at the same time are apprehended to be very praiseworthy qualities which deserve the 
esteem and  approbation  of  everybody”  (Smith  1759,  VII,  ii,  3.16).  Smith  sees  self-interest  as 
prudence’s basic component. It is a self-regard motivation, which makes us better our situation and 
that  of  our  loved  ones.  Prudence  describes  how  self-interest  and  other-regarding  virtues  like 
beneficence can and indeed do complement each other. This other-regarded character of self-interest 
as prudence becomes clear in our striving for praiseworthiness and the subsequent motivation to act 
morally. Much more evident still is the connection of our self-interest to our interest in others in 
Smith’s  examination  of  economics.  “The  economic  man  of  the  Wealth  of  Nations  is  himself 
assumed  by  Smith  to  be  a  servant  of  society,  so  far  as  he  is  truly  prudent,  or  acts 
appropriately” (Macfie 1959, p. 223). Put the other way, positioning it as virtuous in the discussion 
on how to reach praiseworthy behaviour, Smith manages to defend economic striving in his defence 
of capitalism. “Prudence was a characteristic of self-interested conduct — and also one particularly 
helpful in economic pursuits” (Teichgraeber 1981, p. 108). The correlation between our pursuit of 
self-interest and its positive impact on other members of our community was described on multiple 
occasions throughout this thesis. Nevertheless, Smith seems to illustrate it most in the economic 
context. “Not only does prudence more securely sustain one’s own advancement; in doing so, it also 
contributes to economic growth” (Mehta 2006, p. 261). Prudence connects the TMS and the WN in 
contributing to both our moral and our economic advantage at the same time. Both works, therefore, 
illustrate a self-interested agent in a society and, although the latter one raises a few important 
concerns about our self-interest, they both favour the idea of giving individuals the opportunity to 
follow their self-regarding motivations. “Smith was rather apprehensive about the moral goodness 
of what might be termed as self-interest” (Witzum 1998, p. 510). The treatment of it in TMS and 
WN  respectively  connects  his  moral  philosophy  with  his  inquiry  on  economics,  making  the 
interpretation of them being detached contributions to separate fields more unlikely. “Prudence is 
the link between The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Book II of The Wealth of Nations, where 
Smith singles out frugality as an important factor of economic growth” (Mehta 2006, p. 261). Smith 
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also  describes  prudence  as  the  sustainable  exercise  of  self-interest  and  thereby  displays  it  as 
opposing  short-sighted  selfishness.  Rather  than  satisfying  our  present  desires  at  all  cost,  we 
therefore, by acting prudently, prioritise and act in a way, which allows us to formulate and achieve 
more significant goals. “Prudence is the virtue that allows us to weigh our present desires against 
our  long-term  desires  without  regard  to  what  at  times  is  the  pressing  feeling  of 
immediacy” (Otteson 2000, p. 53). On the contrary, selfishness is expressed by a lack of prudence. 
The failure  to  act  prudently  is  what  Smith  understands  as  selfish behaviour.  “Imprudence (…) 
means that the person only cares for himself and has no regard whatsoever for rank or reputation. 
(…)  With  such  individuals  around,  society  may  not  subsist.  It  is  therefore  clear  (…)  that  the 
difference in the other-regarding behavior of characters is closely associated with their pursuit of 
their own business”. Through promoting prudence to a virtue, Smith makes clear that pure self-love 
cannot lead to virtuous conduct and, in extension, to praiseworthy behaviour. 
Prudence, along with showing the virtuous character Smith seems to assign to self-interest, is an 
expression of his belief that we, in the majority of cases, are simply the most competent responder 
regarding our own affairs. The “definition of self-interest, prudence, is the virtue of caring for one’s 
self, according to Smith” (Witzum 1998, pp. 506, 502). In addition to its virtuous character, self-
interest is favourable for practical reasons as well. Hence, common sense seems to promote self-
interest as a motive. “Every man, as the Stoics used to say, is first and principally recommended to 
his own care; and every man is certainly, in every respect, fitter and abler to take care of himself 
than of any other person. Every man feels his own pleasures and his own pains more sensibly than 
those  of  other  people”  (Smith  1759,  VI,  ii,  1.1).  However,  Smith  does  not  see  self-interest  as 
excluding concern for others. The opposite is true, since “all human beings are naturally motivated 
to pursue their own affairs. This does not mean that they cannot be endowed with the capacity to 
feel for others” (Witzum 1998, p. 489). Rather than ruling out our interest in others, as the ASP 
theorists interpreted Smith’s depiction of self-interest in the WN, he instead observed a hierarchy of 
our priorities. The virtues do not eradicate each other but can occur together in our actions. “We are 
first and foremost attuned to ourselves and consider our self as we act. But we are also capable of 
weighing considerations of justice and beneficence as we choose our actions” (Evensky 2001, p. 
503). Despite the value Smith assigns to the virtue of prudence, we are perfectly able to not neglect 
other-regarding virtues in our conduct. Prudence is our best hope when it comes to dealing with our 
own concerns.  We see matters concerning ourselves better than anyone else could. Self-love in 
other contexts can have destructive effects, not only for our impact on other people and society as a 
whole  but  also  on  us  as  individuals.  “Smith  did  claim that  self-interest  is  endemic  to  human 
behaviour. But this kind of self-interest—and this kind of interest pervades TMS just as much as WN
—is more a matter of perspective than some crude (economic) impulse to self-gratification” (Wilson 
2006, p. 270). The justification of self-interestedness lies therefore to some extent in us having the 
highest  competence  ourselves  when  it  comes  to  issues  that  occur  in  us  as  individuals  and,  in 
extension, those nearest to us. We favour ourselves and those who we consider our family and 
friends first not for reasons of selfishness but because we can better their situation most effectively. 
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“Benevolence,  while  the  highest  form of  virtue,  for  Smith  was  primarily  a  feature  of  private 
relationships” (Teichgraeber 1981, p. 107) and not part of our everyday economic endeavours with 
people  otherwise  unknown  to  us.  “This  kind  of  act—  behaviour  motivated  by  self-interest—
dominates the discourse of WN, but not because Smith (…) has changed his opinion on how people 
are motivated. It is rather that WN (…) is not concerned with situations in which a ‘benevolent’ 
disposition is to be expected” (Wilson 2006, p. 270). Prudence shields us from being exploited in an 
economic environment. 
Interpreting self-interest as selfishness is mistaken in a third way. Apart from constituting the virtue 
of prudence and being the most efficient way to improve our situation, Smith is opposed to selfish 
conduct for rational reasons as well. Being primarily seen as the father of capitalism, Smith’s usage 
of self-interest in the WN is oftentimes taken as an indication for Smith seeing greedy behaviour as 
the  modus  operandi  of  a  market  economy.  “In  the  20th  century,  the  invisible  hand  became a 
grabbing hand — the foundation for  ethical  egoism” (Wight 2007,  p.  350).  However,  a  proper 
reading of Smith’s two books together reveals that this interpretation could not be further from what 
the author intended. “The principle of the invisible hand, in its twentieth-century sense, was quite 
un-Smithian”  (Rothschild  2006,  p.  363).  This  mistake,  again,  could  only  occur  through 
misunderstanding the WN as separate to the TMS. It is not in our interest to act selfishly, this seems 
to be Smith’s point consistently throughout both of his books. “Smith’s psychological system was 
founded upon sympathy” and a “problem with the greed interpretation is that the ends of nature 
(survival  and  procreation)  require  a  high  degree  of  social  cooperation  and  justice  for  their 
fulfillment”  (Wight  2007,  p.  350).  To  observe  and  explain  the  conditions  of  rewarding  human 
interaction  was  Smith’s  vision  and  purpose.  Acts  disregarding  the  interests  of  others  directly 
opposes the effort of cooperation. We cannot fruitfully interact with others and form meaningful 
relationships if we let our behaviour be guided by greed. “Selfishness is not a sufficient instinct for 
creating and maintaining a good society”. This thought of not being able to progress towards our 
goal is captured by the WN in the same way. As Smith’s market economy is inhabited by the same 
agents who he describes in his moral philosophy, the same conditions for their interaction apply. 
“Although many markets are assumed to rely on anonymous exchange, Smith’s market examples 
usually depend on conversation, civility,  and character”. Relying on the free market to regulate 
price is a trust-based system. It works best and most quickly in the case of everyone complying to 
agreed upon market rules. “Transactions costs are lower when a merchant believes a supplier is 
honest by principle not by calculation”. An elaborate system of enforceable market rules is not the 
motivated by constraining self-love but the result of self-interestedness. Greedy behaviour such as 
fraud and cheating is penalised instantly, independently from formal market rules, by a decrease in 
trust put in the agent. The short-term gain he achieves through defecting is not worth the prospect of 
future  isolation  as  isolation  leads  to  the  end  of  any  business  in  a  liberal,  Smithian  society. 
Selfishness  is  therefore  the  least  successful  strategy  to  follow.  Furthermore,  Smith  was  openly 
opposed  to  selfishness.  Another  “problem  with  the  greed  interpretation  is  that  Smith  clearly 
condemned  it”.  He  was,  differently  to  the  capitalism  of  the  twentieth  century,  in  favour  of 
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controlling  and  regulating  market  economies  to  prevent  selfish  passions  and  an  unbearable 
inequality. “The instinct for promoting one’s own welfare is intense yet it is a passion that must be 
disciplined alongside  other  appetites”  (ibid.,  p.  351).  Rather  than  the  cold  hearted  laissez-faire 
capitalist  he is presented as, the economist Smith proves to be closer to a critic of the modern 
interpretation of  capitalism.  In  any case,  his  understanding of  self-interest  in  the  WN  does  not 
favour selfish behaviour, nor does it promote a general altruism. “Far from being either one-sidedly 
‘optimistic’ or one-sidely ‘pessimistic’, Smith’s view of man and of human moral possibilities, one 
might say, is quite realistic and balanced” (Nieli 1986, p. 624). Both of his works are based on one 
understanding of self-interest. The ASP’s claim that Smith presented a direr view on human nature 
and, in turn, self-interest therefore does not seem to be valid.
Apart from promoting self-interest as including in itself the interests of others and thereby serving 
society  as  a  whole,  Smith  also  sees  the  necessity  for  constraining  self-regarding  motivations 
throughout his academic career. Smith regards regulations to be a necessity to ensure order in a 
community and thereby avoid a situation, in which liberties can no longer be exercised. “An ideal 
liberal society is, according to Smith, one in which there is liberty and justice for all. Liberty offers 
freedom of movement and choice, and justice ensures the security that empowers individuals to take 
advantage of their liberties” (Evensky 2001, p. 506). The picture of self-interest in the TMS is a 
positive one and it is assigned a function, which goes beyond the individual. In the WN, self-love is 
presented  as  a  potentially  dangerous  trait  for  people  and,  in  extension,  for  society,  due  to  the 
different context self-interest is applied in. Despite the favourable picture he draws of self-regarding 
motives  in  his  first  work,  Smith  constrains  the  exercise  of  self-interest  in  both  of  his  books. 
“Unregulated self-interest is no more advocated in the Wealth of Nations than it is in the [Theory of] 
Moral Sentiments” (Morrow 1927, p. 331). Regarding regulation in his moral philosophy, he relies, 
as has been lined out in the third chapter, on the regulative function of the Impartial Spectator. In 
cases, in which we would have acted improper, the moral rules, which are expressing the Impartial 
Spectator’s moral judgement, guide us back towards praiseworthy behaviour. It is worth noting that 
our motivation is essential in order to avoid unrestrained self-love. Without our drive to achieve 
what the Impartial Spectator points towards, a liberal society could not sustain as we would not be 
motivated  to  motivated  to  comply  with  agreements.  “Smith  believed  that  liberty  can  only  be 
complete and thus the fruits of liberal society can only be fully realized where justice is based on a 
common willingness of citizens to voluntarily follow the dictates of civic ethics” (Evensky 2001, p. 
506). Individuals cannot be forced into order but must have an interest in following rules. This 
motivation is provided by our desire for attaining praiseworthiness. In addition to this constraint of 
self-interest,  which,  through  the  Impartial  Spectator,  is  imbedded  in  us  as  individuals,  Smith 
proposes governmental regulations in form of enforceable laws as well. “Social exchange requires 
not only positive reciprocity (…) but also negative reciprocity, the endogenous policeman whereby 
failures to reciprocate are punished” (Smith 1998, p. 17). A law system, and a government strong 
enough to enforce it, is a presupposition of a liberal society. In order for competition and liberal 
markets as well as the self-regulating function of self-love to work their magic, we need to have 
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established a framework of basic rules governing our everyday conduct. Self-interest is essential to 
maintain and improve our standard of living.  However,  Smith stressed that  self-love cannot go 
unguided as it would at some point hurt the liberties of other members of society. “The important 
consideration is that these self-interested activities must be regulated by justice” (Morrow 1927, p. 
330). This is one of Smith’s main messages in the WN. He inquires into the wealth of nations and 
not  into  the  personal  wealth  of  their  citizens.  Consequently,  Smith,  throughout  his  work  on 
economics, deals with the question of how it is possible to establish order in a society of self-
interested people. The WN, therefore, was, rather than glorifying self-love, concerned with how to 
constrain it for the good of society as a whole. “Adam Smith’s employment of self-interest in the 
Wealth  of  Nations,  then,  does  not  mean either  that  he  regarded self-love as  the  only actuating 
principle in human nature, or that he recommended unrestrained selfishness as the best means of 
promoting public wealth”. Nevertheless, the resulting system of laws meant to regulate the excesses 
of personal self-love was not a suggesting a general rejection of individualism. Rather, “it expresses 
his faith in the value of the individual and in the importance of freeing the individual man from the 
fetters of outworn economic institutions” (ibid., p. 331). Smith, despite seeing the need for a system 
of basic laws to keep self-interest in check, was not in favour of the government regulating the life 
of its citizens. Limiting its involvement into the everyday interaction of its subjects should therefore 
be  a  priority  of  every  nation’s  ruler.  “To the  degree  that  external  Government  enforcement  of 
constructive behaviour is necessary it not only reduces the fruits of liberal society (…), it reflects 
the tenuousness of that [particular] liberal experiment”. Smith generally has trust in the individual 
agents. His favourable image of them arises from his observation that individuals are interested in 
being the proper object of praise. An excessive government would, by gradually eradicating their 
individual drive towards praiseworthiness,  minimise this self-regulating effect that moral agents 
have on each other through their interaction. A liberal society cannot subsist for long if its rulers 
interfere with its members too much. As a result, the more regulations a government installs, the 
weaker it becomes. “In Smith’s story small government is not the cause of liberal society’s success, 
it is the benefit of that success” (Evensky 2001, pp. 506, 507). The laws of a nation therefore should 
work to amortise themselves as “a society of virtuous men was one in which individuals were 
allowed to attend to their own self-interest, broadly defined” (Teichgraeber 1981, p. 115). A society 
works better, the less guidance its members require. Having established an ethos of morally right 
conduct seems to be what a government should aim for. “In Smith’s view, the ultimate success of a 
liberal experiment lay in the institutional development and general inculcation of a mature set of 
civic ethics” (Evensky 2001, p. 506). The achievement of a society is to have embedded in their 
members an attitude towards morality which deems all government intervention unnecessary. One 
of the ways, which Smith proposed towards this end was the design of the laws themselves. As they 
are supposed to serve the good of the whole society, their basic character must appeal equally to all 
individuals. Smith derives this foundation of all laws from his moral philosophy as “a theory of the 
prudent man, of self-love, which is carefully fitted into the theory of society, as operative through 
the working of sympathy and reason constructing the detail of moral rules and economic institutions 
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as essential guides to appropriate action” (Macfie 1959, p. 223). Here, the relation between Smith’s 
two works becomes apparent once more and clearly shows how the ASP’s interpretation of the 
economic work as a means to counter his efforts on moral philosophy seems untenable. The nature 
of the constraints of self-love proposed in the WN to decrease its potentially negative effects in an 
economical context are a consequence of the moral agent as depicted in the TMS, not a reaction to 
it. For Smith, economics is growing on the fundament of moral philosophy. “His ethical theory is of 
great importance for understanding the doctrine of the economic harmony between the interests of 
the individual and the interests of the public” (Morrow 1927, p. 340). Another characteristic of the 
regulations  Smith  proposes  for  a  society  is  flexibility.  Despite  its  underlying  function,  “Smith 
believed that moral philosophy should be a general guide for policy, not a blueprint for arranging 
the social construct” (Evensky 2001, p. 514). A set framework of rules would snooker the individual 
progress in a society as well as that of society as a whole. It would therefore have a similar effect as 
a too high number of regulations as a fossilised legal system could not respond adequately to the 
drastic changes society faces over time. 
The belief Smith could have changed his mind and that the WN was a result of that swift turn in his 
academic thinking is one major argument held by the ASP, at least in its historic shape. This view is 
based on, as was addressed above already, the claim that Smith was, during his stay in France, 
influenced to the point at which he had to alter the direction of his thinking. Even after a connection 
of  Smith’s  time  in  France  and  the  WN  was  credibly  rejected  by  Cannan’s  publication  of  the 
Lectures, a modern version of the ASP still sees an inconsistency in Smith’s work. The defenders of 
this claim are driven by the search for the reason, which explains Smith’s apparent detachment of 
the WN from the TMS. However, both, the historic ASP as well as its attempted reviving by modern 
Smith scholars, fail  to see the red thread, connecting all  his works. In the following, it  will  be 
shown how the two works of Smith are directly related to one another and form Smith’s overall 
academic legacy together. Firstly, it will be briefly illustrated how the view seeing the WN being 
published after the TMS  is mistaken altogether.  After this,  hints suggesting Smith’s intention to 
consolidate his thoughts will  be examined before explaining the role of the Lectures in linking 
Smith’s  moral  philosophy  with  his  remarks  in  economics.  Finally,  this  chapter  will  end  with 
presenting the WN as ‘TMS-sequel’. By means of four arguments, it will be shown how Smith’s 
economics is a direct result of his moral philosophy.
The TMS, as well as the WN, each were revised and newly published by Smith in his lifetime a 
number of times. While the four editions of the WN, which follow the original publication in 1776, 
were rapidly finalised and published in the course of little over ten years (1778, 1784, 1786 and 
1789), Smith spent a much longer time with the TMS. Its first publication in 1759 was followed by 
five subsequent editions in 1767, 1774, 1781 and 1790 (see Raphael 2009, p. 2). It is important to 
note that two of these later editions also followed the publication of the revised WN. The many 
differences, which do separate the particular versions of the TMS from each other in detail are of 
minor interest for the present purpose, once it is established that they did not change the main theme 
and message of the work as such. Realising this, the interpretation of the WN countering and even 
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contradicting the TMS becomes even less tenable. Especially the last version of the TMS stands out 
in  clarifying  this  mistake.  This  “drastically  revised  and  expanded  version,  the  sixth  edition, 
appeared a few months before Smith’s death in 1790” (ibid., p. 1). It is clear from the scope and 
number of changes that it is a conscious move to update the treatise on moral philosophy. “Smith 
spent a good deal of time revising the sixth edition of the TMS” and it took him almost four years to 
finish it, which makes it likely that “these were not cosmetic changes for him” as “a rough page 
count of the edition reveals that about one-third of the book was newly written” (Dickey 1986, p. 
592).  The newly written passages include the whole sixth part,  explaining Smith’s view on the 
character of virtue. He therefore maintained the view, which he was later accused of having wanted 
to counter in the WN,  in the last edition of the TMS,  as the last work published by him in his 
lifetime. Should the ASP theorists have been right in claiming a drastic change of mind between the 
first and the second of Smith’s books, he would have held on to a view he wanted to correct even 
after the supposed correction had been published. Moreover, the TMS was read as a supplement to 
the WN by the authors contributing to the historic ASP. “One source of misunderstanding is that 
many  of  the  commentators  have  been  economists  who  have  looked  at  the  [Theory  of]  Moral 
Sentiments simply in order to find some relevance for The Wealth of Nations”. However, “Smith 
himself is said to have thought it superior to The Wealth of Nations” (Raphael 2009, p. 1). It is 
highly unlikely that  Smith maintained a view in his  economic work,  with which he wanted to 
correct his moral philosophy. Still holding on to a major change of Smith’s thought expressed by the 
WN is saying that Smith has held two opposing views at the same time, which, as this chapter has 
been trying to show, is mistaken for a number of reasons. Furthermore, in the preface of the TMS’s 
sixth edition, Smith not only announces a major work regarding jurisprudence, he also refers to the 
first edition of the TMS, in which he signals a work on law and government through different ages. 
In the same passage, he states to have partly realised this project in the WN. With the sixth edition 
of the TMS being the last book Smith published, it seems to be more adequate to see the TMS as 
being published after the WN and, in turn, the last testimony of Smith’s thought. The interpretation 
of the WN opposing Smith’s work on moral philosophy, again, appears to simply be mistaken.
Apart  from  this  consistency,  with  which  Smith  maintains  the  themes  of  his  respective  books 
throughout later editions, as well as the announcements of a third major book, the academic project 
of  Smith  is  further  evident  through  the  red  thread  connecting  his  two  works.  “Smith  himself 
obviously saw no great contradiction between his two works, having conceived both of them as part 
of a broader study of the history of morals, government, and law” (Nieli 1986, p. 616). The scope of 
the  TMS  and  the  WN  put  together  encompasses  major  parts  of  history,  moral  philosophy  and 
political economy already. Also, and more importantly, they both can be subsumed under the same 
Smithian  endeavour.  In  all  fields  to  which  he  contributed,  Smith’s  primary  ambition  was  to 
understand and describe the nature of people’s interaction with each other in a society and the 
apparent  tension between our selfish passions and our desire to contribute to the greater  good. 
“Adam Smith's single axiom, broadly interpreted to include the social exchange of goods and favors 
across time, as well as the simultaneous trade of goods for money or other goods, is sufficient to 
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characterize a major portion of the human social and cultural enterprise. It explains why human 
nature appears to be simultaneously self-regarding regarding and other-regarding” (Smith 1998, p. 
3). Moreover, Smith was not finished with this project. He seems to have intended a third treatise to 
complete it. This third work was to examine the nature of jurisprudence. “Smith had stated that his 
grand  intellect  design  was  the  creation  of  three  overlapping  ‘systems’:  the  Theory  [of  Moral 
Sentiments] at one end, the political economy of the Wealth of Nations at the other, and a theory of 
justice that would pull each end into one grand, harmonious system” (Teichgraeber 1981, p. 108). 
Along  with  moral  philosophy,  examined  in  the  TMS,  economics  and  government  of  nations, 
addressed in the WN, he wanted to examine justice and the judiciary system in a third major book. 
This particular project “was probably a treatise on jurisprudence after the manner of Montesquieu; 
but the materials which he had collected for this work were destroyed at his own order shortly 
before his death” (Morrow 1927, p. 324). All three works together would have formed an even more 
multifaceted academic legacy. In addition to sympathy, making interaction between us as moral 
agents possible in the first place by enabling us to imagine ourselves in other’s situations, and the 
nature of self-interest, which expresses our constant drive to improve our situation, justice, as the 
foundation of society, would have completed Smith’s enterprise of explaining all aspects of human 
interaction. The chronology of the works’ publication would also have corresponded to Smith’s 
construct.  “The choice  of  these  particular  principles  and their  subsequent  relationship  — upon 
which the coherence of his entire theory surely relies — is naturally associated with the way in 
which Smith conceived, and described, the human character” (Witzum 1998, p. 494). Justice, in this 
view, consists of the exercise of sympathy. As such, a treatise on it evolves naturally from the TMS, 
in  which  sympathy  is  introduced  and  explained,  in  combination  with  the  WN,  in  which  the 
execution of justice in a nation is depicted. All three endeavours of Smith’s career, of which only 
two were published in his lifetime, not only work together but also build on each other. “Smith’s 
approach to moral philosophy encompassed four realms of thought and action: natural theology, 
ethics, justice (or jurisprudence), and expediency (by which he meant concern for wealth, power, 
and prosperity). The domain of ethics was explored in the Theory of Moral Sentiments; expediency, 
or wealth and associated power, in the Wealth of Nations; and justice was to be the object of another 
discourse” (Samuels 1977, p. 193). It is likely that a work on jurisprudence would have featured a 
strong emphasis on the individual just like his former two did. “If Smith had lived to complete his 
work on jurisprudence we might have seen a similar application of his individualistic principles to 
the subject of law and political institutions” (Morrow 1927, p. 331).
The  Lectures,  published  by  Cannan more  than  a  century  after  Smith’s  death,  allow a  decisive 
rejection of the claim that Smith was, in writing the WN, significantly influenced by the French. 
Being founded upon a student’s notes from lectures in 1763, before Smith left  for France,  and 
containing the clear vision of central themes of the WN, the Lectures credibly link the second of 
Smith’s books to the time preceding his departure for the continent. “The Glasgow Lectures showed 
that many of the main principles of Smith’s economic theory, especially his understanding of the 
division of labor, had in fact been put forward at roughly the same time as his Theory of Moral 
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Sentiments” (Teichgraeber 1981, p. 107). In addition to the division of labour, which makes Book I 
of the WN, other main motives of his later work, such as the description of economic systems and 
the attack on mercantilism in particular, were anticipated in the Lectures as well. “Book IV of The 
Wealth of Nations, like large sections of Smith’s lectures on jurisprudence, is a sequence of strong 
criticisms  of  different  tenets  of  the  commercial  system”  (Rothschild  2006,  p.  338).  Also,  the 
institution of private property, which is constitutional for the market economy Smith describes in 
Book II of the WN, is essentially founded upon the discussion on people’s rights in the Lectures. 
“Smith refers to the natural right of each person to his life and to security against violence, the 
natural right of inheritance, and the natural right to private property” (Grampp 1948, p. 325). The 
essential role of property as the focus of the sovereign’s protection and as the guarantee against 
arbitrary encroachments is depicted clearly. “Till there be property, there can be no government, the 
very end of which is to secure wealth and to defend the rich from the poor” (Smith 1896, p. 15). 
Moreover, the Lectures also anticipate the market regulations Smith suggests in the fifth book of the 
WN. This thought, too, arises from the dealing with natural rights of every person. “The belief that 
each man possesses undeniable rights necessarily implies that he must respect the rights of others 
and that all men together must so arrange their social conduct that each may have what is due 
him” (Grampp 1948, p.  326).  It  is  worth noting that,  additionally to the WN,  the,  at  this point 
already published, TMS is very present in the Lectures as “Smith suggests that sympathy, and yet 
another principle, utility, explain the origin of civil societies” (Witzum 1998, p. 494). By connecting 
jurisprudence closely to his thoughts on political economy as “much of the material that was to 
form  the  core  of  WN  already  occupied  a  significant  place  in  Smith’s  thought  concerning 
jurisprudence”  (Otteson  2000,  p.  52)  while,  at  the  same  time,  containing  and  building  on  his 
remarks  on  moral  philosophy,  the  Lectures  serve  as  a  link,  connecting  not  only  Smith’s  two 
published works but also the third unfinished one. Apart from helping to reject the historic ASP and 
solidifying the picture of Smith’s works as all being part of one academic enterprise, the published 
Lectures therefore also indicate once more the third work Smith announced in editions of the TMS. 
Cannan points this out in his editorial introduction. “Besides thus elucidating the composition of the 
Wealth of Nations,  the lectures serve to settle the (…) question of the nature of Adam Smith’s 
proposed work on Justice” (Cannan 1896, p. xxxi). Cannan even speculated on the stage in which 
Smith had to leave his third book behind. “After the publication of the Wealth of Nations he must 
have had far greater distractions than before, and his official duties at the Board of Customs must 
have  occupied  a  portion  of  his  time”.  In  combination  with  Smith’s  deteriorating  health,  “it  is 
therefore unlikely that the unfinished work ever consisted of very much more than those parts of the 
lectures on Justice which were not incorporated in the Wealth of Nations” (ibid., pp. xxxiii, xxxiv).
The realisation of the strong conjunction, which connects all  of his writings to one legacy and 
consolidates his academic career, did clarify the understanding of Smith as a scholar immensely. 
Especially, the misunderstanding of seeing the TMS and the WN separately and even opposing each 
other distorted the image of Smith and confused scholars as to whether he should be seen as an 
economist  or  as  a  moral  philosopher.  This  puzzlement  was  part  of  what  caused  the  ASP  and 
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contributed to its endurance. The ASP  is mostly rejected today and has ceased to dominate the 
discussion on Smith. However, the exact relationship between Smith’s two works is still debated 
today.  It  has  become  clear  “that  Smith  never  thought  that  benevolence  was  the  sole  or  even 
predominant motive in human action. Smith knew the power of self-interest already in TMS, so its 
appearance in WN  was not new” (Otteson 2000, p.  52).  Nevertheless,  the precise nature of the 
connection between Smith’s two works needs to be examined more closely. So far,  it  has been 
exemplified that his later work is the result of his former, rather than an attempted rectification. 
“The Wealth of Nations develops the story of the twists and turns of material progress in the context 
of  the  lessons  laid  out  in  the  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments  and  his  Lectures  on 
Jurisprudence” (Evensky 2001, p. 505). It now has to be established that the WN is the sequel to the 
TMS in Smith’s greater academic project. Not only does it follow chronologically, it also continues 
the thoughts Smith elaborates in his first book. “Far from there being any clash between the two 
books,  the  later  one  gives  merely  a  particular  development  of  the  broader  doctrine  in  the 
first” (Macfie 1959, p. 223). Seeing the WN as having been intended by Smith as the direct follow-
up  to  the  TMS  is  likely  for  three  reasons.  The  first,  and  most  obvious,  argument  refers  to  a 
continuity expressed by the WN and thereby directly steps in opposition to the theorists defending 
the ASP. According to this view, the WN could not have been written as it completely arises from 
the TMS. In other words, the second work is the application of the first to the field of economics. 
“This  argument maintains that  the ethical  system of  TMS  ‘contains’ the economic argument of 
WN” (Dickey 1986, p. 584). Sympathy, according to this view, is the fundament upon which all 
Smithian thinking is based. Accordingly, the “doctrine of sympathy is a necessary presupposition of 
the doctrine of the natural order expounded in the Wealth of Nations” (Morrow 1927, p. 341). The 
self-interested individual pictured in the WN is an embodiment of the moral agent depicted in the 
TMS.  “Here then we have the picture of the prudent man, of whom homo oeconomnicus  of the 
Wealth of Nations is just the economic facet”. Being a result from Smith’s considerations in the 
TMS, the economic man of the WN behaves and is affected by circumstances exactly as the moral 
agent of Smith’s first book would have been. This not only implies that he strives to sympathise 
with  his  fellows,  it  also  means  that  he  seeks  the  moral  judgement  of  the  informed  Impartial 
Spectator. ”The economic man is the prudent man in the economic sphere. So the economic man 
also  is  under  the  sway  of  social  sympathy  and  the  impartial  rulings  of  the  informed 
spectator” (Macfie 1959, pp. 221, 223). The continuity argument also is in accordance with the view 
of  one  Smithian  project  as,  for  the  proponents  of  this  interpretation,  the  WN  is  the  next  step, 
building on one coherent vision. “Smith’s economic prescriptions were only one dimension of a 
larger  vision  of  societal  improvement.  Pursued  in  isolation  they  cannot  accomplish  his 
goal”  (Evensky  2001,  p.  514).  The  WN,  consequently,  seemingly  has  to  be  seen  as  a  ‘TMS 
continued’. However, “in saying this, the WN is conceptually assimilated back into the TMS”. It 
seems to follow that Smith’s first work already contains every thought he would have brought to 
publication,  had  he  been  given  the  time.  The  TMS  almost  become  a  manifesto  rather  than  a 
contribution to moral philosophy. “The argument for continuity conceptually insists that TMS is the 
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single  ‘motivating  center’ of  Smith’s  thought.  Everything  that  Smith  writes  after  that  is  an 
elaboration of themes developed in that book which is to say that this treatment of the ASP refuses 
to  allow Smith  fundamentally  to  change his  mind about  things”.  Therefore,  it  appears  to  be  a 
somewhat “unhistorical view of Smith as a thinker” (Dickey 1986, pp. 584, 585) and seemingly 
strips him off his academic sovereignty as all his ideas, according to this view, have to be seen as 
being originated in the TMS. A second argument for the WN being the successor of the TMS and the 
next step in the Smithian academic legacy is based on a view opposite to the first argument. It 
focusses on the supposed discontinuity between Smith’s two books. Rather than completely relying 
on the first work, according to this view, the WN  instead represents a new chapter of Smithian 
thought and does not need to carry on where the first  finished in order to be part  of the same 
academic legacy. This view was prominently maintained by Jacob Viner in his 1927 paper Adam 
Smith and Laissez Faire. Here, he states that “the Wealth of Nations was a better book because of its 
partial  breach with  the  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments”.  Connection  of  both  works  is  established 
through lack of continuity and not in spite of it. The TMS as well as the WN see an internal order in 
their respective fields. Either work holds that an agent, “in following his own interests, at the same 
time and without necessarily intending it serves also the general interests of mankind”. However, 
although this seems to be the general thought of both of Smith’s books, the WN raises concerns 
whereas the TMS does not see any need to do so. “In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, this harmony 
(…) is represented as universal and perfect. In the Wealth of Nations, this harmony is represented as 
not extending to all elements of the economic order, and often as partial and imperfect where it does 
extend”. The space Smith uses on the need for market regulations and government interference in 
the WN is to express this slightly more critical approach on individual liberty. Nevertheless, Viner 
appreciates  Smith’s  restrictive  treatment  of  these  regulations  as  well.  “Government  activity  is 
natural and therefore good where it promotes the general welfare, and is an interference with nature 
and therefore bad when it injures the general interests of society” (Viner 1927, pp. 201, 208, 220; 
emphasis added).  This seems to lead Viner to see Smith supplementing his first  work with the 
second  instead  of  replacing  it.  This  way,  the  two  books  can  without  problem  coexist,  both 
contributing to the same academic project with the WN, being a sequel to the TMS and adding to it a 
more refined view on the positive image of  human nature depicted in the previous work.  This 
approach, although it comes to a similar conclusion, stands in contrast to the continuity argument 
examined above by allowing for a discrepancy between the two works. While the continuity view 
connects “the economic argument of WN back into the context of TMS, Viner absorbs the natural 
harmony of interest doctrine of TMS  into WN  and then allows it  to be superseded there as the 
interventionism of  the  mature  Smith  develops”  (Dickey  1986,  p.  586).  Self-interest,  as  shown 
above,  features  heavily  in  both  of  Smith’s  works.  However,  it  can  do  so  without  necessarily 
connecting  both as it “meant to Smith not only the desire for wealth, but self-love in all its possible 
manifestations” (Viner 1927, p. 212). Another difference of the discontinuity view is the different 
perspective,  from which Smith’s  work as  a  whole  is  seen.  While  the continuity  argument  sees 
Smith’s work on political economy as a sequel to his book on moral philosophy because the former 
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arose  from  and  is  already  entailed  in  the  latter,  Viner’s  view  is  the  complete  opposite.  He 
“establishes the WN, not TMS, as the ‘motivating center’ of Smith’s thought” and thereby changes 
the  focus  from  Smith  the  moral  philosopher  to  him  as  an  economist.  This  seems  to  have 
implications on the character of the market regulations proposed by Smith as they are, differently to 
the TMS where regulations are issued to us and enforced by the Impartial Spectator, decreed by the 
government. “The strategy of economic containment has changed also it is no longer nonpolitical 
but is quite specifically political in an interventionist sense” (Dickey 1986, p. 586). One critique 
brought forward against Viner is that his argument for a relation between the two books can be, and 
has  been,  interpreted as  a  defence of  the ASP.  “According to  Viner,  the ethics  book reflects  a 
youthful  idealism  that  is  inconsistent  with  the  mature,  realistic  thought  of  the  great  work  on 
economics” (Raphael 2009, p. 118). The discontinuity argument indeed encourages a view, which 
disconnects the WN from the TMS. Viner therefore seems to support the ASP. “In his earlier work 
Smith was a purely speculative philosopher, reasoning from notions masquerading as self-evident 
verities. In the Wealth of Nations Smith made use of a rich harvest of facts gathered by personal 
observation at home and abroad”. Nevertheless, he does not see Smith as proposing a boundless 
laissez-faire and in that way contrasts from, at least the traditional form of, the ASP. “Smith had 
himself  undermined  what  is  ordinarily  regarded  as  his  principal  argument  for  laissez  faire,  by 
demonstrating that  the natural  order,  when left  to take its  own course,  in many respects works 
against, instead of for, the general welfare” (Viner 1927, pp. 216, 218). Also, instead of holding the 
apparent discrepancy between the TMS and the WN against Smith, Viner seems to incorporate it into 
his argument in order to use it as support for the claim of one Smithian account. The third argument 
endorsing the characterisation of the WN as TMS-sequel  aims at  combining the two views just 
examined. By avoiding confrontation between the arguments of continuity and discontinuity, the 
third  argument  “explains  the  relationship  between the  two books  in  terms of  a  continuity  and 
change argument rather than in terms of a continuity versus change argument” (Dickey 1986, p. 
586). Instead of referring to the respective contents of the two books, this reconciliation argument 
concentrates on a chronological context. “The TMS and the WN are taken as complementary for 
historical rather than logical reasons”. Such a fresh change of perspective has implications for the 
role of Smith as the creator of the books. Not only leaves it “two ‘motivating centers’ for Smith’s 
thought” and thereby agrees with the discontinuity argument, the reconciliation view also minimises 
the sovereignty of the author in general. Sympathy, according to this interpretation, simply evolved 
historically  into  a  market-economic,  somewhat  contractualist  concept  of  human  interaction. 
Following this, the WN is a result of Smith’s adaptation to a change in academic fashion rather than 
a product of genuine thought. The reconciliation argument seems to have “historicized the ASP” but 
“has not tried to solve it as a conceptual problem” (ibid., p. 587). It seems to arrange the two works 
by Smith instead of effectively engaging in attacking the ASP by interpreting the content of Smith’s 
works and their relation to each other. 
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VI. Conclusion
This thesis has endeavoured to give a comprehensive picture of Smith’s legacy. Explaining the 
messages of his two major works and the various inspirations, which went into them, it has been 
shown how they both are part of the same academic project. Smith builds the whole construct of his 
scholarly  accomplishment  on  his  unique  understanding  of  sympathy,  which  he  lines  out  very 
elaborately in his first work, the TMS, which is subject of chapter II of this thesis. It also explained 
how Smith manages to combine in the notion of sympathy the ability and motivation to interact 
with  other  moral  agents  in  society.  We are  able  to  interact  with  others  because  the  faculty  of 
sympathy  enables  us  to  understand  and  morally  evaluate  their  perspectives.  Our  motivation  to 
engage in this interaction is also derived from sympathy, as we need the consistent social exchange 
with peers to develop the capability to sympathise and the only way to reach that level of contact is 
through the exercise of sympathy itself. Additionally, we can, through sympathising with others, 
enter their perspective in a way that allows us to see ourselves through their eyes. Thereby, we reach 
a level of self-reflection unattainable to us without sympathy. “The logic of Smith’s position is just 
this: before I can judge, I must feel” (Wilson 2006, p. 266), and this seems to hold true for the moral 
evaluation  of  other’s  as  well  as  our  own.  Through  sympathy,  Smith  introduces  the  figurative 
character of the Impartial Spectator. This virtual moral judge, which was the subject of chapter III 
of this thesis, is pivotal for Smith on the way to sustainable moral conduct. He develops this moral 
authority in three stages, which all rely on his understanding of sympathy. From understanding and 
entering the perspectives of other people to internalising the entirely unbiased vantage point of the 
Impartial  Spectator,  Smith gradually  leads us  as  moral  agents  through a  learning process.  This 
development includes the temporary reliance on moral rules helping us to maintain morally right 
behaviour. The third chapter also showed the essential role of praiseworthiness in Smith’s moral 
philosophy, consisting of virtuous behaviour and the self-command required to overcome vices. By 
illustrating the nature of praiseworthiness, especially the way he separates it from actual praise, it 
was demonstrated how Smith sees it  as the only criterion the Impartial Spectator uses to judge 
morally. This thesis’ fourth chapter turned to Smith’s second work, the WN and set out to briefly 
summarise the very comprehensive treatise on European economic history. The approach of Smith’s 
second book was described by exemplifying different main topics of the book. “Economic life, for 
Smith, was intricately interconnected with the rest of life, or with the life of politics, sentiment, and 
imagination” (Rothschild 2006, p. 319). In addition to the messages of the WN, the notion of the 
Invisible Hand, for which Smith became known particularly throughout the twentieth century, was 
discussed with a view to its importance for the work as a whole. The topic of the fifth chapter was 
Das  Adam  Smith  Problem.  It  was  shown  how  the  ASP  developed  historically  and  still  is,  in 
alternated  forms,  championed  in  contemporary  literature.  The  fifth  chapter  also  illustrated  the 
fundamental mistakes, which the ASP seems to be based upon, and explained in more detail the 
nature and sources of those misconceptions. Throughout this thesis, a cohesive account of Smith’s 
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thinking has been developed, combining his two works by showing that, instead of contradicting 
each other, they can express Smith’s message only if they are seen together. The mistake of the ASP 
theorists was to read them separately. This wrong approach can be partly excused by the fact that , 
since the defenders  of  the ASP  were mostly  German economists,  their  access  to  the TMS  was 
hindered by a language barrier as well as a lack of competence in moral philosophy. However, the 
scope and persistency of the misconception and the complete absence of similar interpretations in 
England deem it  a  significant  academic blunder.  In  uncovering the  common thread,  this  thesis 
refuted the ASP and demonstrated that Smith created one unified account in both of his publications. 
This claim was supported in recourse to the historical background of Smith’s ideas in TMS and WN 
as well as their implicit reference to each other. Smith’s intention to publish a third major work, 
focussing on the nature of justice, was examined as further evidence for an overall academic project 
he was pursuing. In a nutshell, Smith’s message can be summarised as the conviction that the self-
interested conduct of moral agents serves society in its entirety. As our aim is not primarily to be 
praised but first  of all  being worthy of praise,  we are highly incentivised to behave virtuously. 
Consequently, other’s interests are naturally incorporated into our own. “Ethical individuals live in 
perfect harmony and realize, through their autonomous efforts, the best for themselves and in turn 
the greatest possible wealth for the nation” (Evensky 2001, p. 505). His positive view of human 
nature, built on our desire to sympathise with one another, made Smith a strong believer in the 
individual moral agent. He opposes the sovereigns of nations and the ruling classes of societies 
respectively, which dominate the lives of their subjects by imposing extensive regulations on them. 
However, neither does he defend an anarchic situation, in which every person’s self-interest will 
eventually resolve all kinds of challenges and injustices. Rather, he proposed a strong government 
as the basis for individual liberty. “Adam Smith was not a doctrinaire advocate of laissez faire. He 
saw a wide and elastic range of activity for government, and he was prepared to extend it even 
farther if government, by improving its standards of competence, honesty, and public spirit, showed 
itself entitled to wider responsibilities” (Viner 1927, p. 231). His concise message was that each of 
us has a strong interest in benefitting others and society as a whole. Thereby, rather than being a 
burden, contributing to the public good becomes what should be the motivating aim of every self-
interested individual. “Smith’s aim was to show that removing arbitrary restrictions on labor, prices, 
and supply would give self-interest free reign and bring about universal opulence” (Mehta 2006, p. 
249). Out of this account arose his, sometimes controversial and very modern, opinions on how to 
best govern a nation in general and deal with the American colonies as a particular example.
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